מִידֵי דַּהֲוָה לְאַחַר מִיתָה.

The Gemara answers: The halakha here is just as it is after the death of his father, and the son is liable for cursing his father even after his death. Therefore, he is also liable when his father’s death is imminent.

מַאי הֲוָה עֲלָהּ? אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא, וְכֵן תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״לַכֹּל אֵין הַבֵּן נַעֲשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְאָבִיו לְהַכּוֹתוֹ וּלְקַלְּלוֹ, חוּץ מִמֵּסִית, שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: ׳וְלֹא תַחְמֹל וְלֹא תְכַסֶּה עָלָיו׳״.

Despite several attempts to cite proof contradicting his opinion, there is no conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Sheshet that a son may serve as an agent of the court to punish his father. The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Rabba bar Rav Huna says, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: With regard to all cases a son is not designated as an agent to strike his father or to curse him, except in a case where his father incites others to worship idols, as the Torah states: “Neither shall you spare, nor shall you conceal him” (Deuteronomy 13:9).

מתני׳ הַמַּכֶּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בָּהֶן חַבּוּרָה. זֶה חוֹמֶר בַּמְּקַלֵּל מִבַּמַּכֶּה, שֶׁהַמְקַלֵּל לְאַחַר מִיתָה חַיָּיב, וְהַמַּכֶּה לְאַחַר מִיתָה – פָּטוּר.

One who strikes his father or his mother is not liable to be executed unless he wounds one of them. This is a stringency with regard to one who curses his father that is more severe than the halakha with regard to one who strikes his father, as one who curses his father or his mother after his or her death is liable, but one who strikes one of them after his or her death is exempt, as he did not cause a wound.

גמ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״׳אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל׳, לְאַחַר מִיתָה. שֶׁיָּכוֹל, הוֹאִיל וְחַיָּיב בְּמַכֶּה וְחַיָּיב בִּמְקַלֵּל – מַה מַּכֶּה אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא מֵחַיִּים, אַף הַמְקַלֵּל אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא מֵחַיִּים.

The Sages taught in a baraita that it is written: “For any man who curses his father and his mother shall be put to death, he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him who curses his father and his mother shall die; he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him” (Leviticus 20:9). This is referring to one who curses his parents even after their death, as one might have thought: Since one is liable for striking and one is liable for cursing, just as one who strikes is liable only when his father or mother are alive, so too, one who curses is liable only when they are alive.

וְעוֹד, קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמַה מַּכֶּה – שֶׁעָשָׂה בּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא ׳בְעַמְּךָ׳ כִּ׳בְעַמְּךָ׳ – לֹא חִיֵּיב בּוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה, מְקַלֵּל שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה בּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא ׳בְעַמְּךָ׳ כִּ׳בְעַמְּךָ׳ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא חִיֵּיב בּוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה.

Furthermore, one may draw an a fortiori inference: If, with regard to one who strikes another, where the Torah deemed the status of striking one who performs actions not of your people, i.e., a sinner, like that of striking one who performs actions that are of your people, yet the Torah did not deem him liable for striking another after death, then with regard to one who curses, where the Torah deemed the status of cursing one who performs actions not of your people like that of cursing one who performs actions that are of your people, is it not right that the Torah did not deem him liable for cursing another after their death?

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ׳אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל׳ – לְאַחַר מִיתָה״.

Therefore, the verse states the extraneous phrase: “He has cursed his father and his mother,” to include even one who curses his father or mother after that parent’s death.

הָנִיחָא לְרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן דְּמִיַּיתַּר לֵיהּ קְרָא, ״אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ״, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, for whom the phrase “his father and his mother” is extraneous. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, who disagrees with him, what is there to say?

דְּתַנְיָא: ״׳אִישׁ אִישׁ׳, מַה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ׳אִישׁ אִישׁ׳? לְרַבּוֹת בַּת, טוּמְטוּם, וְאַנְדְּרוֹגִינוֹס. ׳אֲשֶׁר יְקַלֵּל אֶת אָבִיו וְאֶת אִמּוֹ׳, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ, אָבִיו שֶׁלֹּא אִמּוֹ, אִמּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא אָבִיו מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ׳אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל׳, אָבִיו קִלֵּל, אִמּוֹ קִלֵּל. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה.

This is as it is taught in a baraita that it is written: “For any man [ ish ish ] who curses his father and his mother shall be put to death, he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him.” What is the meaning when the verse states redundantly: “ Ish ish ”? It serves to include not only a son, but also a daughter, one whose sexual organs are indeterminate [ tumtum ], and a hermaphrodite who curse their parent. When the verse states: “Who curses his father and his mother,” I have derived only liability for cursing both his father and his mother. From where is liability derived for one who cursed his father but who did not curse his mother, or one who cursed his mother but who did not curse his father? The verse states: “He has cursed his father and his mother,” from which it is derived that the halakha is as if the verse states: He cursed his father or he cursed his mother. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מַשְׁמַע שְׁנֵיהֶן כְּאֶחָד, וּמַשְׁמַע אֶחָד וְאֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, עַד שֶׁיְּפָרֵט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב ׳יַחְדָּיו׳״.

Rabbi Yonatan says: In verses of this kind when two subjects are joined with a prefix of the letter vav , that prefix indicates the conjunction “and,” meaning both subjects together, and it also indicates the conjunction “or,” meaning each one by itself, unless the verse specifies with the word: “Together,” in which case the meaning is both together. Therefore, the phrase “he has cursed his father and his mother” is extraneous.

מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״וּמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת״.

Since according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, the phrase is not redundant, from where does he derive that one is liable for cursing his father after his death? The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which is written: “And one who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:17).

וְאִידָךְ? הַהוּא מִיבָּעֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבּוֹת בַּת, טוּמְטוּם וְאַנְדְּרוֹגִינוֹס.

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna , Rabbi Yonatan, what does he derive from that verse? The Gemara answers: He requires the other verse to include a daughter, a tumtum , and a hermaphrodite in the prohibition against cursing a parent.

וְתֵיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מֵ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״! דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה כִּלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם.

The Gemara challenges: But let him derive that halakha from the redundant use of “ ish ish ,” as Rabbi Yoshiya does. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yonatan holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people. The repetition of the term ish is merely a rhetorical flourish commonly employed in speech, and no additional halakhot can be derived from it.

וְלִיתְנֵי: חוֹמֶר בַּמַּכֶּה מִבַּמְּקַלֵּל, שֶׁהַמַּכֶּה עָשָׂה בּוֹ שֶׁ״לֹּא בְעַמְּךָ״ כִּ״בְעַמְּךָ״, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בַּמְּקַלֵּל! קָסָבַר: מַקְּשִׁינַן הַכָּאָה לִקְלָלָה.

§ The Gemara asks with regard to the mishna: And let the tanna teach a second stringency in the mishna: This is a stringency with regard to one who strikes his father that is more severe than the halakha with regard to one who curses his father, that with regard to one who strikes a parent the Torah deemed the status of striking one who performs actions not of your people to be like that of striking one who performs actions of your people, which is not so with regard to one who curses a parent. The Gemara responds: The tanna of the mishna disagrees and holds that we liken striking to cursing based on the juxtaposition of the verses.

לֵימָא הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי כְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי? דְּתָנֵי חֲדָא: ״כּוּתִי אַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה עַל הַכָּאָתוֹ, וְאִי אַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה עַל קִלְלָתוֹ״. וְתַנְיָא אִידָךְ: ״אִי אַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה לֹא עַל קִלְלָתוֹ, וְלֹא עַל הַכָּאָתוֹ״.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinions of these following tanna’im are parallel to the opinions of those following tanna’im , as it is taught in one baraita : With regard to a Samaritan, you are commanded to refrain from striking him, but you are not commanded to refrain from cursing him. And it is taught in another baraita : You are commanded neither to refrain from cursing him nor to refrain from striking him.

סְבָרוּהָ: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כּוּתִים גֵּירֵי אֱמֶת הֵן. מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: מַקְּשִׁינַן הַכָּאָה לִקְלָלָה, וּמָר סָבַר: לָא מַקְּשִׁינַן הַכָּאָה לִקְלָלָה?

It is assumed that everyone, i.e., the tanna of each baraita , agrees that Samaritans are true converts. Since their conversion was sincere, their status is that of a Jew who sinned. Based on that assumption, the Gemara suggests: What, is it not that they disagree about this: That one Sage, the tanna of the second baraita , holds that we liken striking to cursing and the halakha is the same with regard to both, and therefore it is neither prohibited to strike a Samaritan, nor is it prohibited to curse him; and one Sage, the tanna of the first baraita , holds that we do not liken striking to cursing, and there is no prohibition against cursing a sinner, but there is a prohibition against striking him?

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא מַקְּשִׁינַן הַכָּאָה לִקְלָלָה. וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר: כּוּתִים גֵּירֵי אֱמֶת הֵן, וּמָר סָבַר: כּוּתִים גֵּירֵי אֲרָיוֹת הֵן.

The Gemara rejects the parallel between the two tannaitic disputes. No, everyone, i.e., the tanna’im in each baraita , agrees that we do not liken striking to cursing, and here they disagree about this: One Sage, the tanna of the first baraita , holds that Samaritans are true converts and their status is that of a Jew who sinned. Therefore, there is no prohibition against cursing him, but there is a prohibition against striking him. And one Sage, the tanna of the second baraita , holds that Samaritans are converts who converted under duress due to the threat of lions (see II Kings, chapter 17) and their conversion was never valid. Therefore, their legal status is that of a gentile and it is neither prohibited to strike a Samaritan nor to curse him.

אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי עֲלָהּ: ״וְשׁוֹרוֹ כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל״? אֶלָּא, שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: בְּהֶיקֵּישָׁא פְּלִיגִי. שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ.

The Gemara asks: If so, is that consistent with that which is taught with regard to the second baraita : And in terms of damage caused to his ox his status is like that of a Jew? Apparently, even the tanna of the second baraita holds that the conversion of the Samaritans was sincere. Rather, learn from it that the two tanna’im disagree with regard to the juxtaposition of the two prohibitions, as initially suggested; their dispute is not with regard to the status of a Samaritan. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is the crux of their dispute.

מתני׳ הַגּוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיסֶנּוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיסֶנּוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ וְיִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְהִתְעַמֶּר בּוֹ וּמְכָרוֹ״. הַגּוֹנֵב אֶת בְּנוֹ – רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין. גָּנַב מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין.

One who abducts a Jewish person is not liable to be executed unless he brings the abductee into his domain. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is not liable unless he brings him into his domain and exploits him, as it is stated: “If a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren from the children of Israel, and he exploited him and sold him, then that abductor shall die” (Deuteronomy 24:7). The phrase “exploited him” indicates using him for labor. With regard to one who abducts his own son and sells him, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. If one abducted one who is a half-slave half-freeman, i.e., a Canaanite slave who belonged to two owners and was emancipated by one of them, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

גמ׳ וְתַנָּא קַמָּא לָא בָּעֵי עִימּוּר? אָמַר רַבִּי אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: עִימּוּר פָּחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara asks: And does the first tanna not require exploitation as a condition for liability? The Torah states it explicitly in the verse in Deuteronomy. Rabbi Aḥa, son of Rava, says: The difference between them is in a case of exploitation worth less than the value of one peruta . The first tanna holds that one is liable for any exploitation and there is no minimum value in order to establish liability. Rabbi Yehuda holds that one is liable only if one derives benefit equal to at least one peruta from his exploitation.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: גְּנָבוֹ וּמְכָרוֹ יָשֵׁן, מַהוּ? מָכַר אִשָּׁה לְעוּבָּרָהּ, מַהוּ? יֵשׁ דֶּרֶךְ עִימּוּר בְּכָךְ, אוֹ אֵין דֶּרֶךְ עִימּוּר בְּכָךְ?

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If one abducted another and sold him while he was asleep, what is the halakha ? If one abducted and sold a pregnant woman solely for benefit from her fetus, what is the halakha ? Is that a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed or is that not a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed?

וְתֵיפּוֹק לֵיהּ דְּלֵיכָּא עִימּוּר כְּלָל! לָא צְרִיכָא. יָשֵׁן – דִּזְגָא עֲלֵיהּ. אִשָּׁה – דְּאוֹקְמָא בְּאַפֵּי זִיקָא. דֶּרֶךְ עִימּוּר בְּכָךְ אוֹ אֵין דֶּרֶךְ עִימּוּר בְּכָךְ, מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara asks with regard to the dilemmas raised by Rabbi Yirmeya: But let him derive that the abductor is not liable, as there is no exploitation at all of a sleeping individual or a fetus. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma only with regard to the sleeping individual in a case where one reclines on him, and with regard to the pregnant woman where one stands her in the face of the wind to protect himself from the wind. In those cases, is that a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed or is that not a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed? What is the halakha ? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand [ teiku ] unresolved.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״׳כִּי יִמָּצֵא אִישׁ גֹּנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מֵאֶחָיו׳, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִישׁ שֶׁגָּנַב, אִשָּׁה מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ׳וְגֹנֵב אִישׁ׳.

The Sages taught in a baraita that it is written: “If a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren from the children of Israel, and he exploited him and sold him, then that abductor shall die” (Deuteronomy 24:7). I have derived only that a man who abducted another is liable. From where is it derived that a woman who abducts another is liable as well? It is derived from the verse that states: And one who abducts a man, and sells him, if he be found in his hand, he shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:16), where the sex of the abductor is not specified.

אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִישׁ שֶׁגָּנַב, בֵּין אִשָּׁה וּבֵין אִישׁ, וְאִשָּׁה שֶׁגָּנְבָה אִישׁ, אִשָּׁה שֶׁגָּנְבָה אִשָּׁה מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ׳וּמֵת הַגַּנָּב הַהוּא׳ – מִכָּל מָקוֹם״.

I have derived only that a man who abducted another, whether a man or a woman, is liable, as it is written: “If a man shall be found abducting a person”; the abductor is male but the sex of the abductee is not specified. And I derived that a woman who abducted a man is liable, as it is written: “And one who abducts a man”; the sex of the abductor is not specified but the abductee is male. From where is it derived that a woman who abducted a woman is liable as well? It is derived from the verse that states: “Then that abductor shall die” (Deuteronomy 24:7); the abductor shall die in any case, regardless of the sex of the one who was abducted.

תַּנְיָא אִידָךְ: ״׳כִּי יִמָּצֵא אִישׁ גֹּנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מֵאֶחָיו׳ – אֶחָד הַגּוֹנֵב אֶת הָאִישׁ, וְאֶחָד הַגּוֹנֵב אֶת הָאִשָּׁה, וְאֶחָד גֵּר וְאֶחָד עֶבֶד מְשׁוּחְרָר וְקָטָן – חַיָּיב. גְּנָבוֹ וְלֹא מְכָרוֹ, מְכָרוֹ וַעֲדַיִין יֶשְׁנוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ פָּטוּר. מְכָרוֹ לְאָבִיו אוֹ לְאָחִיו, אוֹ לְאֶחָד מִן הַקְּרוֹבִים, חַיָּיב. הַגּוֹנֵב אֶת הָעֲבָדִים פָּטוּר״.

It is taught in another baraita that it is written: “If a man is found abducting a person of his brethren,” from which it is derived that whether he abducts a man, or whether he abducts a woman, or whether he abducts a convert, or whether he abducts an emancipated slave or a minor, he is liable. If he abducted another but did not sell him, or if he sold him but he remains in his domain, the abductor is exempt. If he sold him to the father of the abductee, or to his brother, or to one of his other relatives, the abductor is liable. One who abducts slaves is exempt.