הוּא אָסוּר בְּאִמָּהּ, וּבְאֵם אִמָּהּ, וּבְאֵם אָבִיהָ, וּבְבִתָּהּ, וּבְבַת בִּתָּהּ, וּבְבַת בְּנָהּ, וּבַאֲחוֹתָהּ בִּזְמַן שֶׁהִיא קַיֶּימֶת, וְהָאַחִין מוּתָּרִין.

Accordingly, he is forbidden to engage in relations with her mother, and with her mother’s mother, and with her father’s mother, and with her daughter, and with her daughter’s daughter, and with her son’s daughter, and with her sister while his yevama is still alive. However, the other brothers who did not perform ḥalitza are permitted to her relatives.

וְהִיא אֲסוּרָה בְּאָבִיו, וּבַאֲבִי אָבִיו, וּבִבְנוֹ, וּבְבֶן בְּנוֹ, בְּאָחִיו, וּבְבֶן אָחִיו.

And she is forbidden to engage in relations with his father, and with his father’s father, and with his son, and with his son’s son, and with his brother, and with his brother’s son.

מוּתָּר אָדָם בִּקְרוֹבַת צָרַת חֲלוּצָתוֹ, וְאָסוּר בְּצָרַת קְרוֹבַת חֲלוּצָתוֹ.

The mishna states an additional principle: A man is permitted to engage in relations with a relative of a rival wife of his ḥalutza , i.e., his yevama with whom he performed ḥalitza . Since he did not perform ḥalitza with her, she is not regarded as though she had actually been married to him. However, he is forbidden to engage in relations with a rival wife of a relative of his ḥalutza , i.e., in addition to being forbidden to the relatives of his ḥalutza , he is also forbidden to their rival wives.

גמ׳ אִיבַּעֲיָא לְהוּ: גָּזְרוּ שְׁנִיּוֹת בַּחֲלוּצָה אוֹ לָא?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In addition to the Torah prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s wife’s close relatives, the Sages decreed that it is also prohibited to engage in relations with one’s wife’s secondary relatives, i.e., those who are less closely related and so are permitted by Torah law. Since the Sages decreed that a ḥalutza is to be regarded as though she had actually been married to the one who performed ḥalitza , such that her close relatives are forbidden to him, did they also decree that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships should also apply in the case of a ḥalutza , or not?

בָּעֶרְוָה דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא גָּזְרוּ בְּהוּ רַבָּנַן שְׁנִיּוֹת, בַּחֲלוּצָה לָא גָּזְרוּ רַבָּנַן שְׁנִיּוֹת, אוֹ דִּלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא?

The Gemara presents the sides of the dilemma: Did the Sages decree that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships applies only in a case where there is a relative with whom relations are forbidden by Torah law, but in the case of a ḥalutza , whose relatives are forbidden only by rabbinic decree, they did not decree that there should be a prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships? Or perhaps the case of a ḥalutza is no different, and since the basis of the rabbinic prohibition applying to her relatives is that it is considered as though she had actually been married to her yavam , the prohibition should extend to her secondary relatives as well?

תָּא שְׁמַע: ״הוּא אָסוּר בְּאִמָּהּ וּבְאֵם אִמָּהּ״, וְאִילּוּ ״אֵם אֵם אִמָּהּ״ – לָא קָתָנֵי.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: A yavam is prohibited from engaging in relations with the mother of his ḥalutza and with her mother’s mother. However, the mishna does not teach that it is prohibited to engage in relations with her mother’s mother’s mother, which is one of the secondary relationships. This would suggest that the prohibition of secondary relationships does not apply in this case.

דִּלְמָא הַיְינוּ טַעֲמָא דְּלָא תָּנֵי – מִשּׁוּם דְּקָבָעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא ״וְהָאַחִין מוּתָּרִין״, וְאִי תָּנָא ״אֵם אֵם אִמָּהּ״ הֲוָה אָמִינָא: הָאַחִין מוּתָּרִין דַּוְקָא בְּאֵם אֵם אִמָּהּ, אֲבָל בְּאֵם אִמָּהּ וּבְאִמָּהּ לָא.

The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps this is the reason that the mishna does not teach that case, because it needs to teach in the latter clause: However, the other brothers who did not perform ḥalitza are permitted to her relatives. And if it had taught the prohibition of her mother’s mother’s mother in the first clause, I would mistakenly say that the brothers are permitted specifically to her mother’s mother’s mother, but not to her mother’s mother. Therefore, no proof can be adduced from that case of the mishna.

וְלִיתְנֵי ״אֵם אֵם אִמָּהּ״ וְלִיתְנֵי ״הָאַחִין מוּתָּרִין בְּכוּלָּן״! קַשְׁיָא.

The Gemara objects: But if he is forbidden to the great-grandmother, then let it teach: Her mother’s mother’s mother in the first clause, and then let it teach: The brothers are permitted to all of them, in the latter clause. This would avoid the concern stated above. The fact that the mishna did not do so would suggest that he is not forbidden to the great-grandmother, or any other secondary relatives. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is difficult, but still inconclusive.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הִיא אֲסוּרָה בְּאָבִיו וּבַאֲבִי אָבִיו. קָתָנֵי מִיהָא אֲבִי אָבִיו, מַאי לָאו – מִשּׁוּם חוֹלֵץ, דְּהָוְיָא לָהּ כַּלַּת בְּנוֹ!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: She is prohibited from engaging in relations with his father, and with his father’s father. The Gemara explains the proof: In any case, the mishna teaches that she is forbidden to his father’s father. What, is it not that she is forbidden to him due to the rabbinic decree that it is considered as though she had actually been married to the one who performed ḥalitza with her, and therefore she is forbidden to the grandfather because she is considered to be the grandfather’s son’s daughter-in-law, i.e., the wife of one of the grandfather’s grandsons, which is a secondary relationship? If so, the mishna explicitly demonstrates that the prohibition of secondary relationships also applies in the case of a ḥalutza .

לָא, מִשּׁוּם מִיתְנָא, דְּהָוְיָא לָהּ כַּלַּת בְּנוֹ.

The Gemara rejects the proof: No, she is forbidden to his grandfather due to her previous marriage with the deceased, whose relatives are forbidden to her by Torah law, and it is due to that relationship that she is considered the grandfather’s son’s daughter-in-law. Therefore, no proof can be adduced from that case of the mishna.

תָּא שְׁמַע: וּבְבֶן בְּנוֹ. מַאי לָאו – מִשּׁוּם חוֹלֵץ, דְּהָוְיָא לָהּ (מִשּׁוּם) אֵשֶׁת אֲבִי אָבִיו!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: And she is prohibited from engaging in relations with his son’s son. The Gemara explains the proof: What, is it not that she is forbidden to him due to the rabbinic decree that it is considered as though she had actually been married to the one who performed ḥalitza with her, and she is therefore forbidden to his grandson because she is considered to be the wife of that grandson’s father’s father, which is a secondary relationship? If so, the mishna explicitly demonstrates that the prohibition of secondary relationships also applies in the case of a ḥalutza .

לָא, מִשּׁוּם מִיתְנָא, וְהָוְיָא לָהּ אֵשֶׁת אֲחִי אֲבִי אָבִיו.

The Gemara rejects the proof: No, she is forbidden to his grandson due to her previous marriage with the deceased, whose relatives are forbidden to her by Torah law, and it is due to that relationship that she is considered to be the wife of a brother of that grandson’s father’s father, which is also a forbidden secondary relationship. Therefore, no proof can be adduced from that case of the mishna.

הָא אֲמֵימַר מַכְשַׁר בְּאֵשֶׁת אֲחִי אֲבִי אָבִיו!

The Gemara asks: But Ameimar rules permissible the marriage of a man to the wife of a brother of that man’s father’s father. Accordingly, the prohibition in the mishna cannot be due to that relationship.

אֲמֵימַר מוֹקֵי לָהּ בְּבַר בְּרָא דְּסָבָא.

The Gemara explains: Ameimar would establish the mishna’s case of: His son’s son, as referring to engaging in relations with a son of a son of the grandfather. The mishna states that she is forbidden to his father, to his father’s father, to his son, and to his son’s son. The Gemara assumed that antecedent of the pronoun: His, in the phrase: To his son and to his son’s son, is the one who performed ḥalitza . As such, the mishna teaches that she is forbidden to the son and grandson of the one who performed ḥalitza with her, which are secondary relationships. Ameimar, however, would claim the antecedent of this pronoun is the father’s father, which immediately precedes it in the mishna. As such, the mishna is teaching that she is forbidden to the grandfather of the one who performed ḥalitza with her, to that grandfather’s sons, i.e., the brothers of the deceased, and to the grandfather’s sons’ sons, i.e., the nephews of the deceased. The yevama is forbidden to these relatives by Torah law. Therefore, no proof can be derived from that case of the mishna.

אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ אָחִיו וּבֶן אָחִיו! תָּנָא אָחִיו מִן הָאָב, וְקָתָנֵי אָחִיו מִן הָאֵם

The Gemara challenges this understanding of: His son and his son’s son: But if so, these relatives are none other than his brother and the son of his brother, who are already explicitly mentioned in the mishna. The Gemara explains: This is not a case of unnecessary repetition because the mishna first teaches that she is forbidden to his paternal half brother and then teaches that she is forbidden to his maternal half brother as well.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: אַרְבַּע מִדִּבְרֵי תּוֹרָה, וְאַרְבַּע מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים. אָב וּבְנוֹ, אָחִיו וּבֶן אָחִיו – מִדִּבְרֵי תּוֹרָה, אֲבִי אָבִיו וַאֲבִי אִמּוֹ, בֶּן בְּנוֹ, וּבֶן בִּתּוֹ – מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita that Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: Of the relatives who are forbidden to a ḥalutza , four are forbidden by Torah law and four by rabbinic law, as follows: The father of the deceased husband, and his son, his brother, and his brother’s son are forbidden by Torah law; his father’s father, and his mother’s father, his son’s son, and his daughter’s son are forbidden by rabbinic law.

קָתָנֵי מִיהָא אֲבִי אָבִיו, מַאי לָאו מִשּׁוּם חוֹלֵץ, וְהָוְיָא לָהּ כַּלַּת בְּנוֹ!

In any case, the baraita teaches that she is forbidden to his father’s father. What, is it not that she is forbidden to him due to the rabbinic decree that it is considered as though she had actually been married to the one who performed ḥalitza with her, and therefore she is forbidden to the grandfather because she is considered to be the grandfather’s son’s daughter-in-law, which is a secondary forbidden relationship? This would prove that the prohibition of secondary relationships applies in the case of a ḥalutza .

לֹא, מִשּׁוּם מִיתְנָא, דְּהָוְיָא לָהּ כַּלַּת בְּנוֹ.

The Gemara rejects the proof: No, she is forbidden due to her previous marriage with the deceased, whose relatives are forbidden to her by Torah law, and it is due to that relationship that she is considered the grandfather’s son’s daughter-in-law. Therefore, no proof can be adduced from that case of the baraita .

תָּא שְׁמַע: אֲבִי אִמּוֹ – מַאי לָאו מִשּׁוּם חוֹלֵץ, דְּהָוְיָא לָהּ כַּלַּת בִּתּוֹ!

The Gemara proceeds to consider whether proof may be adduced from each of the other secondary relationships listed in the baraita : Come and hear a proof from that which the baraita teaches: She is forbidden to his mother’s father. The Gemara explains the proof: What, is it not that she is forbidden to him due to the rabbinic decree that it is considered as though she had actually been married to the one who performed ḥalitza with her, and therefore she is forbidden to the grandfather because she is considered to be the grandfather’s daughter’s daughter-in-law, which is a secondary relationship? This would prove that the prohibition of secondary relationships applies in the case of a ḥalutza .

לָא, מִשּׁוּם מִיתְנָא, דְּהָוְיָא לָהּ כַּלַּת בִּתּוֹ.

The Gemara rejects the proof: No, she is forbidden due to her previous marriage with the deceased, whose relatives are forbidden to her by Torah law, and it is due to that relationship that she is considered the grandfather’s daughter’s daughter-in-law. Therefore, no proof can be adduced from that case of the baraita .

תָּא שְׁמַע: וּבֶן בְּנוֹ, מַאי לָאו מִשּׁוּם חוֹלֵץ, דְּהָוְיָא לָהּ אֵשֶׁת אֲבִי אָבִיו!

Come and hear a proof from that which the baraita teaches: And she is forbidden to his son’s son. The Gemara explains the proof: What, is it not that she is forbidden to him due to the rabbinic decree that it is considered as though she had actually been married to the one who performed ḥalitza with her, and so she is forbidden to his grandson because she is considered to be the wife of that grandson’s father’s father, which is a secondary relationship? If so, the baraita explicitly demonstrates that the prohibition of secondary relationships applies in the case of a ḥalutza .

לָא, מִשּׁוּם מִיתְנָא, וְהָוְיָא לָהּ אֵשֶׁת אֲחִי אֲבִי אָבִיו.

The Gemara rejects the proof: No, she is forbidden to his grandson due to her previous marriage with the deceased, whose relatives are forbidden to her by Torah law, and due to that relationship she is considered to be the wife of a brother of that grandson’s father’s father, which is also a forbidden secondary relationship. Therefore, no proof can be adduced from that case of the baraita .

וְהָא אֲמֵימַר מַכְשִׁיר בְּאֵשֶׁת אֲחִי אֲבִי אָבִיו! אֲמֵימַר מוֹקִים לָהּ מִשּׁוּם חוֹלֵץ, וְקָסָבַר גָּזְרוּ שְׁנִיּוֹת בַּחֲלוּצָה.

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Ameimar rule permissible the marriage of a man with the wife of a brother of his father’s father? Accordingly, the prohibition in the mishna cannot be due to that relationship. The Gemara concedes: Ameimar would establish the mishna’s case of: His son’s son, as being due to the rabbinic decree that it is considered as though she had actually been married to the one who performed ḥalitza with her, and as such it is evident that he holds that the Sages decreed that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships should apply in the case of a ḥalutza .

תָּא שְׁמַע: וּבְבֶן בִּתּוֹ, מַאי לָאו מִשּׁוּם חוֹלֵץ, דְּהָוְיָא לָהּ אֵשֶׁת אֲבִי אִמּוֹ!

The Gemara continues to seek proof for those who disagree with Ameimar: Come and hear a proof from that which the baraita teaches: And she is forbidden to his daughter’s son. The Gemara explains the proof: What, is it not that she is forbidden to him due to the rabbinic decree that it is considered as though she had actually been married to the one who performed ḥalitza with her, and so she is forbidden to his grandson because she is considered to be the wife of that grandson’s mother’s father, which is a secondary relationship? If so, the baraita explicitly demonstrates that the prohibition of secondary relationships applies in the case of a ḥalutza .

לָא, מִשּׁוּם מִיתְנָא דְּהָוְיָא לָהּ אֵשֶׁת אֲחִי אֲבִי אִמּוֹ. וְהָא גַּבֵּי שְׁנִיּוֹת דְּעֶרְוָה לָא גָּזְרוּ!

The Gemara rejects the proof: No, she is forbidden to his grandson due to her previous marriage with the deceased, whose relatives are forbidden to her by Torah law, and due to that relationship she is considered to be the wife of a brother of the grandson’s mother’s father. The Gemara challenges this: But the Sages did not decree that such a person is included among those relatives who are forbidden as secondary forbidden relationships.

אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם חוֹלֵץ, וּשְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: גָּזְרוּ שְׁנִיּוֹת בַּחֲלוּצָה, שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ.

Rather, is it not, as the Gemara initially assumed, that she is forbidden to him due to the rabbinic decree that it is considered as though she had actually been married to the one who performed ḥalitza with her, and therefore must one not conclude from this case that the Sages decreed that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships should apply in the case of a ḥalutza ? The Gemara confirms: One should indeed conclude from it that this is so.

״מוּתָּר אָדָם״ וכו׳. אָמַר רַב טוֹבִי בַּר קִיסְנָא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַבָּא עַל צָרַת חֲלוּצָה – הַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר. מַאי טַעֲמָא – בְּאִיסּוּרָהּ קַיְּימָא.

§ The mishna states: A man is permitted to engage in relations with a relative of a rival wife of his ḥalutza ; however, he is prohibited from engaging in relations with a rival wife of a relative of his ḥalutza . The Gemara cites a ruling: Rav Tovi bar Kisna said that Shmuel said: With regard to one who engages in intercourse with a rival wife of his ḥalutza , the offspring of that union is a mamzer . What is the reason for this ruling? It is that she remains in her original prohibition. yavam and yevama . Although following ḥalitza the levirate bond is dissolved, the woman’s status as a ḥalutza means that only the lesser prohibition against marrying a ḥalutza applies to her, and she does not return to her original forbidden status. Shmuel claims that the rival wives of the ḥalutza are not considered to be represented in her act of ḥalitza ; consequently, they are not afforded a status similar to that of the ḥalutza herself. Therefore, he assumes that following ḥalitza the rival wives once again become subject to the original prohibition against marrying a brother’s wife. Since that prohibition entails karet , any offspring born from such a union is a mamzer .

אֲמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אַף אֲנַן נַמִי תָּנֵינָא: מוּתָּר אָדָם בִּקְרוֹבַת צָרַת חֲלוּצָתוֹ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא צָרָה אַבָּרָאי – מִשּׁוּם הָכִי מוּתָּר בַּאֲחוֹתָהּ.

Rav Yosef said: We, too, learned this though an inference from the mishna: A man is permitted to engage in relations with a relative of a rival wife of his ḥalutza . Rav Yosef explains the inference: Granted, if you say that a rival wife is outside, i.e., she is not represented in the ḥalitza of the ḥalutza and so she is not afforded a status similar to that of the ḥalutza herself, then it is due to that reason that he is permitted to engage in relations with her sister and other relatives, because since they are not the relatives of his ḥalutza , there is no reason for them to be forbidden.

אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ צָרָה כַּחֲלוּצָה דָּמְיָא – אַמַּאי מוּתָּר?

However, if you say that a rival wife is afforded a status similar to that of the ḥalutza herself, why is he permitted to her relatives? Rather, from the fact that the relatives of the rival wives are permitted, it is apparent that the rival wives are not represented in the ḥalitza . As such, it follows that they should return to their original forbidden status of a brother’s wives, as Shmuel claims.

לֵימָא תֶּיהֱוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: בֵּין הוּא בֵּין אַחִין אֵין חַיָּיבִין לֹא עַל הַחֲלוּצָה כָּרֵת, וְלֹא עַל צָרָתָהּ כָּרֵת!

The Gemara suggests: Shall we say, then, that this mishna is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? As Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Neither he who performed the ḥalitza nor his brothers are liable to receive karet ; they are neither liable to receive karet on account of engaging in relations with the ḥalutza , nor are they liable to receive karet on account of engaging in relations with her rival wife.

אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְתִסְבְּרָא אֲחוֹת חֲלוּצָה דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא? וְהָאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כָּאן שָׁנָה רַבִּי: אֲחוֹת גְּרוּשָׁה – מִדִּבְרֵי תּוֹרָה, אֲחוֹת חֲלוּצָה – מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים.

The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: But how can you understand it that way? Why do you assume that if the rival wives are considered to be represented in the ḥalitza that perforce means that their relatives should be forbidden to the yavam ? Is a sister of one’s ḥalutza forbidden by Torah law ? Didn’t Reish Lakish say with regard to another mishna (41a): Here, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught: Engaging in relations with a sister of one’s divorcée is forbidden by Torah law, whereas engaging in relations with a sister of one’s ḥalutza is forbidden by rabbinic law. Since the prohibition with regard to the relatives of one’s ḥalutza is rabbinic, it is reasonable to assume that it was applied to only the wife who actually performed ḥalitza and not extended to her rival wives, even if they are considered to be represented in her ḥalitza to the extent that they do not return to their original forbidden status.

מַאי שְׁנָא הַאי, וּמַאי שְׁנָא הַאי?

§ The Gemara questions the distinction indicated by the mishna: What is different about this woman, the relative of a rival wife of one’s ḥalutza , that she is permitted, and what is different about that woman, the rival wife of a relative of one’s ḥalutza , that she is forbidden?