אִי לָאו דַּעְתָּא צִילּוּתָא – וּלְעוֹלָם חֲדָא דַּעְתָּא הוּא. אוֹ דִּלְמָא: פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דְּדַעְתֵּיהּ קְלִישְׁתָּא וְלָאו דַּעְתָּא צִילּוּתָא הוּא. וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעֲמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּעִתִּים חָלִים וְעִתִּים שׁוֹטֶה.

Or perhaps his mind is not clear, i.e., he cannot achieve full and clear understanding, and yet he is always of one mind. In other words, a deaf-mute functions at the same level of intellectual capacity every day. Rav Ashi explains the other possibility: Or perhaps it is obvious to Rabbi Elazar that the mind of a deaf-mute is weak and his mind is unclear, but in this case here, this is Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning: Since he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, without clarity of mind, i.e., he does not function at the same level of understanding every day, therefore the teruma of a deaf-mute is considered teruma that is of doubtful legal status.

לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינָּהּ – לְהוֹצִיא אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּגֵט. אִי אָמְרַתְּ חֲדָא דַּעְתָּא הוּא – כְּקִדּוּשִׁין כָּךְ גֵּירוּשִׁין.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference how one defines the intellectual capacity of a deaf-mute? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference with respect to divorcing his wife with a bill of divorce. If you say that a deaf-mute has one consistent mind, his divorce is equivalent in status to his betrothal. Since he had a weak mind at the time of his betrothal, he has the same level of competence at his divorce and therefore he may divorce his wife.

וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ עִתִּים חָלִים וְעִתִּים שׁוֹטֶה – קִדּוּשֵׁי מָצֵי מְקַדֵּשׁ, גֵּרוּשֵׁי לָא מָצֵי מְגָרֵשׁ. מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.

But if you say that he is at times competent and at times imbecilic, he may betroth a woman, as the Sages are stringent and assume that he was healthy and of clear mind at the time; however he cannot divorce her, due to a concern that he was competent when he betrothed her but he is incompetent now. If so, what is Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning? No solution is found, and therefore the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

״נִשְׁתַּטֵּית״ וכו׳. אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה שׁוֹטָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, מִידֵי דַּהֲוָה אַפִּקַּחַת בְּעַל כָּרְחָהּ. וּמַה טַּעַם אָמְרוּ אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת? שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ בָּהּ מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר.

§ The mishna taught that one whose wife became imbecilic may not divorce her. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: By Torah law, an imbecilic woman may be divorced, just as it is in the analogous case of a halakhically competent woman who was divorced against her will. Since there is no need for a woman to agree to receive a bill of divorce, an imbecile’s lack of sound mind does not prevent her from being divorced. And if so, what is the reason that the Sages said that an imbecilic woman may not be divorced? The reason is so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property. Since she is not of sound mind and has no husband to protect her, there is a concern that people might treat her in a disrespectful fashion.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵימָא דְּיוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר גִּיטָּהּ וְיוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר עַצְמָהּ – מִי נָהֲגִי בָּהּ מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר? אֶלָּא: דְּאֵין יוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר לֹא גִּיטָּהּ וְלֹא עַצְמָהּ.

The Gemara inquires: What are the precise circumstances of this case? If we say that this woman knows how to guard her bill of divorce, i.e., she understands the concept of a bill of divorce, and she also knows how to take care of herself, would people treat her in the manner of ownerless property? She is capable of protecting herself. Rather, the mishna is evidently referring to a woman who does not know how to guard her bill of divorce, nor does she know how to take care of herself.

דְּבַר תּוֹרָה שׁוֹטָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת?! וְהָא אָמַר דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: ״וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ״ – מִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ יָד לְגָרֵשׁ עַצְמָהּ, יָצְתָה זוֹ – שֶׁאֵין לָהּ יָד לְגָרֵשׁ עַצְמָהּ!

The Gemara asks: Is it correct that by Torah law an imbecilic woman may be divorced? But didn’t a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai say, with regard to the verse: “He shall write her a bill of divorce and give it into her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:3), to a woman who has a hand, i.e., she has enough intellectual capacity to accept a bill of divorce for herself. This serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, who does not have a hand to accept her divorce for herself.

וְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְשִׁלְּחָהּ מִבֵּיתוֹ״ – מִי שֶׁמְּשַׁלְּחָהּ וְאֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת, יָצְתָה זוֹ שֶׁמְּשַׁלְּחָהּ וְחוֹזֶרֶת!

And the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught this slightly differently. The verse continues: “And send her out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:3); this indicates that one may divorce only the type of woman whom he will send away and she will not return. It serves to exclude this imbecilic woman, as he will send her away and she will return, as she does not understand the concept of divorce.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּיוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר גִּיטָּהּ וְאֵינָהּ יוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר עַצְמָהּ, דְּבַר תּוֹרָה שׁוֹטָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת – דְּהָא יוֹדַעַת לִשְׁמוֹר גִּיטָּהּ, וַאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן לָא לֵיפְּקָא, שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ בָּהּ מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר.

The Gemara explains: No, Rabbi Yitzḥak’s halakha is necessary in the case of a woman who knows how to guard her bill of divorce but does not know how to take care of herself. By Torah law this imbecilic woman may be divorced, as she knows how to safeguard her bill of divorce, and yet the Sages said that her husband should not divorce her, so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property, because she does not know how to take care of herself.

אֲמַר אַבַּיֵי דַּיְקָא נַמִי, דְּקָתָנֵי גַּבֵּי דִּידָהּ: נִשְׁתַּטֵּית – לֹא יוֹצִיא, וְגַבֵּי דִּידֵיהּ: לֹא יוֹצִיא עוֹלָמִית. מַאי שְׁנָא הָכָא דְּקָתָנֵי עוֹלָמִית וּמַאי שְׁנָא הָתָם דְּלָא קָתָנֵי עוֹלָמִית? אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: הָא – דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא, הָא – דְּרַבָּנַן.

Abaye said: The language of the mishna is also precise in this case, as it teaches with regard to this woman that if she became an imbecile he may not divorce her; and yet, with regard to the husband, the mishna states that if he became an imbecile he may never divorce her. What is different here, that the mishna teaches using the word: Never, and what is different there, that it does not teach: Never? Rather, one can learn from here that this halakha , that an imbecilic man may not give a divorce, applies by Torah law, and this one, that a man may not divorce an imbecilic woman, applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the mishna does not add the phrase: Never.

״אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי״ וכו׳. אִיבַּעֲיָא לְהוּ: רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי – אִישׁ פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ וְאִשָּׁה קָמִיבָּעֲיָא לֵיהּ, אוֹ דִּלְמָא: אִשָּׁה פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ וְאִישׁ קָמִיבָּעֲיָא לֵיהּ?

§ The mishna taught that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: What is the reason that the husband of a woman who became a deaf-mute may divorce her, whereas a man who becomes a deaf-mute may not divorce his wife? A dilemma was raised before the scholars with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: Is it obvious to him that a deaf-mute man may not divorce his wife, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a woman, i.e., why she may be divorced if she is a deaf-mute? Or perhaps, it is obvious to him why one may divorce a deaf-mute woman, and he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, i.e., why he may not divorce his wife.

תָּא שְׁמַע: מִדְּקָאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הָאִישׁ הַמְגָרֵשׁ לָאִשָּׁה הַמִּתְגָּרֶשֶׁת – שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה יוֹצֵאת לִרְצוֹנָהּ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִרְצוֹנָהּ, וְהָאִישׁ אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא אֶלָּא לִרְצוֹנוֹ – שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: אִישׁ קָמִיבָּעֲיָא לֵיהּ. אַדְּרַבָּה, מִדְּקָאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ אַף זוֹ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ – שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: אִשָּׁה קָמִיבָּעֲיָא לֵיהּ!

The Gemara cites a proof: Come and hear from what the Rabbis said in response to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling, and the man divorces his wife only willingly. Learn from here that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute man, not a woman, as the reply of the Rabbis is referring to the man, not the woman. The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, from the fact that the Rabbis said to him: This woman, too, has a similar status, one can learn from here that he raised his dilemma with regard to a deaf-mute woman.

אֶלָּא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי לְדִבְרֵיהֶם קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּאִישׁ לָא מָצֵי מְגָרֵשׁ – אִשָּׁה נַמִי לָא מִיגָּרְשָׁא, אֶלָּא לְדִידְכוּ – מַאי שְׁנָא אִשָּׁה וּמַאי שְׁנָא אִישׁ? אָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הָאִישׁ הַמְגָרֵשׁ לָאִשָּׁה הַמִּתְגָּרֶשֶׁת.

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri spoke to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, i.e., he formulated his statement so as best to argue with their opinion, as follows: According to my opinion, just as a deaf-mute man cannot divorce his wife, so too a deaf-mute woman cannot be divorced. However, according to your opinion, what is the difference between the case of a deaf-mute woman and the case of a deaf-mute man? They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced.

״הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן״ וכו׳. אָמַר רָבָא: מֵעֵדוּתוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן גּוּדְגַּדָּא, אָמַר לְעֵדִים: ״רְאוּ גֵּט זֶה שֶׁאֲנִי נוֹתֵן,״ וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״כִּנְסִי שְׁטַר חוֹב זֶה״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.

The mishna taught: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified that in the case of a deaf-mute minor whose father married her off, which is a marriage that is valid by Torah law, she may nevertheless be divorced once she matures. Rava said: From the testimony of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada one may learn that if a husband said to witnesses: See this bill of divorce that I am giving my wife, and yet he said to her: Take this promissory note, she is divorced, despite the fact when he gave his wife the bill of divorce she did not know what it was.

מִי לָא אֲמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן גּוּדְגַּדָּא לָא בָּעֵינַן דַּעֲתָהּ – הָכָא נַמִי לָא בָּעֵינַן דַּעֲתָהּ. פְּשִׁיטָא!

This halakha is derived from Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada’s statement in the following manner: Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada say that we do not require her consent, as there is no need for the woman to understand that she is receiving a bill of divorce? Here, too, we do not require her consent, and even if she believes that she is receiving a bill of debt, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that there is no need for the woman’s consent? What is the novel element in Rava’s statement?

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִדְּאָמַר לָהּ ״כִּנְסִי שְׁטַר חוֹב זֶה״ בַּטּוּלֵי בַּטְּלֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן אִי אִיתָא דְּבַטְּלֵיהּ – לְעֵדִים הֲוָה קָאָמַר לְהוּ; וּמִדְּלָא אֲמַר לְעֵדִים – לָא בַּטְּלֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵי, וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר הָכִי – מֵחֲמַת כִּיסּוּפָא הוּא דְּקָאָמַר לְהוּ.

The Gemara answers that Rava’s statement is necessary, lest you say: From the fact that the husband said to her: Take this promissory note, he has thereby nullified the bill of divorce. Rava therefore teaches us that this is not the case, for if it is so, that he nullified the bill of divorce, he would have said so to the witnesses. And from the fact that he did not say this to the witnesses, he evidently did not nullify the bill of divorce at all. And the reason that the husband said this, i.e., that she should take this bill of debt, it was due to shame that he said this to her, as he meant to divorce her all along, but he did not want her to know at the time what he was doing.

רַב יִצְחָק בַּר בִּיסְנָא אִירְכְּסוּ לֵיהּ מַפְתְּחֵי דְּבֵי מִדְרָשָׁא בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים בְּשַׁבְּתָא. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי פְּדָת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל

The Gemara relates a story: Rav Yitzḥak bar Bisna lost the keys to the study hall, and therefore they could not come into the study hall from the public domain on Shabbat. It was impossible to open the synagogue, as they could not bring the key because it is prohibited to carry in the public domain. He came before Rabbi Pedat to ask what to do. Rabbi Pedat said to him: Go