אֶלָּא סֵיפָא דַּאֲמַר ״לָזֶה וְלָזֶה״ – רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, אַמַּאי פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ? וְהָאָמְרַתְּ: דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּר!

But as the latter clause of that mishna, in the case where he said: I intended to prohibit eating figs to this one and to that one, and they are all permitted to do so, is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, which is evident from the fact that this halakha is cited in his name, then according to your opinion why do the Rabbis disagree with him? But haven’t you said that all agree that they are all permitted to partake when the one who took the vow explains that he meant: To this one and to that one?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וּלְרַבָּה, לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מִי נִיחָא סֵיפָא? בְּמַאי מוֹקִים לָהּ – דַּאֲמַר ״לְכוּלְּכֶם״, הֵי דֵּין הוּא רִאשׁוֹן וְהֵי דֵּין הוּא אַחֲרוֹן?

Rava said to Rav Pappa: And according to Rabba, whose opinion you are supporting with this objection, does the latter clause work out well according to Rabbi Akiva? In what case does he establish it? In a case where one retracted and said: From all of you, which of them is the first one and which of them is the last one? The mishna stated that if benefit from the last one was permitted, benefit from the last one alone is permitted and benefit from all the others is forbidden. If he is now saying: From all of you, who is the first and who is the last?

אֶלָּא, רֵישָׁא – דַּאֲמַר ״לְכוּלְּכֶם״, וְסֵיפָא – כְּגוֹן שֶׁתְּלָאָן זֶה בָּזֶה, וַאֲמַר: פְּלוֹנִי כִּפְלוֹנִי, וּפְלוֹנִי כִּפְלוֹנִי.

Rather, Rava explains as follows: The first clause is referring to where he said: From all of you, and this follows the opinion of Beit Hillel, who say, according to Rava, that the entire vow is dissolved. And in the latter clause, i.e., the last two cases, it is referring to where he did not specify: From this one and from that one, but where, for example, he linked them to one another and said: So-and-so should be prohibited to partake like so-and-so, and so-and-so like so-and-so, but there is no general prohibition on all of them. Rather, each prohibition is linked to another one. Therefore, if the prohibition pertaining to the first individual is dissolved, then all those prohibitions linked to that one are dissolved as well.

דַּיְקָא נַמִי, דְּתַנְיָא: הוּתַּר הָאֶמְצָעִי – הֵימֶנּוּ וּלְמַטָּה מוּתָּרִין, וּלְמַעְלָה אֲסוּרִין.

The Gemara comments: The language is also precise, as it is taught in a baraita concerning this mishna: If the middle one in this chain of people prohibited by the vow from partaking was permitted to do so, then from him and below, i.e., those who were mentioned after him, are permitted to partake, and from him and above, i.e., those who were mentioned before him, are prohibited from partaking. This indicates that the mishna speaks about a case where the prohibitions are linked together. Therefore, the prohibition is dissolved for those who were mentioned after that individual whose prohibition is dissolved.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה לְרָבָא: ״קוֹנָם בָּצָל שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם שֶׁהַבָּצָל רַע לַלֵּב״. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: וַהֲלֹא הַכּוּפְרִי יָפֶה לַלֵּב! הוּתַּר בְּכוּפְרִי. וְלֹא בְּכוּפְרִי בִּלְבַד הוּתַּר – אֶלָּא בְּכָל הַבְּצָלִים. מַעֲשֶׂה הָיָה וְהִתִּירוֹ רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּכָל הַבְּצָלִים.

Rav Adda bar Ahava raised an objection to Rava: The mishna (66a) states that if one says: Onions are konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, because onions are bad for the heart, and others said to him: But isn’t the kuferi onion good for the heart, the vow is dissolved with regard to kuferi onions, and not only with regard to kuferi onions is it dissolved, but with regard to all types of onions. The mishna relates that an incident of this kind occurred, and Rabbi Meir dissolved the vow with regard to all types of onions.

מַאי לָאו דַּאֲמַר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהַכּוּפְרִי יָפֶה לַלֵּב הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר ״כָּל הַבְּצָלִים אֲסוּרִין וְכוּפְרִי מוּתָּר״?

What, is it not speaking here of a case where that person said: Had I known that the kuferi onion is good for the heart I would have said: All onions are forbidden and the kuferi onion is permitted? This would be difficult for Rabba, who argues in similar cases that all opinions maintain that the other onions are forbidden, as well as for Rava, who would hold that only Beit Shammai, who follow the opinion of Rabbi Meir, maintain that all onions are forbidden in this type of case, and yet here Rabbi Meir himself permits all types of onions.

לָא, בְּאוֹמֵר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהַכּוּפְרִי יָפֶה לַלֵּב הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר ״בָּצָל פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי אֲסוּרִין וְכוּפְרִי מוּתָּר״. וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן.

The Gemara responds: No, this should be explained as a case where one says: If I had known that the kuferi onion is good for the heart, I would have said: Such an onion and such an onion are forbidden to me and the kuferi onion is permitted, and the opinion of Rabbi Meir is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and also in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. This is because, according to Rava, when one says: This one and that one, all agree that everything is permitted.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ נֶדֶר שֶׁמִּקְצָתוֹ מוּתָּר וּמִקְצָתוֹ אָסוּר. כֵּיצַד? נָדַר מִן הַכַּלְכָּלָה

Ravina raised an objection to Rava: Rabbi Natan says there is a vow that is partially dissolved and partially binding. How so? One who took a vow that benefit from all the items in a basket be forbidden to him,