וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן עוֹר וּבָשָׂר וּפֶרֶשׁ, מַה לְּהַלָּן עַל יְדֵי נִיתּוּחַ שֶׁלֹּא בְּהֶפְשֵׁט – אַף כָּאן עַל יְדֵי נִיתּוּחַ שֶׁלֹּא בְּהֶפְשֵׁט.

And it is stated below, with regard to the bull sin offerings that are burned, the terms skin, flesh, and dung, in the verse: “But the skin of the bull, and all its flesh, with its head, and with its legs, and its innards, and its dung” (Leviticus 4:11). Just as below it is prepared for burning by means of cutting it into pieces but not by means of flaying, as derived by the verbal analogy, so too here it is prepared for burning by means of cutting it into pieces but not by means of flaying. Evidently, a halakha derived via a verbal analogy can then teach another halakha via a verbal analogy.

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה הֶיקֵּשׁ שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ, אִי מִדְּרָבָא אִי מִדְּרָבִינָא – מְלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר, מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל; גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה הַמְלַמֶּדֶת בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ, מִדְּרַב פַּפָּא – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר?

§ The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: That question itself can be answered with an a fortiori inference: And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a matter derived via a verbal analogy, which can teach its halakha via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rav Pappa (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference?

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ דְּרַב פַּפָּא, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַב פַּפָּא מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara clarifies: This works out well according to the one who accepts the statement of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept the statement of Rav Pappa, i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, what is there to say?

אֶלָּא קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה הֶיקֵּשׁ שֶׁאֵין מְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ, אִי מִדְּרָבָא אִי מִדְּרָבִינָא – מְלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר, מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל; גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה הַמְלַמֶּדֶת בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה חֲבֵירְתָּהּ, מִדְּרָמִי בַּר חָמָא – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר?

Rather, this can be derived through a different a fortiori inference: And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a matter derived via a verbal analogy, which can teach its halakha via another verbal analogy, as proven from the statement of Rami bar Ḥama (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference?

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּבִנְיַן אָב? תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its halakha to another matter via a paradigm? The question shall stand unresolved.

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמַה גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ לְמֵדָה בְּהֶיקֵּשָׁא, מִדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – מְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ, מִדְּרַב פַּפָּא; קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַלָּמֵד מֵהֶיקֵּשׁ, מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ?

§ The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via a juxtaposition? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an a fortiori inference: And just as a halakha derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha to another matter via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rav Pappa (50a), with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via a juxtaposition?

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ דְּרַב פַּפָּא, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַב פַּפָּא מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara clarifies: This works out well according to the one who accepts the statement of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept the statement of Rav Pappa, i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, what is there to say? The Gemara comments: The question shall stand unresolved.

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמַה גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ לְמֵידָה בְּהֶיקֵּשָׁא, מִדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – מְלַמֵּד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה, מִדְּרָמִי בַּר חָמָא; קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ, מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתְּלַמֵּד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה?

The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an a fortiori inference. And just as a halakha derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy, as proven from the statement of Rami bar Ḥama (50a), with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via a verbal analogy?

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמַה גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ לְמֵידָה בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ, מִדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – מְלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר, כְּדַאֲמַרַן; קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַלָּמֵד מֵהֶיקֵּשׁ, מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר?

The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an a fortiori inference. And just as a halakha derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference, as we have said, with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference?

וְזֶהוּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר בֶּן קַל וָחוֹמֶר. בֶּן בְּנוֹ שֶׁל קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא!

The Gemara comments: And this is an a fortiori inference that is the son of, i.e., is derived from, another a fortiori inference. The Gemara challenges this last statement: It is not the son of an a fortiori inference, but the grandson of an a fortiori inference, halakha via an a fortiori inference is itself derived from an a fortiori inference, as the Gemara stated.

אֶלָּא קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה הֶיקֵּשׁ שֶׁאֵינוֹ לָמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ, אִי מִדְּרָבָא אִי מִדְּרָבִינָא – מְלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר, מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל; קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַלָּמֵד מֵהֶיקֵּשׁ, מִדְּתָנֵי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר? וְזֶהוּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר בֶּן קַל וָחוֹמֶר.

Rather, the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference can be derived via another a fortiori inference. And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot be derived via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference? The Gemara comments: And this is an a fortiori inference that is the son of another a fortiori inference.

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּבִנְיַן אָב? אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, תָּא שְׁמַע: מָלַק וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה בְּבֵית הַבְּלִיעָה, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מְטַמְּאָה בְּבֵית הַבְּלִיעָה.

The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via a paradigm? Rabbi Yirmeya says: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (69a–b): If a priest pinched the nape of a bird offering properly and it was then found to be a bird with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ], which disqualifies it from being used as an offering and renders it prohibited for consumption by the priests, Rabbi Meir says: An olive-bulk of its meat does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat, as is the halakha concerning a bird carcass, as the fact that it underwent pinching means that it is not in the category of a carcass. Rabbi Yehuda says: Its status is like that of any other carcass of a kosher bird, and its meat renders one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat.

אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: קַל וָחוֹמֶר, וּמַה נִּבְלַת בְּהֵמָה שֶׁמְּטַמְּאָה בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא – שְׁחִיטָתָהּ מְטַהֶרֶת טְרֵיפָתָהּ מִטּוּמְאָתָהּ, נְבֵילַת עוֹף שֶׁאֵין מְטַמָּא בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתְּהֵא שְׁחִיטָתָהּ מְטַהֶרֶת טְרֵיפָתָהּ מִטּוּמְאָתָהּ? מַה מָּצִינוּ בִּשְׁחִיטָה שֶׁמַּכְשַׁרְתָּהּ בַּאֲכִילָה

The mishna continues: Rabbi Meir said: My opinion can be proved via an a fortiori inference. And just as with regard to the carcass of an animal, which transmits impurity to a person through touching it and carrying it, its slaughter nevertheless purifies its tereifa from its impurity, with regard to the carcass of a bird, which possesses less severe impurity, as it does not transmit impurity through touching it and carrying it, but only when it is in the throat, is it not logical that its slaughter purifies its tereifa from its impurity? And once it is established that slaughter purifies a bird that is a tereifa , it can be derived: Just as we found with regard to a bird’s slaughter that it permits it for consumption