מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא מִין אֶחָד וְתַמְחוּי אֶחָד, מִין אֶחָד וְתַמְחוּי אֶחָד צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיְתָה לוֹ יְדִיעָה בֵּינְתַיִים, וְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.

by inference, the first clause in the mishna is referring to one type of food and one dish. The problem is then more difficult. In a case where one ate two halves of an olive-bulk from one type of food and in one dish, was it necessary to say that he is liable? That is obvious. Rav Huna said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he had a period of awareness between eating the two half olive-bulks. After eating the first half of an olive-bulk, he became aware that he had eaten food that was prohibited. Then he became unaware again and ate the second half of an olive-bulk. Although, with regard to sacrifices, awareness usually serves as a line of demarcation between unwitting transgressions performed prior to the period of awareness and unwitting transgressions performed thereafter, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel who said: There is no awareness for half a measure. Since one is not liable to bring a sacrifice for half a measure, the fact that one became aware between consumption of the two halves of an olive-bulk is of no significance and does not demarcate between the two half-measures with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering.

אִיתְּמַר, אָכַל שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד וְנוֹדַע לוֹ עַל הָרִאשׁוֹן, וְחָזַר וְנוֹדַע לוֹ עַל הַשֵּׁנִי. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר חַיָּיב, “עַל חַטָּאתוֹ וְהֵבִיא״. וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר פָּטוּר, “מֵחַטָּאתוֹ וְנִסְלַח לוֹ״.

A dispute between amora’im was stated: With regard to one who ate two olive -bulks of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness, and became aware of the transgression of eating the first olive-bulk, and then became aware of the transgression of eating the second, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable to bring two sin-offerings, one offering for each transgression. And Reish Lakish said: He is liable to bring only one. Both Sages cite proofs for their opinions. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that he is liable as it is stated: “And he shall offer for his sin that he sinned… and he shall bring the ox” (Leviticus 4:3–4), indicating that he is liable to bring a separate sacrifice for each sin. And Reish Lakish said he is exempt, as it is stated: “And the priest shall atone for him from his sin, and it shall be forgiven for him” (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that even if he atoned from his sin, i.e., for part of his sin and not all of his sin, the entire transgression is forgiven.

וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, הָכְתִיב: “עַל חַטָּאתוֹ וְהֵבִיא״! הַהוּא לְאַחַר כַּפָּרָה. וּלְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן נַמִי, הָכְתִיב: “מֵחַטָּאתוֹ וְנִסְלַח לוֹ״! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָכַל כְּזַיִת וּמֶחֱצָה, וְנוֹדַע לוֹ עַל כַּזַּיִת, וְחָזַר וְאָכַל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת אַחֵר בְּהֶעְלֵמוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי, מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא – לִיצְטָרְפוּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.

The Gemara asks: And how can Reish Lakish say that one sin-offering is sufficient? Isn’t it written: “For his sin … and he shall bring”? The Gemara answers: That verse refers to a case where he only became aware of the second sin after attaining atonement for the first. However, if he became aware prior to atonement, he is required to bring only one sin-offering. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, too, how can he say that one is liable to bring two sin-offerings? Isn’t it written: “From his sin, and it shall be forgiven for him? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, with what are we dealing here? It is a case where one ate an olive-bulk and a half, and he became aware of his transgression of eating a single olive-bulk, and then he ate another half of an olive -bulk in the course of the lapse of awareness of the second half of an olive-bulk that he ate together with the whole olive-bulk. Lest you say that the two halves of an olive-bulk should join together, and he is liable to bring an additional sin-offering, the verse teaches us that in that case he is exempt because he has already atoned for part of his transgression.

אָמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אַשִׁי: דְּאִיתְיַדַע לֵיהּ קוֹדֶם הַפְרָשָׁה פְּלִיגִי, וּבְהָא פְּלִיגִי; דְּמָר סָבַר: יְדִיעוֹת מְחַלְּקוֹת, וּמָר סָבַר: הַפְרָשׁוֹת מְחַלְּקוֹת. אֲבָל לְאַחַר הַפְרָשָׁה – מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּחַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם; אוֹ דִּילְמָא: דְּאִיתְיַדַע לֵיהּ לְאַחַר הַפְרָשָׁה פְּלִיגִי, וּבְהָא פְּלִיגִי; דְּמָר סָבַר: הַפְרָשׁוֹת מְחַלְּקוֹת, וּמָר סָבַר: כַּפָּרוֹת מְחַלְּקוֹת. אֲבָל קוֹדֶם הַפְרָשָׁה – מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת; אוֹ דִּילְמָא: בֵּין בְּזוֹ וּבֵין בְּזוֹ מַחֲלוֹקֶת?

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, they disagree in a case where one became aware of the second transgression prior to designating an animal for the first sin-offering, and this is the point over which they disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that periods of awareness separate. Since one became aware of his sins at two different stages, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. And one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that only designations of animals for sacrifices separate. However, if one became aware of the second transgression after designation of the animal for the first sin-offering, Reish Lakish agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. Or, perhaps they are disagreeing in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designating an animal for the first sin-offering, and this is the point over which they disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that designations separate; and one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that only atonements separate. Only after the sin-offering has been sacrificed on the altar and the sinner has obtained atonement can it be said that the sacrifice’s capacity to atone is spent and cannot atone for a sin of which he became aware afterward. However, if he became aware of the second sin prior to designation of the sacrifice, Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Reish Lakish that he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Or, perhaps, the dispute between them is both in this case, before designation, and in that case, after designation.

אָמַר לֵיהּ: מִסְתַּבְּרָא, בֵּין בְּזוֹ וּבֵין בְּזוֹ מַחֲלוֹקֶת. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַּעֲתָךְ קוֹדֶם הַפְרָשָׁה פְּלִיגִי, אֲבָל לְאַחַר הַפְרָשָׁה מוֹדֶה לֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּחַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם, אַדְּמוֹקֵים לֵיהּ קְרָא לְאַחַר כַּפָּרָה – לוֹקְמֵיהּ לְאַחַר הַפְרָשָׁה! וְאִי אַחַר הַפְרָשָׁה פְּלִיגִי, אֲבָל קוֹדֶם הַפְרָשָׁה מוֹדֶה לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת – אַדְּמוֹקִי לֵיהּ קְרָא בִּכְזַיִת וּמֶחֱצָה, לוֹקְמֵיהּ קוֹדֶם הַפְרָשָׁה!

Rav Ashi said to him: It is reasonable to say that the dispute is both in this case and in that case. As, should it enter your mind that they disagree only in a case where he became aware of the second sin prior to designation of an animal for the first sin-offering, and in a case where he became aware after designation Reish Lakish agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, then rather than establishing the verse that posed a difficulty to Reish Lakish’s opinion in a case where one became aware of the second sin after atonement for the first, let him establish it in a case where one became aware of the transgression after designation of an animal for the first sin-offering. And similarly, if you say that they disagree only in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designation, and in a case where he became aware prior to designation Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Reish Lakish that he is only liable to bring one sin-offering, then rather than establishing the verse that posed a difficulty to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion in a case where he ate an olive-bulk and a half, let him establish it in a case where he became aware of the transgression prior to designation.

וְדִילְמָא סַפּוֹקֵי מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ, וְאִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר קָאָמַר: אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר קוֹדֶם הַפְרָשָׁה פְּלִיגִי בָּהּ, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הֵיכִי מוֹקֵי לֵיהּ לִקְרָא – בִּכְזַיִת וּמֶחֱצָה. וְאִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר לְאַחַר הַפְרָשָׁה פְּלִיגִי, רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ הֵיכִי מוֹקֵי לֵיהּ לִקְרָא – בִּלְאַחַר כַּפָּרָה.

Ravina does not accept this proof, as, in his opinion, it is flawed: And perhaps there is uncertainty with regard to this matter, and he spoke employing the style of: If you wish to say. If you wish to say that they disagree in a case where he became aware of the second sin prior to designation, then how does Rabbi Yoḥanan establish the verse? He establishes the verse in a case where one ate an olive-bulk and a half. And if you wish to say they disgaree in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designation, then how does Reish Lakish establish the verse? He establishes the verse in a case where one became aware of the second sin after attaining atonement.

אָמַר עוּלָּא: לְמַאן דְּאָמַר “אָשָׁם וַדַּאי לָא בָּעְיָא יְדִיעָה בַּתְּחִילָּה״

Ulla said: According to the one who said that in order to designate a definite guilt-offering, a sacrifice brought by one who committed a robbery, misused sacred objects, or had relations with a designated maidservant, one does not require prior knowledge that he definitely sinned,