מַה לְּתוֹדָה שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנָה לֶחֶם!

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a thanks offering? It is unique in that it requires a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.

עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים יוֹכִיחוּ. וְחָזַר הַדִּין, לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁהֵן קֳדָשִׁים, וּשְׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כָּשֵׁר וְאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה, אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם שֶׁהוּא קֹדֶשׁ, וּשְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – כָּשֵׁר וְאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה.

The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering and a peace offering can prove the point, as loaves are not brought with them. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering and a peace offering, is not like the aspect of that case, a thanks offering, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate God. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha , as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but does not propitiate God.

מַה לְּהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן שֶׁהֵן בָּאִין בְּנֵדֶר וּבִנְדָבָה!

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about the common element of a thanks offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering? It is unique in that these offerings are brought either as a vow offering or as a gift offering, whereas a guilt offering is brought only to fulfill an obligation.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה״ וגו׳ – הִקִּישׁוֹ הַכָּתוּב לִשְׁלָמִים, מַה שְּׁלָמִים שֶׁהֵן קֳדָשִׁים, וּשְׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשֵׁרִים וְאֵין מְרַצִּין, אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם שֶׁהוּא קוֹדֶשׁ כו׳.

Rather, Rava says: The verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37), juxtaposes a guilt offering with a peace offering, indicating that just as peace offerings are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate, so too, I shall include a guilt offering, as it is an offering, and therefore if it is slaughtered not for its sake, although it is fit, it does not satisfy the obligation of its owner.

מַאי חָזֵית דְאַקַּשְׁתְּ לִשְׁלָמִים, אַקֵּישׁ לְחַטָּאת!

The Gemara asks: What did you see, i.e., why do you think it is reasonable, that you compared a guilt offering to a peace offering? Why not compare it to a sin offering, which is disqualified in such a case?

הָא מִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא: ״אוֹתָהּ״.

The Gemara answers: The Merciful One excluded all other offerings from the halakha concerning a sin offering in this matter, as derived from the verse: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33).

(סִימָן: הנ״ש בש״ר).

The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the amora’im who participated in the two following discussions: Heh , nun , shin ; beit , shin , reish .

יָתֵיב רַב הוּנָא וְרַב נַחְמָן, וְיָתֵיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָשָׁם דְּלָא אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה – לֵימָא לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אָשָׁם נַמִי אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה!

Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman were sitting, and Rav Sheshet was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: Reish Lakish raised his difficulty with regard to a guilt offering, since it is not brought after its owner’s death. Let Rabbi Elazar say to him that a guilt offering is also essentially brought after its owner’s death, since it is sold once it develops a blemish, and the proceeds are used to buy a burnt offering.

אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אָשָׁם לְמַאי קָרֵב – לְמוֹתָרוֹ, חַטָּאת נַמִי מִיקְרַב קָרְבָה מוֹתָרָהּ!

Rav Sheshet said to them: This claim can be refuted: What element of a guilt offering is sacrificed after its owner’s death? Only its remainder, i.e., the money from its sale that is used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed. And if so, it is no different from a sin offering, the remainder of which is also sacrificed, and a sin offering itself is entirely disqualified if slaughtered not for its sake.

חַטָּאת, אַף עַל גַּב דְּקָרְבָה מוֹתָרָהּ – מִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא ״הוּא״.

Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman explained: A sin offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified even though its remainder is sacrificed, because the Merciful One specifically excludes a sin offering from being a fit offering if sacrificed not for its own sake, as derived from the verse: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The redundant phrase “it is a sin offering” teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if sacrificed not for its own sake.

אָשָׁם נַמִי, כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״הוּא״!

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it also written with regard to a guilt offering: “And the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar for an offering made by fire unto the Lord; it is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5)? Why is a guilt offering not disqualified when it is slaughtered not for its sake?

הַהוּא לְאַחַר הַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִים הוּא דִּכְתִיב; כִּדְתַנְיָא: אֲבָל אָשָׁם לֹא נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר הַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִין, וְהוּא עַצְמוֹ אִם לֹא הִקְטִירוּ אֵימוּרִין – כָּשֵׁר.

The Gemara answers: That verse is written not with regard to the main sacrificial rites, but with regard to the stage after the burning of the offering’s sacrificial portions on the altar, as it is taught in a baraita : But with regard to a guilt offering, the term “It is a guilt offering” is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the guilt offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.

וְאֶלָּא ״הוּא״ לָמָּה לִי? לְכִדְרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: אָשָׁם שֶׁנִּיתַּק לִרְעִיָּה וּשְׁחָטוֹ סְתָם – כָּשֵׁר;

The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term “It is a guilt offering” to be stated at all? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to a guilt offering whose owner died or whose transgression was otherwise atoned for, and that was therefore consigned by the court to grazing until it develops a blemish so that it can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a burnt offering, if, before it developed a blemish, someone slaughtered it without specification of its purpose, it is fit as a burnt offering.

נִיתַּק – אִין, לֹא נִיתַּק – לָא, מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״הוּא״ – בַּהֲוָויָיתוֹ יְהֵא.

The Gemara infers: If it was consigned to grazing, yes, it is fit as a burnt offering if slaughtered. By inference, if it was not consigned to grazing, it is not fit. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “It is a guilt offering,” indicating that it shall remain as it is, i.e., as a guilt offering, unless it is consigned by the court to fulfill another purpose.

יָתְבִי רַב נַחְמָן וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת, וְיָתֵיב רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתָּנָה גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: הָא דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מָצִינוּ בַּבָּאִין לְאַחַר מִיתָה שֶׁהֵן כְּשֵׁרִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין – לֵימָא לֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הָנְהוּ נַמִי לַיְיתוּ וְלִירַצּוּ!

§ Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet were sitting, and Rav Adda bar Mattana was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: In response to that which Rabbi Elazar said to Reish Lakish: We have found a precedent for this situation in the case of offerings that are brought after their owners’ death, as they are fit but they do not propitiate God, let Reish Lakish say to him: These offerings should also be brought and propitiate God with regard to the heirs. Why did Reish Lakish not challenge Rabbi Elazar’s assumption?

אֲמַר לָהֶן רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתָּנָה: יוֹלֶדֶת, אִם הִיא יָלְדָה, בָּנֶיהָ מִי יָלְדוּ?

Rav Adda bar Mattana said to them: How can the offering of a woman after childbirth propitiate God after her death? If she gave birth, did her children give birth?

מַתְקִיף לָהּ רַב אַסִי: וּמַאן לֵימָא לָן דְּאִי אִיכָּא כַּמָּה עֲשֵׂה גַּבָּהּ לָא מִיתְכַּפְּרָא? וְכֵיוָן דְּכִי אִיכָּא כַּמָּה עֲשֵׂה גַּבָּהּ מִיכַּפְּרָא – יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ נַמִי מִיכַּפַּר.

Rav Asi objects to this reasoning: And who shall say to us that if a woman has several violations of positive mitzvot for which to atone, she does not atone by means of the burnt offering she brings after childbirth for her purification? Clearly, such offerings can atone for transgressions other than those for which they are brought. And since, when she has several violations of positive mitzvot she atones by means of the offering, so too, if she dies, her heirs atone by this offering for their own violations of positive mitzvot.

לְמֵימְרָא דְּקַנְיָא לְהוּ? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִנִּיחַ מִנְחָה לִשְׁנֵי בָנָיו וּמֵת – קְרֵיבָה, וְאֵין בּוֹ שׁוּתָּפוּת; וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ קַנְיָא לְהוּ, ״נֶפֶשׁ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא.

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the offering is acquired by the heirs, and this is why it atones for their transgressions? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that if one left his two sons a meal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and it does not have the status of a meal offering brought in partnership? And if it enters your mind that the offering is acquired by the heirs, it should be considered a meal offering brought in partnership, which is unfit, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And when one brings a meal offering unto the Lord” (Leviticus 2:1). The word “one” teaches that two people cannot bring a meal offering together. Clearly, the heirs do not inherit the offering, and if so, it should not atone for their transgressions.

וְלָא קַנְיָא לְהוּ? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִנִּיחַ בְּהֵמָה לִשְׁנֵי בָנָיו וּמֵת – קְרֵיבָה, וְאֵין מְמִירִין בָּהּ; אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא קַנְיָא לְהוּ – הַיְינוּ דְּאֵין מְמִירִין בָּהּ, דְּהָוְיָא לְהוּ כְּשׁוּתָּפִין,

The Gemara asks: And is the offering not acquired by them? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say that if one left his two sons an animal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it? Even if they declare another animal to be a substitute for it, that animal is not consecrated. Granted, if you say that the offering is acquired by them, this is the reason that they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it: It is because they are like partners,