הֵפֵר לַתְּאֵנִים – אֵינוֹ מוּפָר עַד שֶׁיָּפֵר אַף לָעֲנָבִים, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ״ מַה ״יְקִימֶנּוּ״ – מִמֶּנּוּ, אַף ״יְפֵרֶנּוּ״ – מִמֶּנּוּ. וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: מִי כְּתִיב ״יָפֵר מִמֶּנּוּ״? וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: מַקִּישׁ הֲפָרָה לַהֲקָמָה, מַה הֲקָמָה מִמֶּנּוּ – אַף הֲפָרָה מִמֶּנּוּ.

But if he nullified it with regard to figs, it is not nullified until he will also nullify the vow for grapes. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says that the verse states: “Her husband may uphold it, or her husband may nullify it.” Just as the words “may uphold it” [ yekimennu ] should be understood as if they read: He may uphold part of it [ yakim mimmennu ], implying that if he upheld part of the vow he has upheld all of it, so too, the words “he may nullify it” [ yeferennu ] should be understood as if they read: He may nullify part of it [ yafer mimmennu ]. And Rabbi Yishmael retorts: Is it written: He may nullify part of it, with a mem , as it is written with respect to a husband who upholds the vow? And Rabbi Akiva replies: The verse juxtaposes nullification to upholding; just as upholding means part of it, so too, nullification means part of it.

אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מַקִּישׁ הֲקָמָה לַהֲפָרָה, מַה הֲפָרָה – מַה שֶּׁהֵפֵר הֵפֵר, אַף הֲקָמָה – מַה שֶּׁקִּיֵּים קִיֵּים.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This opinion, that a vow is treated as a single unit, so that the entire vow is upheld even if the husband upheld only a part of it, is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. But the Rabbis say: The verse juxtaposes upholding to nullification; just as with regard to nullification, that which he nullified he has nullified, so too, with regard to upholding, that which he upheld he has upheld, but no more.

״אָמְרָה קוֹנָם תְּאֵנָה״. אֲמַר רָבָא: מַתְנִיתִין רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא. דְּאָמַר: עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר שְׁבוּעָה לְכָל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד.

The mishna teaches that if a woman said: Tasting a fig and tasting a grape are konam for me, these are viewed as two separate vows. Rava said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon said that that one is not liable to bring multiple offerings for taking false oaths to multiple people in the same utterance, for example, if he says: I take an oath that I do not have your item, nor yours, nor yours, unless he states an expression of an oath to each and every one of the creditors, for example by stating: I take an oath I do not have yours; I take an oath I do not have yours. Here too, only if she says: Tasting, with respect to each fruit are they viewed as two separate vows.

מתני׳ ״יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ נְדָרִים אֲבָל אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁיֵּשׁ מְפִירִין״ – יָפֵר. ״יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ מְפִירִין אֲבָל אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁזֶּה נֶדֶר״, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לֹא יָפֵר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יָפֵר.

If a man’s wife or daughter took a vow and he failed to nullify the vow on the day he heard it, but afterward he said: I know that there are vows, but I don’t know that there are those who can nullify them, i.e., he was unaware of the possibility of nullifying vows, he can nullify the vow of his wife or his daughter on the day he learned that he can nullify vows. If, however, he said: I know there are those who can nullify vows, but I refrained from nullifying the vow that I heard because I do not know that this is considered a vow, Rabbi Meir says he cannot nullify the vow at this point, but the Rabbis say that even in this case he can nullify the vow on the day that he learned of his mistake.

גמ׳ וּרְמִינְהוּ: ״בְּלֹא רְאוֹת״ – פְּרָט לְסוּמָא, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַסּוּמָא.

The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita : With regard to one who kills unintentionally, the verse states: “Without seeing” (Numbers 35:23), which serves to exclude a blind person from the category of those who are exiled to a city of refuge due to having killed unintentionally, as the verse indicates that it was only in this instance that he did not see, but he is generally able to see. A blind person who kills another unintentionally is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says the verse serves to include a blind person in the category of those who are exiled, as he too does not see. This shows that Rabbi Meir does not distinguish between different kinds of lack of knowledge, whereas the mishna suggests that he does accept such a distinction. The opposite is true of Rabbi Yehuda, who, unless it is otherwise indicated, is assumed to be Rabbi Meir’s disputant in all places.