מתני׳ חוֹמֶר בַּעֲבָדִים מִבְּנָשִׁים, שֶׁהוּא מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ וְאֵינוֹ מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי עַבְדּוֹ. הֵפֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ – הֵפֵר עוֹלָמִית, הֵפֵר לְעַבְדּוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת וּמַשְׁלִים נְזִירוּתוֹ.

The previous mishna taught that the naziriteship of women includes a stringency that does not apply to slaves. This mishna adds: There is a greater stringency in the case of slaves than in the case of women, as a man can nullify the vows of his wife but he cannot nullify the vows of his slave, despite the fact that he can prevent him from fulfilling them in practice. Similarly, if he nullified the naziriteship of his wife it is permanently nullified, and it remains nullified even if she is later divorced or widowed. Conversely, if he nullified the naziriteship of his slave by forcing him to violate the terms of his vow of naziriteship, when the slave is emancipated he completes his naziriteship.

גמ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְמָה רַבּוֹ כּוֹפוֹ – לִנְזִירוּת, אֲבָל לֹא לִנְדָרִים וְלַעֲרָכִין.

The Sages taught ( Tosefta 6:4): With regard to what matter can his master force a slave? With regard to naziriteship. However, he cannot force his slave in the case of other vows and valuations. This baraita is apparently saying that a master cannot prevent his slave from fulfilling the terms of a vow.

מַאי שְׁנָא גַּבֵּי נָזִיר – דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״לֶאֱסֹר אִסָּר עַל נַפְשׁוֹ״ – בְּמִי שֶׁנַּפְשׁוֹ קְנוּיָה לוֹ, יָצָא עֶבֶד שֶׁאֵין נַפְשׁוֹ קְנוּיָה לוֹ. אִי הָכִי אֲפִילּוּ גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים נַמִי!

The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to a nazirite that a master can force his slave to transgress his naziriteship, as the Merciful One states: “To bind his soul with a bond” (Numbers 30:3), from which it is inferred that the Torah is referring only to one whose soul is in his possession, i.e., who is not owned by another; this excludes a slave, whose soul is not in his possession because he is under his master’s control. If so, then even with regard to vows that same halakha should apply as well, as that verse is written in the context of vows in general, not specifically vows of naziriteship. Why is a master unable to compel his slave to break a vow?

אֲמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה אֶשְׁכּוֹל שֶׁל עֲנָבִים מוּנָּח לְפָנָיו; גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים, דְּכִי מִיתְסַר בְּהַאי לָא מִיתְסַר בְּאַחֲרִינִי – לָא מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ.

Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? With a case where a cluster of grapes was placed before the slave and he vowed not to derive benefit from it. With regard to vows, when he is prohibited from eating this cluster he is not rendered prohibited from eating others; therefore, the master cannot force him to eat it, as he has no reason to insist that the slave consume this particular cluster of grapes.

גַּבֵּי נְזִירוּת, דְּכִי מִיתְסַר בְּהַאי אִיתְסַר בְּכוּלְּהוּ – מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ. וְגַבֵּי נְדָרִים, מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דְּלֵיכָּא אֶלָּא הַאי אֶשְׁכּוֹל, דְּאִי לָא אָכֵיל לֵיהּ חֲלֵישׁ?

By contrast, with regard to naziriteship, when he is prohibited from eating this cluster he is rendered prohibited from consuming all others; therefore, the master can force him to eat. This is because the lack of food weakens the slave, who is the property of his master. The Gemara asks: And with regard to vows, are we not dealing even with a situation where he has only this cluster before him and he vows not to eat it, in which case if he does not eat it he is weakened? Why can’t the master compel him to eat the grapes in this case?

אֶלָּא אֲמַר רָבָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה חַרְצָן מוּנָּח לְפָנָיו; גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים – בְּהַאי הוּא דְּמִיתְסַר, לָא מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ. גַּבֵּי נָזִיר, דְּאִיתְּסַּר נַמִי בְּאַחֲרִינִי – מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ.

Rather, Rava said that the difference between vows of naziriteship and other vows concerns a case where there was a grape seed, which provides only negligible nourishment, that was placed before the slave, and he vowed not to eat it. With regard to vows, concerning which he is prohibited to eat only this one seed, the master cannot force him to eat it, as refraining from eating a grape seed would not weaken him. With regard to a nazirite, who is prohibited from consuming other grape products as well, the master can force him.

וְגַבֵּי נְדָרִים, מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דְּלֵיכָּא אֶלָּא הַאי חַרְצָן, דְּאִי לָא אָכֵיל לֵיהּ חֲלֵישׁ?

The Gemara again asks: And with regard to vows, are we not dealing even with a situation where he has only this grape seed in front of him, in which case if he does not eat it he would be weakened? Why, then, can the master compel him to violate only his naziriteship vow but not a regular vow?

אֶלָּא אֲמַר אַבַּיֵי: לְמָה רַבּוֹ צָרִיךְ לִכְפּוֹתוֹ – לִנְזִירוּת, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לִכְפּוֹתוֹ לִנְדָרִים, וְאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִכְפּוֹתוֹ לִשְׁבוּעָה.

Rather, Abaye said that the baraita does not in fact list cases in which a master can compel his slave to violate his vow, but rather means the following: With regard to what situation is a master who wants to negate his slave’s vow required to force his slave to violate his vow by stating explicitly that he does not want him to fulfill it? It is the case of a vow of naziriteship. But he is not required to force him in the case of other vows and he is not required to force him in the case of an oath, as these do not take effect at all.

מַאי טַעֲמָא – דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״ מָה הֲטָבָה רְשׁוּת – אַף הֲרָעָה רְשׁוּת, יָצָא לְהָרַע לַאֲחֵרִים שֶׁאֵין הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדוֹ.

What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states with regard to oaths: “Or if anyone swear clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). Just as the “good” mentioned in this verse is referring to a voluntary action, so too the “evil” is voluntary, e.g., if he takes an oath not to derive benefit from an item. This excludes a slave, whose oath or vow would cause evil to others, as it is not in his power to affect his master adversely. Therefore, his statement is invalid. Here too, as the owner will suffer if his slave’s diet is restricted, a slave may not accept a vow or an oath upon himself.

מתני׳ עָבַר מִכְּנֶגֶד פָּנָיו, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לֹא יִשְׁתֶּה, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: יִשְׁתֶּה.

In a case where a slave took a vow of naziriteship but was prevented by his master from fulfilling the terms of his vow, the Sages engaged in a dispute what the halakha would be if he permanently left his master’s presence, i.e., he ran away without being emancipated. Rabbi Meir says: He may not drink wine. Since the slave is free in practice, his vow goes into effect. And Rabbi Yosei says: He may drink wine, as he is not emancipated.

גמ׳ לֵימָא בְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁיחְרוּר.

The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree with regard to the following statement of Shmuel? As Shmuel said: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated, and he does not require a bill of manumission. This halakha indicates that if a slave is free in practice, he no longer requires a bill of manumission but is automatically considered a freeman.

רַבִּי מֵאִיר – אִית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי – לֵית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל?

The Gemara asks: If so, should one say that Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, and therefore the slave is obligated in naziriteship as soon as he runs away, like any other freed slave, and Rabbi Yosei is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel?

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. אֶלָּא, מַאן דְּאָמַר יִשְׁתֶּה – סָבַר: סוֹף סוֹף מִיהֲדַר הָדַר וְאָתֵי גַּבֵּיהּ, לִישְׁתֵּי חַמְרָא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא לִיכְחוֹשׁ. וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר לֹא יִשְׁתֶּה – סָבַר: לֶיהֱוֵי לֵיהּ צַעֲרָא, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִיהֲדַר גַּבֵּיהּ.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it is possible that everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where the master refused to declare the runaway ownerless, and was intent on recovering him. Consequently, the slave is not in fact a freeman at all, and the tanna’im disagree with regard to the following: Rabbi Yosei, the one who says that he may drink wine, maintains that the slave will ultimately return and come back to his master, and therefore it is preferable for him to drink wine so that he should not be weakened by the time he returns. And according to Rabbi Meir, the one who says that he may not drink wine, he maintains that it is better that the slave should suffer by being deprived of wine, so that he will return to his master, as the desire to drink wine will spur him to return.