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Zevahim
Daf 31bהָא לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל דּוּמְיָא דְּלֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר, וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי – בִּשְׁנֵי בְנֵי אָדָם – מִצְטָרֵף, שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ.
It can be inferred that if one had intent to eat and to eat in a manner similar to a case of intent to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk; Abaye interjects: And what are the circumstances of such a case? It is a case with two people, i.e., where each one will consume half an olive-bulk. Abaye continues with the conclusion of his statement: Then the two halves join together.
RASHI
הא לאכול ולאכול לשנים דומיא דלאכול ולהקטיר שאין זית שלם לאוכל אחד מצטרף:
TOSAFOT
הא לאכול ולאכול דומיא דלאכול ולהקטיר מצטרף וא"ת דלמא לעולם לא יצטרף ואתא למידק דלאכול ולאכול בחד גברא מצטרף ואפי' ביתר מכדי אכילת פרס וכן בתר הכי דדייק אביי דלאכול ולאכול ביתר מכדי אכילת פרס מצטרף מדקתני לאכול ולהקטיר דלמא אתא למידק דלאכול ולאכול בשני בנ"א מצטרף ויש לומר דדייק מדתלי טעמא שאין הקטרה ואכילה מצטרפין משום דהאי אכילה והאי הקטרה הא אי חשיבא הקטרה כאכילה הוה מצטרף (אי חשיבא הקטרה) אע"ג דהוי כעין שני בני אדם וביתר מכדי אכילת פרס:
בָּעֵי רָבָא: חִישֵּׁב לֶאֱכוֹל כַּזַּיִת בְּיָתֵר מִכְּדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס, מַהוּ? לַאֲכִילַת גָּבוֹהַּ מְדַמִּינַן לֵיהּ, אוֹ לַאֲכִילַת הֶדְיוֹט מְדַמִּינַן לֵיהּ?
Rava raises a dilemma: If one had intent to eat an olive-bulk in more than the period of time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread,
RASHI
ביתר מכדי אכילת פרס לשהות בין תחילת אכילתו לסופה יותר מכדי אכילת פרס דאילו גבי כל איסורים שבתורה קיימא לן דלא הויא אכילה הכא מאי:
לאכילת גבוה מדמינן לה דהא איתקוש לענין מחשבה אכילת גבוה ואכילת אדם בהדי הדדי ואכילת גבוה אף ביותר מכדי אכילת פרס היא פעמים שאינו ממהר לשרוף:
TOSAFOT
ביתר מכדי אכילת פרס מהו וא"ת לוכח מדתנן חצי זית בחוץ חצי זית למחר פסול וי"ל דדלמא בלהקטיר אע"ג דרישא קתני לאכול כזית בחוץ כזית למחר שמא בבא דחצי זית מיירי בלהקטיר דווקא:
אֲמַר אַבַּיֵי, תָּא שְׁמַע: לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין. טַעְמָא דְּלֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר, הָא לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל – מִצְטָרֵף; וְהָא הַקְטָרָה בְּיוֹתֵר מִכְּדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס הוּא!
Abaye said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together. One may infer that the reason the offering is fit is that he had intent to eat and to burn the offering. But if he had intent to eat half an olive-bulk at the normal rate and to eat half an olive-bulk in the time it takes to burn half an olive-bulk, the two would join together. But the burning of an olive-bulk of an offering can take more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. It therefore seems that there is no upper limit on the time in which one is considered to have consumed an offering.
RASHI
ה"ג לאכול ולאכול דומיא דלהקטיר מצטרף והיכי דמי יותר מכדי אכילת פרס לאכול חצי זית ולחזור ולאכול חצי זית ובין זה לזה יותר מכדי אכילת פרס דומיא דהקטרה מצטרף:
דִּלְמָא בְּהֶיסֵּק גָּדוֹל.
The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps the mishna is referring to intent to burn half an olive-bulk in a large fire, which can consume it in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. Accordingly, one may draw the inference only with regard to a case where his intent was to consume the halves of an olive-bulk within this time.
RASHI
דלמא האי להקטיר דקתני בהיסק גדול קאמר ודכוותה דוקא לאכול ולאכול דמצטרף:
״לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת – כָּשֵׁר״. טַעְמָא דְּלֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר, הָא לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל – מִצְטָרֵף.
§ The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the animal with intent to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit. The Gemara infers: The reason that the two halves of an olive-bulk do not join together is because his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk. But if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk of the meat and to eat half an olive-bulk of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, then the halves do join together and disqualify the offering, as both intentions concern eating.
RASHI
ה"ג מתני' לאכול כחצי זית כו' טעמא דלאכול ולהקטיר כו' דבר שאין דרכו לאכול כי האי להקטיר דמתני' דקמיירי (הא) באימורים:
הָא קָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: לֶאֱכוֹל אֶת שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל (מִצְטָרֵף); אֶת שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל – אִין, שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ – לָא!
The Gemara notes an apparent contradiction: But the first clause of the mishna teaches: If one’s intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, beyond its designated time, his intent joins together to disqualify the offering. One can infer that only if his intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, does his intent join together, but if his intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not to partake of it, then it does not join together.
RASHI
הא קתני רישא זה הכלל כל השוחט והמקבל לאכול דבר שדרכו לאכול כו' אלמא מאכילת מזבח לאדם לאו מחשבה היא:
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ וּמֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לַאֲכִילַת אָדָם. דִּתְנַן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר – כָּשֵׁר, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל.
Rabbi Yirmeya says: In accordance with whose opinion is this latter clause? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: One can have intent to shift an item’s consumption from consumption by a person to consumption by the altar, or from consumption by the altar to consumption by a person. As we learned in another mishna (35a): In the case of one who slaughters the offering with intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not to partake of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is fit, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit.
RASHI
הא מני הך סיפא דאיצטריך למיתני אין אכילה והקטרה מצטרפין רבי אליעזר היא:
לאכול דבר שאין דרכו לאכול [דהיינו] אימורין וחישב עליו חוץ למקומו או חוץ לזמנו:
אַבַּיֵי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן; וְלָא תֵּימָא: הָא לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, אֶלָּא אֵימָא: הָא לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל.
Abaye says: You may even say that the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And do not say that one should infer from the mishna that if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk of an item normally consumed and to eat half an olive-bulk of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, then the offering is disqualified. Rather, say that one infers that if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to eat another half an olive-bulk, both halves from an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, then the halves join together to disqualify the offering.
RASHI
אלא אימא הא לאכול ולאכול דבר שדרכו לאכול הכי דוק מיניה אכילה והקטרה אין מצטרפין לפגל הא לאכול ולאכול דבר שדרכו לאכול מצטרף ואע"ג דחשיב לחצאין:
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן? אִי דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן – מֵרֵישָׁא שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר – פָּסוּל, הָא כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר – פִּיגּוּל!
The Gemara asks: If so, what is this latter clause teaching us? If it teaches us that two half olive-bulks from an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, join together, one can already learn this from the first clause of the mishna: If one has intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, the offering is disqualified. One can infer that if his intent was to eat the first half an olive-bulk the next day, the offering would be rendered piggul .
RASHI
ומאי קמ"ל הך סיפא אי לאו למידק מיניה הא לאכול ולאכול דבר שאין דרכו לאכול דומיא דלהקטיר מאי קמשמע לן למה לי למתני אי לאכול ולאכול דבר שדרכו לאכול קא משמע לן כדקאמרת דמחשבת חצאין מצטרפת מרישא שמעת מינה:
TOSAFOT
ומאי קמ"ל אי לאכול ולאכול שדרכן לאכול כו' תימה טובא קמ"ל כדדייק אביי גופיה לעיל לאכול ולאכול בשני בני אדם וביתר מכדי אכילת פרס:
אֶלָּא אִי לֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר – מִדּוּקְיָא דְּרֵישָׁא שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל – אִין, שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל – לָא;
But if one will say that this term teaches its literal meaning, that intentions to eat and to burn two halves of an olive-bulk do not join together, one can already learn this from the inference drawn above from the first clause of the mishna, namely that intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it does disqualify the offering, but intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it does not. By extension, intent to consume half an olive-bulk of such an item does not join to disqualify the offering.
RASHI
ואי לאכול ולהקטיר כלומר ואי היא גופה קא אתא לאשמועינן דאין אכילה והקטרה מצטרפת ולאו לדיוקא דילה אתאי:
מדיוקא דרישא שמע מינה דקתני לאכול דבר שדרכו לאכול הויא מחשבה אבל לאכול דבר שאין דרכו לאכול לא הוי מחשבה ש"מ דאם חישב לאכול חצי זית בשר וחצי זית אימורים לא מצטרפי וכל שכן לאכול חצי זית בשר ולהקטיר חצי זית אימורין דלא מצטרפי:
הָשְׁתָּא וּמָה לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל – לָא מִצְטָרֵף, לֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר מִיבָּעֵי?
Now, consider the following: And just as if when one has intent to partake of an item normally eaten and to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, his intentions do not join together, even though both intentions concern consumption, is it necessary for the mishna to teach that intentions to consume and to burn do not join together? The last clause therefore seems unnecessary.
RASHI
השתא ומה לאכול ולאכול לא מצטרפי בשר ואימורים לאכול ולהקטיר מיבעיא:
לֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר אִיצְטְרִיךְ; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמִינָא: הָתָם הוּא דְּלָאו כִּי אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָא מְחַשֵּׁב, אֲבָל הָכָא דִּבְהַאי כִּי אוֹרְחֵיהּ וּבְהַאי כִּי אוֹרְחֵיהּ – אֵימָא לִיצְטָרֵף, קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן. הדרן עלך כל הזבחים שקבלו דמן
The Gemara responds: It was necessary for the mishna to explicitly address the case where one had intent to eat and to burn, as it might enter your mind to say that it is only there, where one’s intentions are referring solely to consumption, that they do not join together, since he has intent to act in a way that is not consistent with its typical manner and consume an item not normally consumed. But here, where his intent is to both eat and burn the offering, such that with regard to this half he intends to act in a way consistent with its typical manner, and with regard to that half he intends to act in a way consistent with its typical manner, one might say that they should join together. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that intentions to eat and to burn do not join together.
RASHI
התם כי חישב לאכול אימורים הוא דלא מצטרף בהדי אכילת בשר משום דלאו כי אורחיה קמחשב אבל לאכול בשר ולהקטיר אימורין דבהאי כי אורחיה קמחשב כו' קמ"ל:
SUMMARY
This chapter clarified the primary halakhot pertaining to the disqualification of offerings due to improper actions or unfit people. The chapter did not address the varying severity of these disqualifications, some of which carry the penalty of death at the hand of Heaven, others lashes, and some which carry no punishment at all. Unfit people may be those inherently unfit to perform the service, e.g., a non-priest, a blemished priest, and an uncircumcised priest. Alternatively, their lack of fitness may be contingent on a temporary circumstance, as in the case of an acute mourner, an impure priest, one for whom the sun has not yet set after his immersion, one who still lacks atonement after his immersion, one who has not washed his hands and feet, or one who drank wine. Still others may disqualify the offering by dint of their actions, e.g., one sitting, standing on anything other than the Temple floor, or performing a rite with his left hand. Through all such acts, the offering is disqualified, but mere intent to perform any of them does not in itself disqualify the offering. The Gemara explained several halakhot concerning the priestly vestments, the Basin in the Temple, the water it contains, and the matter of washing from it. Its primary conclusions are that the Basin is considered a service vessel whose contents are disqualified by being left overnight, and that washing from it is in many ways similar to a sacrificial rite. The second major topic covered in the chapter concerned intentions to consume an offering beyond its designated time and outside its designated area, both of which disqualify the offering, and the former of which renders it piggul as well. These intentions can arise at any point during the four sacrificial rites of the service, but both can refer only to the eating of an olive-bulk of meat, the sprinkling of sufficient blood to sprinkle, or the burning of an olive-bulk of the offering’s sacrificial portions. Although improper intentions with regard to eating and burning the offering both disqualify it, they cannot join together to complete the requisite measure of an olive-bulk. Furthermore, an offering can be rendered piggul only if its service, aside from the intent of piggul, was performed properly. If there were additional improper intentions or actions, the offering is disqualified but it is not rendered piggul.
INTRO
And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord, and Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present the blood, and sprinkle the blood roundabout against the altar that is at the door of the Tent of Meeting. (Leviticus 1:5)
This chapter supplements the preceding chapter. While the previous chapter discussed individuals whose performance of the sacrificial rites renders those rites not valid and intentions that disqualify offerings, this chapter examines the exceptions to those halakhot. This includes cases in which individuals unfit to perform the Temple service do not render the offering unfit with their service, as well as cases in which improper intent does not disqualify an offering. Three primary topics are addressed in this chapter, the first of which is the slaughter of the offering. Although the slaughter of an offering is one of the indispensable sacrificial rites, it may be performed by non-priests. The chapter enumerates the halakhot that pertain to slaughter performed by an individual unfit to perform the other sacrificial rites, including the technicalities of its performance, especially with regard to a ritually impure individual for whom it is prohibited to enter the Temple courtyard to slaughter the offering. The second issue that is explored is the status of the later sacrificial rites, associated with the blood, that were performed by an individual unfit for the Temple service. Such rites can occasionally be rectified and redone properly, thereby preventing the offering from being rendered not valid. The chapter will discuss the specifics of this halakha, what can be corrected, and what cannot be. The third issue analyzed in the chapter is that of improper intent with regard to the place and time of the offering. Various questions are raised in this context: Do all intentions to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated time render the offering piggul? Likewise, do all intentions to sacrifice or partake of the offering outside its designated area render the offering not valid? The chapter also discusses the halakha in situations where one had intent to perform other aspects of the sacrificial rites improperly. The clarification of these issues, the presentation of the various differing opinions, and the citation of their biblical sources are the main topics of this chapter.
מתני׳ כָּל הַפְּסוּלִין שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה. שֶׁהַשְּׁחִיטָה כְּשֵׁרָה בְּזָרִים, וּבְנָשִׁים, וּבַעֲבָדִים, וּבִטְמֵאִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּקָדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיוּ טְמֵאִים נוֹגְעִין בַּבָּשָׂר. לְפִיכָךְ הֵן פּוֹסְלִין בְּמַחֲשָׁבָה.
With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered