קְלַתֵּיהּ!

she could have burned it. Why did you not accept her testimony?

כֵּיוָן דְּאִיתַּחְזַק בְּבֵי דִינָא, ״אִיבַּעֲיָא קְלַתֵּיהּ״ לָא אָמְרִינַן.

Rav Naḥman answered him: Since the promissory note was ratified in court, we do not say that she is deemed credible to nullify its validity because if she had wanted to, she could have burned it. The validity of a ratified document is not nullified without evidence.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: סִימְפוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלָיו עֵדִים – יִתְקַיֵּים בְּחוֹתְמָיו. אֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים, וְיָצָא מִתַּחַת יְדֵי שָׁלִישׁ; אוֹ שֶׁיָּצָא אַחַר חִיתּוּם שְׁטָרוֹת – כָּשֵׁר. אַלְמָא: שָׁלִישׁ מְהֵימַן!

Rava raised an objection to the ruling of Rav Naḥman from a baraita : A receipt [ simfon ] of repayment of a debt upon which witnesses are signed is ratified by means of its signatories. The witnesses testify that these are their signatures, and it is thereby ratified. If there are no witnesses signed on it, but the receipt emerged from the possession of a third party serving as a trustee, or if it emerged after the signing of the documents, i.e., the receipt was written on the promissory note beneath the content of the note and the witnesses’ signatures, it is valid. Rava states his objection: Apparently, the testimony of a third party serving as a trustee is deemed credible, as he can testify that the receipt is valid even if it was not signed by witnesses.

תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב נַחְמָן, תְּיוּבְתָּא.

The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Naḥman is indeed a conclusive refutation.

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אֲמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְעוֹלָם מֵבִיא רְאָיָה וְסוֹתֵר, עַד שֶׁיִּסְתַּתֵּם טַעֲנוֹתָיו, וְיֹאמַר: קִרְבוּ פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי וְהָעִידוּנִי.

§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One can always bring a proof for his claim and overturn the previous verdict, until his claims are stopped up, i.e., until he has no more claims, and he says: Come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, in which case those witnesses are not allowed to testify.

הָא גּוּפָא קַשְׁיָא. אָמְרַתְּ ״יִסְתַּתֵּם טַעֲנוֹתָיו״ – אֲתָאן לְרַבָּנַן; וַהֲדַר אָמְרַתְּ: ״קִרְבוּ אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי וַהֲעִידוּנִי״ – אֲתָאן לְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל!

The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult. When you say: Until his claims are stopped up, we arrive at, i.e., this represents, the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold in the mishna that once a litigant stops presenting his claims, he cannot present additional claims later. And when you then say: Until he says come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, we arrive at the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that it is only in that case that the testimony is not accepted.

וְכִי תֵּימָא כּוּלָּהּ רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וּפֵרוּשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ: מַאי ״עַד שֶׁיִּסְתַּתֵּם טַעֲנוֹתָיו״? עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״קִרְבוּ פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי וַהֲעִידוּנִי״. וְהָא אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמִשְׁנָתֵינוּ, הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ – חוּץ מֵעָרֵב, וְצַיְדָן, וּרְאָיָה אַחֲרוֹנָה!

And if you would say that the entire statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and Rabbi Yoḥanan is explaining his own statement, saying: What is the meaning of the phrase: Until his claims are stopped up? Until he says: Come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, this is difficult. But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that anywhere that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a ruling in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor, and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan, and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement? Evidently, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in this case.

אֶלָּא, כִּי אֲתָא רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְעוֹלָם מֵבִיא רְאָיָה וְסוֹתֵר, עַד שֶׁיִּסְתַּתֵּם טַעֲנוֹתָיו, וְיֹאמְרוּ לוֹ: ״הָבֵא עֵדִים״, וְאוֹמֵר: ״אֵין לִי עֵדִים״! ״הָבֵא רְאָיָה״, וְאוֹמֵר: ״אֵין לִי רְאָיָה״. אֲבָל, בָּאוּ עֵדִים מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם, אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה דִּיסַקַּיָא שֶׁל אָבִיו מוּפְקֶדֶת בְּיַד אַחֵר – הֲרֵי זֶה מֵבִיא רְאָיָה וְסוֹתֵר.

Rather, the Gemara presents another version of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement. When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One can always bring a proof and overturn the previous verdict until his claims are stopped up, and the judges say to him: Bring witnesses, and he says: I have no witnesses, and they say to him: Bring evidence, and he says: I have no evidence. This is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna. But if witnesses came from overseas, or if there was a saddlebag [ disakkaya ] of his father’s documents deposited by another individual, which are cases where he did not know of the evidence, he can bring this evidence and overturn the previous verdict, as there is no concern of artifice.

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַתּוֹקֵף אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ בַּדִּין, אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״נָדוּן כָּאן״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״נֵלֵךְ לִמְקוֹם הַוַּועַד״ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְיֵלֵךְ לִמְקוֹם הַוַּועַד.

§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who attacks another in judgment, i.e., tenaciously raises legal claims against another, and one of the litigants says: Let us go to court here in our locale, and the other one says: Let us go to the place of the Assembly, i.e., the Sanhedrin, or another High Court, the former litigant is compelled to go to the place of the Assembly.

אָמַר לְפָנָיו רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: רַבִּי, מִי שֶׁנּוֹשֶׁה בַּחֲבֵירוֹ מָנֶה, יוֹצִיא מָנֶה עַל מָנֶה?! אֶלָּא, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְדָן בְּעִירוֹ.

Rabbi Elazar said before him: My teacher, if so, must one who claims a debt of one hundred dinars from another spend one hundred dinars of travel and lodging expenses for the one hundred dinars he wants to collect? Rather, one is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city.

אִיתְּמַר נַמִי: אָמַר רַב סָפְרָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁנִּתְעַצְּמוּ בַּדִּין, אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״נָדוּן כָּאן״ וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״נֵלֵךְ לִמְקוֹם הַוַּועַד״ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְדָן בְּעִירוֹ. וְאִם הוּצְרַךְ דָּבָר לִשְׁאוֹל כּוֹתְבִין וְשׁוֹלְחִין.

It was also stated that Rav Safra says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to two who were struggling in judgment, one of whom says: Let us go to court here, and one of whom says: Let us go to the place of the Assembly, the latter litigant is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city. And if the local court needs to ask a higher court about a certain matter, the judges write to the Assembly, and the higher court sends its response.

וְאִם אָמַר: כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ לִי מֵאֵיזֶה טַעַם דַּנְתּוּנִי – כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין לוֹ.

And if one of the litigants says to a court: Write for what reason you judged me in this manner and give it to me, as I do not trust your decision without explanation, the judges write it and give it to him.

וְהַיְּבָמָה הוֹלֶכֶת אַחַר הַיָּבָם לְהַתִּירָהּ.

Another halakha was stated with regard to the location of the judgment: And with regard to a woman whose husband had a brother, and he died childless [ vehayevama ], she follows her brother-in-law [ hayavam ] for him to free her of the levirate bond through ḥalitza . yavam does not have to go to her.

עַד כַּמָּה? אָמַר רַבִּי אַמִי: אֲפִילּוּ מִטִּבֶּרְיָא לְצִפּוֹרִי.

The Gemara asks: How far does she have to go? Rabbi Ami says: Even from Tiberias to Tzippori. This is the halakha even though the court in Tiberias is more prestigious than the one in Tzippori.

אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: מַאי קְרָא ״וְקָרְאוּ לוֹ זִקְנֵי עִירוֹ״ – וְלֹא זִקְנֵי ״עִירָהּ״.

Rav Kahana says: What is the verse that alludes to this halakha ? It is the verse that states: “Then the elders of his city shall call him, and speak to him, and if he stands and says: I do not wish to take her” (Deuteronomy 25:8). The fact that the elders of his city, and not the elders of her city, are mentioned indicates that ḥalitza is performed in his city and not in hers.

אָמַר אַמֵימָר, הִילְכְתָא: כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְיֵלֵךְ לִמְקוֹם הַוַּועַד. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַשִׁי לְאַמֵימָר: וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְדָן בְּעִירוֹ?! הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ לֹוֶה לַמַּלְוֶה; אֲבָל מַלְוֶה – ״עֶבֶד לֹוֶה לְאִישׁ מַלְוֶה״.

Ameimar says: The halakha is that if one litigant wants to go to the place of the Assembly and the other does not, the latter is compelled to go to the place of the Assembly. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say that he is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city? Ameimar answered: This statement applies in a case where the borrower said to the lender: Let us go to the place of the Assembly; in that case, the debtor is compelled to be judged in his city. But if the lender requests to go to the place of the Assembly, his request is accepted, as it is stated: “The borrower is servant to the lender” (Proverbs 22:7).

שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ לְמָר עוּקְבָא: לִדְזִיו לֵיהּ כְּבַר בִּתְיָה, שְׁלָם! עוּקְבָן הַבַּבְלִי קְבַל קֳדָמָנָא: יִרְמְיָה, אָחִי, הֶעֱבִיר עָלַי אֶת הַדֶּרֶךְ. וְאִמְרוּ לוֹ; הַשִּׂיאוּהוּ וְיִרְאֶה פָּנֵינוּ בְּטִבֶּרְיָא.

The Sages sent a letter to Mar Ukva, the Exilarch in Babylonia, which stated: To he who has light upon him, like Moses, who is called the son of Bithiah, Shalom. The letter continued: Ukvan the Babylonian complained before us as follows: Yirmeya, my brother, came past me, i.e., did me a great evil. And therefore tell Yirmeya; induce him [ hassiuhu ] to see our face in Tiberias, where we will judge his case.

הָא גּוּפָא קַשְׁיָא! אָמְרַתְּ ״אִמְרוּ לוֹ״ – אַלְמָא דָּיְינוּהּ אַתּוּן; ״הַשִּׂיאוּהוּ וְיִרְאֶה פָּנֵינוּ בְּטִבֶּרְיָא״ – אַלְמָא שְׁדַרוּהוּ הָכָא!

The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult to understand. You said: Tell him. Apparently the intention was: Judge him yourselves in Babylonia. But then the letter states: Induce him to see our face in Tiberias. Apparently the intention was: Send him here.

אֶלָּא, הָכִי קָאָמְרִי: ״אִמְרוּ לֵיהּ״ – דָּיְינוּ אַתּוּן. אִי צָיֵית, צָיֵית; וְאִי לָא – ״הַשִּׂיאוּהוּ וְיִרְאֶה פָּנֵינוּ בְּטִבֶּרְיָא״.

Rather, this is what the Sages were saying: Tell him, i.e., judge him yourselves. If he listens to the court, he listens, and the issue is resolved. But if he does not listen, induce him to see our face in Tiberias.

רַב אַשִׁי אֲמַר: דִּינֵי קְנָסוֹת הֲוָה, וּבְבָבֶל לָא דָּיְינוּ דִּינֵי קְנָסוֹת. וְהָא דִּשְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ הָכִי, כְּדֵי לַחֲלוֹק כָּבוֹד לְמָר עוּקְבָא. הדרן עלך זה בורר

Rav Ashi said: That is not the correct understanding of the letter. Rather, it was a case pertaining to the halakhot of fines, and in Babylonia the courts do not adjudicate in cases pertaining to the halakhot of fines, as there are no ordained judges there; such Sages are found only in Eretz Yisrael. Consequently, it was necessary to send the case to Eretz Yisrael. And the fact that they sent the letter to Mar Ukva using this wording, as though he were capable of adjudicating the case himself, was in order to give honor to Mar Ukva, who was a Sage and a leader. They hinted to him that he could not judge this case and that he therefore had to send the defendant to Eretz Yisrael.