מְתִיב רַבִּי אַבָּא: ״קוֹנָם שֶׁאֵינִי נוֹשֵׂא לִפְלוֹנִית כְּעוּרָה״ וַהֲרֵי הִיא נָאָה: ״שְׁחוֹרָה״ וַהֲרֵי הִיא לְבָנָה: ״קְצָרָה״ וַהֲרֵי הִיא אֲרוּכָּה – מוּתָּר בָּהּ, לֹא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכְּעוּרָה וְנַעֲשֵׂת נָאָה, שְׁחוֹרָה וְנַעֲשֵׂת לְבָנָה, קְצָרָה וְנַעֲשֵׂת אֲרוּכָּה – אֶלָּא שֶׁהַנֶּדֶר טָעוּת. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב הוּנָא, דְּאָמַר נַעֲשָׂה כְּתוֹלֶה נִדְרוֹ בְּדָבָר – תָּנָא תּוֹלֶה נִדְרוֹ בְּדָבָר, וְתָנָא נֶדֶר טָעוּת. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר כְּבָר מֵת וּכְבָר עָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה, לָמָּה לִי לְמִתְנֵי תְּרֵי זִימְנֵי נֶדֶר טָעוּת? קַשְׁיָא.

Rabbi Abba raised an objection from a later mishna (66a): If a one said: I will not marry ugly so-and-so as that is konam for me, and she is in fact beautiful, or if he called her black, and she is in fact white, or if he called her short, and she is in fact tall, he is permitted to her. Not because she was ugly and became beautiful, black and became white, or short and became tall, but rather, because the vow was mistaken from the outset. Granted, according to Rav Huna, who said that he is considered like one who makes his vow dependent on a matter, the mishna here taught the case of one who makes his vow dependent on a matter, and it taught there the case of a mistaken vow. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that the mishna here is referring to a situation where the dog had already died, or the father had already repented, why do I need the mishna to teach the halakha of a mistaken vow twice? The Gemara comments: This is difficult.

מתני׳ וְעוֹד אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: פּוֹתְחִין לוֹ מִן הַכָּתוּב שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה, וְאוֹמְרִין לוֹ: אִילּוּ הָיִיתָ יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאַתָּה עוֹבֵר עַל ״לֹא תִקֹּם״ וְעַל ״לֹא תִטֹּר״ וְעַל ״לֹא תִשְׂנָא אֶת אָחִיךָ בִּלְבָבֶךָ״ ״וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ״ ״וְחֵי אָחִיךָ עִמָּךְ״ שֶׁהוּא עָנִי וְאֵין אַתָּה יָכוֹל לְפַרְנְסוֹ. אָמַר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהוּא כֵּן – לֹא הָיִיתִי נוֹדֵר, הֲרֵי זֶה מוּתָּר.

And Rabbi Meir further said: The halakhic authorities may broach dissolution with him from that which is written in the Torah, and they may say to him: Had you known that through your vow you are transgressing the prohibition “you shall not take vengeance” (Leviticus 19:18) and the prohibition “nor bear any grudge” (Leviticus 19:18), and the prohibition “you shall not hate your brother in your heart” (Leviticus 19:17), and “you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), as well as “and your brother should live with you” (Leviticus 25:36), as he, the one prohibited by the vow, is poor and now you are not able to provide him with a livelihood due to your vow, would you have vowed in that case? If he said in reply: Had I known that it is so, that my vow involved all these prohibitions, I would not have vowed; it is dissolved.

גמ׳ אָמַר לְהוּ רַב הוּנָא בַּר רַב קְטִינָא לְרַבָּנַן: נֵימָא כָּל דְּמִעַנֵּי – לָאו עָלַי נָפֵיל, מַאי דְּמָטֵי לִי לְפַרְנְסוֹ בַּהֲדֵי כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא – מְפָרְנַסְנָא לֵיהּ. אָמְרִי לֵיהּ: אֲנִי אוֹמֵר כָּל הַנּוֹפֵל – אֵינוֹ נוֹפֵל לִידֵי גַּבַּאי תְּחִלָּה.

Rav Huna bar Rav Ketina said to the Sages: But let the one who stated the vow say with regard to the last claim: All who become poor do not fall upon me; it is not my responsibility to provide for this specific poor person. What is placed upon me to provide for him together with everyone else, I will provide to him when I give money to those collecting for the communal charity fund. They said to him: I say that anyone who falls into poverty and requires assistance does not fall into the hands of the charity collector first. Rather, his descent begins when he encounters hard times, and it is at this stage that he may require individual, direct support to prevent him from plunging into a state of absolute poverty.

מתני׳ פּוֹתְחִין לְאָדָם בִּכְתוּבַּת אִשְׁתּוֹ.

The halakhic authorities may broach dissolution with a man by raising the issue of his wife’s marriage contract. If one takes a vow that would require him to divorce his wife, e.g., he prohibits her from deriving benefit from him, his vow may be dissolved by asking him whether he had considered how difficult it would be to pay her marriage contract.

וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּאֶחָד שֶׁנָּדַר מֵאִשְׁתּוֹ הֲנָאָה, וְהָיְתָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ אַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת דִּינָרִים. וּבָא לִפְנֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, וְחִיְּיבוֹ לִיתֵּן לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. אָמַר לוֹ: רַבִּי, שְׁמוֹנֶה מֵאוֹת דִּינָרִין הִנִּיחַ אַבָּא, נָטַל אָחִי אַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת, וַאֲנִי אַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת, לֹא דַּיָּהּ שֶׁתִּטּוֹל הִיא מָאתַיִם וַאֲנִי מָאתַיִם? אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אֲפִילּוּ אַתָּה מוֹכֵר שַׁעַר רֹאשְׁךָ אַתָּה נוֹתֵן לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. אָמַר לוֹ: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהוּא כֵּן – לֹא הָיִיתִי נוֹדֵר. וְהִתִּירָהּ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

The mishna relates: And an incident occurred with regard to one who vowed against his wife deriving benefit from him, and her marriage contract was worth four hundred dinars. And he came before Rabbi Akiva, and he obligated him to give her the payment of her marriage contract. He said to Rabbi Akiva: My teacher, my father left eight hundred dinars as our inheritance, of which my brother took four hundred and I took four hundred. Isn’t it enough for my wife to take two hundred and I will have two hundred? Rabbi Akiva said to him: Your claim is not accepted, as even if you sell the hair on your head, you must give her the full payment of her marriage contract. He said to him: Had I known that it was so, that I would have to give her all my property, I would not have vowed. And Rabbi Akiva permitted her to derive benefit from him.

גמ׳ מִטַּלְטְלֵי מִי מִשְׁתַּעְבְּדִי לִכְתוּבָּה? אָמַר אַבַּיֵי: קַרְקַע שָׁוָה שְׁמוֹנֶה מֵאוֹת דִּינָר. וְהָקָתָנֵי שַׁעַר רֹאשׁוֹ, וּשְׂעַר רֹאשׁוֹ מִטַּלְטְלֵי הוּא! הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ אַתָּה מוֹכֵר שַׁעַר רֹאשְׁךָ וְאוֹכֵל.

The Gemara questions the comment made by Rabbi Akiva, that even if the man were to sell the hair on his head, he must pay her the full sum of her marriage contract: Is movable property mortgaged for the payment of a marriage contract? The Rabbis maintain that only land owned by the husband is mortgaged for the payment of a marriage contract, so why should he have to sell the hair on his head? Abaye said: He said that the father had left land worth eight hundred dinars, and he received four hundred dinars’ worth of land, so all of his land is equal in value to his wife’s marriage contract. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the mishna teaches that he must pay even from: The hair on his head, and the hair on his head is movable property. The Gemara answers: This is what he said: You must pay the marriage contract from the land even if you will need to sell the hair on your head and use the proceeds from the sale in order to eat, as you will have no other source of income.

שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינָּהּ: אֵין מְסַדְּרִין לְבַעַל חוֹב? אֲמַר רַב נַחְמָן בְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק:

The Gemara poses a question: Should you conclude from the mishna that arrangements are not made with a creditor, but instead, the entire sum is collected immediately, without reaching an agreement with the husband’s creditors to leave him some money to support himself? The Gemara refutes this suggestion: Rav Naḥman, son of Rabbi Yitzḥak, said: