אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – תְּנֵהוּ לְעִנְיַן חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ; וּמִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא גַּבֵּי נוֹתָר ״וְאֹכְלָיו עֲוֹנוֹ יִשָּׂא״ – לְמַעוּטֵי חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ.

Therefore, if the verse is not referring to the matter of intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, apply it to the matter of intent to consume it outside its designated area. And as for the punishment of karet , the Merciful One restricted it to the prohibition of notar , i.e., actually partaking of the offering beyond its designated time, as the verse states: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 19:8). This indicates that one is liable to receive karet for partaking of notar , to the exclusion of intent to consume the offering outside its designated area.

וְאֵימָא: ״וְאֹכְלָיו עֲוֹנוֹ יִשָּׂא״ – זֶהוּ חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וּלְמַעוּטֵי נוֹתָר מִכָּרֵת!

The Gemara asks: But why not say instead that when the verse states: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,” this is referring to intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, and the verse serves to exclude notar from the penalty of karet ?

מִסְתַּבְּרָא נוֹתָר הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְאוֹקְמֵי בְּכָרֵת, לְמִגְמַר ״עֲוֹן״ ״עֲוֹן״ לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ בְּז״ב.

The Gemara responds: It stands to reason that notar should be interpreted as carrying the penalty of karet , because this would allow one to derive by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” stated with regard to the case of intent to consume the meat beyond its designated time, that the punishment of karet applies to the latter as well. The verbal analogy would be apt since one prohibition is similar to the other in that they share features that form the acronym zayin , beit : Both concern the offering’s designated time [ zeman ], and both are applicable to an offering sacrificed on a private altar [ bama ].

אַדְּרַבָּה, חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְאוֹקְמֵי בְּכָרֵת, לְמִגְמַר ״עֲוֹן״ ״עֲוֹן״ לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ בְּמקד״ש!

The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, intent to consume the offering outside its designated area should be interpreted as carrying the penalty of karet , because this would allow one to derive by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” stated with regard to the case of intent to consume the meat beyond its designated time, that the punishment of karet applies to the latter as well. The verbal analogy would still be apt since one prohibition is similar to the other in that both share features that form the acronym mikdash : Both concern intent [ maḥashava ]; both disqualify the entire offering even if one had intent with regard to only part [ ketzat ] of it; both occur while collecting or sprinkling the offering’s blood [ dam ]; and with regard to both the verse contains an extraneous mention of the third [ shelishi ] day.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, תָּנֵי זַבְדִּי בַּר לֵוִי: אָתְיָא ״קֹדֶשׁ״ ״קֹדֶשׁ״; כְּתִיב הָכָא: ״אֶת קֹדֶשׁ ה׳ חִלֵּל וְנִכְרְתָה״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״וְשָׂרַפְתָּ אֶת הַנּוֹתָר בָּאֵשׁ״ וגו׳, מַה לְּהַלָּן נוֹתָר – אַף כָּאן נוֹתָר.

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Zavdi bar Levi taught: It is derived that the prohibition of notar carries the penalty of karet by way of verbal analogy between “sacred” and “sacred.” It is written here: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity, because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 19:8). And it is written there: “And if any of the flesh of the consecration, or of the bread, remain until the morning, then you shall burn the remainder [ notar ] with fire; it shall not be eaten, because it is sacred” (Exodus 29:34). Just as the verse there is referring to notar , so too, there verse here is referring to notar .

וּמִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא גַּבֵּי נוֹתָר ״וְאֹכְלָיו עֲוֹנוֹ יִשָּׂא״ – לְמַעוּטֵי חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ מִכָּרֵת.

And consequently, when the Merciful One restricted the penalty of karet to the prohibition of eating notar , as the verse states: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,” this restriction serves to exclude the case of intent to consume the offering outside its designated area from the penalty of karet .

וּמַאי חָזֵית דִּקְרָא אֲרִיכָא בְּחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וּשְׁלִישִׁי דְּפָרָשַׁת ״קְדֹשִׁים תִּהְיוּ״ חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ? אֵיפּוּךְ אֲנָא!

The Gemara returns to the initial assumption that the statement of Shmuel is referring to two verses: And what did you see that led you to conclude that the long verse (Leviticus 7:18) is referring to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, and that the verse that mentions the third day (Leviticus 19:7) in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy,” is referring to intent to consume it outside its designated area? I might just as well reverse the two.

מִסְתַּבְּרָא, אֲרִיכָא בְּחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, דְּגָמַר ״עֲוֹן״ ״עֲוֹן״ מִנּוֹתָר דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ בְּז״ב.

The Gemara responds: It stands to reason that the long verse is referring to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, as this allows for one to derive by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” from notar that an offering sacrificed with such intent carries the penalty of karet . The verbal analogy is apt since one prohibition is similar to the other in that both share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: Zayin , beit .

אַדְּרַבָּה, אֲרִיכָא בְּחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וּשְׁלִישִׁי דִּ״קְדֹשִׁים תִּהְיוּ״ בְּחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, מִשּׁוּם דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ סַמְכֵיהּ, וְקָא מְמַעֵט לֵיהּ!

The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, it stands to reason that the long verse is referring to intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, and that the verse that mentions the third day in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy,” is referring to intent to consume it beyond its designated time. This is due to the fact that the latter intent is similar to notar in that both prohibitions share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: Zayin , beit , and it is therefore reasonable that the Torah juxtaposed the two in adjacent verses. And if so, when the verse states with regard to notar : “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,” this excludes intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time from the penalty of karet .

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: כּוּלְּהוּ מִקְּרָא אֲרִיכָא אָתְיָין. דִּכְתִיב: ״הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל״ – בִּשְׁתֵּי אֲכִילוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אֶחָד אֲכִילַת אָדָם וְאֶחָד אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ.

Rather, Rava says: One must accept the original interpretation of Shmuel’s statement, that all of these halakhot with regard to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time or outside its designated area are derived from the long verse. As it is written: “If any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it; it shall be piggul , and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). When the verse states: “Be at all eaten [ he’akhol ye’akhel ],” using a doubled verb, the verse speaks of intent with regard to two consumptions, one consumption by a person, and one consumption by the altar, i.e., burning the offering. Improper intent with regard to either of these acts renders the offering piggul .

״מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו״ – מַה שְּׁלָמִים מְפַגְּלִין וּמִתְפַּגְּלִין, אַף כָּל מְפַגְּלִין וּמִתְפַּגְּלִין.

The phrase “any of the flesh of his peace offerings” indicates that just as a peace offering possesses that which renders piggul and that which is rendered piggul , i.e., the blood, which renders the offering piggul through one’s intent with regard to its rites, and the meat, which is rendered piggul through such intent, so too the verse is referring to all offerings that possess that which renders an offering piggul and that which is rendered piggul .

״שְׁלִישִׁי״ – זֶה חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ;

The term “on the third day” indicates that the verse is referring to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, as peace offerings may be eaten for only two days.

״לֹא יֵרָצֶה״ – כְּהַרְצָאַת כָּשֵׁר כֵּן הַרְצָאַת פָּסוּל, וּמָה הַרְצָאַת כָּשֵׁר עַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּ כָּל מַתִּירָיו – אַף הַרְצָאַת פָּסוּל עַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיבוּ כָּל מַתִּירָיו.

The phrase “it shall not be accepted” indicates that an offering is deemed piggul following the stage of the service at which it would have otherwise effected atonement. Therefore, like the acceptance of a fit offering, so is the acceptance of a disqualified offering, and just as the acceptance of a fit offering does not occur until one sacrifices all its permitting factors, i.e., one sprinkles the blood properly, so too the acceptance of a disqualified offering does not occur until one sacrifices all its permitting factors.

״הַמַּקְרִיב״ – בְּהַקְרָבָה הוּא נִפְסָל, וְאֵינוֹ נִפְסָל בַּשְּׁלִישִׁי. ״אוֹתוֹ״ – בְּזֶבַח הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, וְאֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר בְּכֹהֵן.

The term “he who offers” indicates that piggul is disqualified at the time of offering, due to improper intent, and it is not disqualified on the third day “it,” this indicates that the verse is speaking of a disqualification of the offering only, but it is not speaking of the priest, who is not disqualified from the priesthood through such intent.

״לֹא יֵחָשֵׁב״,

The phrase “neither shall it be credited [ yeḥashev ]”