While the Sanhedrin was the Jewish high court, tractate Sanhedrin is, at its essential core, a discussion of the Jewish state, and not only of the judicial system as its name might indicate. The tractate lays out a blueprint of the Jewish state as a whole and addresses many of the dilemmas created by the concept of a Jewish state. It explains all of the main institutions that exist within the state according to Torah law and their relationships with one another. Indeed, most of the halakhot in this tractate can be applied only in a sovereign Jewish state that operates in accordance with halakha. The singular nature of the Jewish state envisioned by tractate Sanhedrin is determined by a number of inherent principles, which form the basis of many of the halakhot governing various aspects of the operation of the state. The most basic idea in Judaism, which is reflected in its halakhot, philosophy, and manner of living, is the universal dominion of God, the Creator and Sustainer of the entire universe. Just as God creates and maintains the laws of nature, He similarly creates laws that govern human beings and their behavior. The ultimate source of all authority or any type of government is the will of God. Only by virtue of the divine command may people lay claim to leadership, and human rulers derive their authority from God. The prophet Isaiah expresses this point powerfully: “For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king” (Isaiah 33:22). All three standard powers of government: Judicial, legislative, and executive, are enumerated in this verse, and all are concentrated in God Himself. In principle, therefore, God is the judge, legislator, and king. In practice, divine authority is often systematically delegated to humans, who are created “in the image of God” (Genesis 1:27), just as dominion over the physical world and nature are delegated to humankind to continue the divine act of Creation. The judicial branch is completely entrusted to the supreme body of Jewish Sages in each generation, known as the Sanhedrin. Due to the stability and inviolability of the Torah’s laws, the judiciary is of immense importance; it is entrusted with the power to interpret the Torah’s eternal laws and to apply them to the changing circumstances of each generation and locale. This power is granted to a complex system of courts, at the head of which stands the Great Sanhedrin, a court numbering seventy-one members, which is viewed as the successor to the original court of Moses and the seventy elders who assisted him (17a; see Numbers 11:16–17, 24–25). By contrast, the Jewish state does not have a genuine legislature. All laws and ordinances that have become accepted among the Jewish people, beyond the halakhot of the Torah, are not actual laws in the ultimate sense, as those of the Torah are. Fundamentally, they are nothing more than various ordinances designed to add additional safeguards or to regulate matters that the Torah itself either does not address or does not address unambiguously enough or in sufficient detail. The only true legislator is God Himself, expressed practically through the Torah, as interpreted by His human representatives. The Torah is the source of all of the laws in the Jewish state, and all laws in such a state are created based on it and by its authority, so that God remains the eternal legislator for the Jewish people. The executive branch of government in the Jewish state is embodied by the king, sometimes also referred to by the title “prince” (Leviticus 4:22; Ezekiel 19:1, 37:25), and the various ministers and officers he appoints. The king is the head of state and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and he is responsible for both foreign and domestic policy. His position was often, although not always, hereditary. Although certain types of decisions that affect the entire nation, such as the decision to declare war, require the endorsement of the Great Sanhedrin, with regard to most matters the executive branch is completely independent and his powers do not overlap with either of the other branches. Additionally, many aspects of daily life were within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of government, under the leadership of the king. The king, and the entire executive branch were required to act in accordance with Torah law, since this law is above everything and cannot be modified in any way by humans. By contrast, in areas that are not directly addressed by this law, and in matters concerning the running of the country, the king was entitled to act in whatever way he saw fit. He had the authority to impose taxes, to draft people into military or civilian service, and to expropriate property for the sake of the public. The king also had a type of judicial authority, as he stood at the head of a system of administrative courts that operated according to the laws of the kingdom. These courts were primarily concerned with enforcing the king’s orders and royal ordinances, but they also functioned as assistants to the judicial system under the authority of the Sanhedrin and operated in parallel to it. It was necessary at times to try cases in the royal courts in order to impose order in cases where the regular courts would be unable to function effectively due to their strict standards of evidence and judicial procedure. The political structure described in tractate Sanhedrin is not some sort of ideal vision, divorced from practical reality. The tractate does not discuss a utopian conception of the Messianic era, nor does it speak of an idealized past rooted in the heyday of Jewish sovereignty under King David and King Solomon. Rather, it discusses contemporaneous dilemmas rooted in the historical period. This point is particularly clear in the discussions of the halakhot concerning the highest-ranking political and religious leaders, namely the king and the High Priest. The king discussed in this tractate is not the Messiah or some abstract prototype of an ideal ruler. He is a king who is not a descendent of the House of David and who does not consistently follow the Torah’s directives, even on matters of elemental importance. It seems that many of the laws and discussions in tractate Sanhedrin relate to the political structure and societal reality of the Hasmonean or Herodian periods. The tractate does not present this structure as ideal and indeed demands the improvement of various aspects of this society. These improvements are themselves realistic in nature, and the tractate reports that several of them were implemented by some of the Hasmonean kings. Historical developments brought about changes in this political structure. Already during the Second Temple period the Sanhedrin decided to formally relinquish many of its powers, in order that it not be viewed as an empty symbol of theoretical sovereignty, robbed of the practical ability to enforce its decisions (see 21a and Sota 47a–49b). After the loss of Jewish independence and the destruction of the Temple, the situation changed even more drastically. As Jewish sovereignty became diminished and lost, the halakhot in tractate Sanhedrin began to lose their practical relevance. The system of laws discussed in this tractate slowly transformed into the theoretical framework of a country that no longer existed, as most of them cannot be implemented under foreign rule or in the Diaspora. Nevertheless, many of the laws in the tractate were in fact adapted to later conditions and widely observed during various periods. At the same time, the political organization of the Jewish people was never limited to the geographic borders of a state in the manner that this concept is understood today. The jurisdiction of the Sanhedrin and of Jewish law applied in every place where Jews were located and was never limited to the political borders of the Jewish state. In situations where the Jews were granted autonomy that enabled them to apply Jewish law in other countries there was a lesser Sanhedrin in every major city. These courts were subservient to the Great Sanhedrin in Jerusalem. Furthermore, not only was Jewish law not limited to the geographic borders of the Jewish state, it was also not limited to the societal goal of maintaining of law and order. Jewish law addresses social, moral, and religious matters, without any distinction between the body of laws governing one’s interactions with other people and those governing his interactions with God. Even in the area of social or monetary laws, in addition to the goal of maintaining an orderly society, the desire to eradicate sin also plays an important role. In general, sin is viewed as damaging not only to the sinner, but to the entire society and even to the land itself. Therefore, the system of laws and justice is not merely a tool to organize the healthy functioning of society, but rather a method of implementing the divine will in the world and building a state in which this will is completely fulfilled in all of its many details. For this reason, the Jewish court is different from all other courts in the world, both in terms of the goals it sets for itself and the methods it utilizes to achieve those goals. The verse states: “For judgment belongs to God” (Deuteronomy 1:17), and therefore the judge is viewed as fulfilling a holy task. He is charged with arriving at perfect truth, above any possible human doubt. The mission of the court, or the “judges and officers” described by the Torah (Deuteronomy 16:18), is to work toward the rule of pure, divine justice to the extent of its ability. Therefore, under Jewish law there are very strict halakhot and procedures with regard to evidence, with the goal of arriving at absolute certainty beyond any doubt whatsoever. In a case of the slightest uncertainty the accused is acquitted, even if this uncertainty appears exceedingly weak. In order to accomplish this, it was not sufficient for the judges to be knowledgeable. They also needed to undergo a procedure of ordination. Today’s ordination of rabbis is a pale reflection of this procedure, which represented the transference of authority from Moses himself through his students and his students’ students throughout the generations. This ordination granted the judges more than the authority to judge; it also granted a certain degree of divine involvement and blessing to ensure correct judgment. On the basis of this authority, there is an obligation to completely obey the rulings of the Great Sanhedrin, to the extent that “You shall not turn aside from the ruling that they shall declare to you, neither to the right, nor to the left” (Deuteronomy 17:11). The many restrictions on admissible evidence and procedural handling of witnesses that flow from the attempt to arrive at absolute justice create the potential for abuse by various types of transgressors, who could use utilize these restrictions to escape justice and thereby undermine the very foundations of society and the economy. In order to prevent a situation of anarchy, the courts made widespread use of the administrative authority granted them by the verse: “You shall remove the evil from your midst” (e.g., Deuteronomy 13:6). On the basis of this authority the court has the power to impose significant punishments, including monetary fines and the confiscation of property, lashes, and even the death penalty, in order to maintain law and order and to force evildoers into submission. In addition, the courts at times waived some of the strict requirements of admissible evidence in relation to various monetary matters, in order to enable the lawful and orderly functioning of the economy. Tractate Sanhedrin is singular among the tractates of the Talmud in terms of the wide range of topics it covers. Most tractates focus on one or two primary subjects and are generally based on a few biblical verses from which the halakhot relevant to those subjects are derived. Tractate Sanhedrin addresses many different topics, and its biblical source is essentially the entire book of Deuteronomy. Almost all of the topics discussed in the book of Deuteronomy that were not discussed in detail in the other books of the Torah are discussed in tractate Sanhedrin. Like the book of Deuteronomy itself, tractate Sanhedrin begins with the halakhot concerning judges and judicial procedures and then continues with a discussion of the foundations of civil law. After this, most of the principles with regard to the violation of prohibitions are analyzed, concerning both transgressions committed against another and transgressions committed against God. The tractate concludes with a clarification of the principles of faith, as well as halakhic and philosophical discussions relevant to the coming of the Messiah. Tractate Sanhedrin contains eleven chapters, the last five of which are printed in this volume. Almost every one of them discusses a different topic: Chapter Seven describes the various types of capital punishment that can be imposed by a court and the offenses for which the penalty is execution by stoning. Chapter Eight addresses the halakhot of a stubborn and rebellious son, the right to self-defense, and the prevention of transgressions. Chapter Nine enumerates the transgressions for which one is liable for execution by burning or decapitation, and it discusses various administrative punishments and other ordinances instituted for the betterment of society. Chapter Ten enumerates the transgressions for which the penalty is execution by strangulation, which includes transgressors who undermine the rule of law. Chapter Eleven, according to the order in the Babylonian Talmud, contains the most extensive discussion of fundamental principles of faith and of ethical behavior in the Talmud. It also discusses the hope, longing, and practical preparations for the coming of the Messiah and the end of days, at which time the world will reach perfection and completion. In the Mishna and in the Jerusalem Talmud this chapter follows immediately after Chapter Nine.