נִזְרַק דָּם שֶׁל אֶחָד מֵהֶם, אִי אַתָּה מוֹדֶה שֶׁכְּשֵׁם שֶׁדָּמָהּ פּוֹטֵר אֶת בְּשָׂרָהּ מִן הַמְעִילָה אַף יִפְטוֹר בְּשַׂר חֲבֶירְתָּהּ מִן הַמְעִילָה?

And in a case where the blood of one of the sin offerings was sprinkled, do you not concede that just as the sprinkling of its blood exempts its meat from the halakhot of misuse, so too, it exempts the meat of the other animal from the halakhot of misuse?

אִם הִצִּיל בְּשַׂר חֲבֶירְתָּהּ מִן הַמְעִילָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל, דִּין הוּא שֶׁיַּצִּיל אֶת בְּשָׂרָהּ!

If so, one may infer from here by an a fortiori inference with regard to the case of sprinkling the blood of meat that left the courtyard: If the sprinkling of its blood spared the meat of the other animal from the halakhot of misuse, even though that animal is unfit, as it is a leftover sin offering, it is only right that the blood that was sprinkled should exempt its own meat, despite the fact that it left the courtyard.

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם רַב אוֹשַׁעֲיָא: תְּשׁוּבָה גְּנוּבָה הֱשִׁיבוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְאוֹתוֹ תַּלְמִיד, בְּבַת אַחַת אִין, בָּזֶה אַחַר זֶה לֹא?

With regard to this reply by Rabbi Akiva, Reish Lakish says in the name of Rav Oshaya: Rabbi Akiva gave a deceptive response to that student of his, Rabbi Shimon. Reish Lakish elaborates: Based on Rabbi Akiva’s reply, one would think that if the two sin offerings were slaughtered at the same time, then yes, the blood of one sin offering exempts the meat of the other from the halakhot of misuse. But if they were slaughtered one after the other, it does not exempt the meat of the other offering.

דְּכֵיוָן דְּפָסוּל הוּא, מַה לִּי בְּבַת אַחַת – מַה לִּי בָּזֶה אַחַר זֶה?

But since in either case the other offering, whose blood was not sprinkled, is unfit, as it is a leftover sin offering, what difference does it make to me whether they were slaughtered at the same time or whether they were slaughtered one after the other? In either case, according to Rabbi Akiva, the sprinkling of one should exempt the meat of the other from the halakhot of misuse.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: וְאַתָּה אִי אַתָּה אוֹמֵר כֵּן,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish in response: And you, who raise this difficulty, do you not also say the same, that there is a difference between a case where they were slaughtered at the same time, and are therefore considered one entity, when the sprinkling of the blood of one offering exempts the meat of the other, and a case where they were slaughtered one after the other, and are therefore considered two separate entities, which means that the blood of one offering does not exempt the meat of the other?

אִילּוּ הִפְרִישׁ שְׁתֵּי אֲשָׁמוֹת לְאַחֲרָיוּת וְשָׁחַט אֶת שְׁנֵיהֶן, וְקָדַם וְהֶעֱלָה אֵימוּרִין שֶׁל אֶחָד מֵהֶן קוֹדֶם זְרִיקָה, אִי אַתָּה מוֹדֶה שֶׁאִם עָלוּ – יֵרְדוּ?

But in a case where one separated two guilt offerings as a guarantee for his obligation of a single guilt offering, and one slaughtered both of them, and the priest first brought up the sacrificial portions of one of them onto the altar before sprinkling any blood, and then sprinkled the blood of the other offering, would you not concede that even if the sacrificial portions of this offering whose blood was not sprinkled ascended the altar, that they shall descend without being sacrificed? The proper procedure is that first the blood is sprinkled and only then are the sacrificial portions brought up onto the altar to be sacrificed.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ חַד גּוּפָא הוּא, אַמַּאי אִם עָלוּ יֵרְדוּ? הָאָמַר עוּלָּא: אֵימוּרֵי קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים שֶׁהֶעֱלָן לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּם – לֹא יֵרְדוּ, נַעֲשָׂה לַחְמוֹ שֶׁל מִזְבֵּחַ!

Rabbi Yoḥanan analyzes this case: And if it enters your mind to say that even when the two offerings were slaughtered one after the other they are still considered as one entity, why is it the halakha that if the sacrificial portions ascended the altar, they shall descend? Doesn’t Ulla say that sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity which one brought up to the altar before the sprinkling of the offering’s blood, and are therefore not yet fit for the altar, shall not descend, but are sacrificed, as the sacrificial portions have become the food of the altar, by virtue of their placement upon it?

אִישְׁתִּיק, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: קְצַצְתִּינוֹן לְרַגְלוֹהִי דְּיָנוֹקָא.

Reish Lakish was silent, as he had no answer to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s difficulty. Rabbi Yoḥanan said in this regard: We have cut off the legs of the child, i.e., I have refuted Reish Lakish’s opinion by raising a difficulty that eliminates the basis for his opinion.

מתני׳ יֵשׁ מַעֲשֵׂה דָּמִים בְּקָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים לְהָקֵל וּלְהַחְמִיר, וּבְקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים כּוּלְּהוּ לְהַחְמִיר.

With regard to establishing liability for misuse of consecrated items, there is an aspect of leniency and an aspect of stringency in the act of sprinkling the blood of offerings of the most sacred order. But with regard to the sprinkling of the blood in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity, it contains in its entirety aspects of stringency, i.e., there are only aspects of stringency.

כֵּיצַד? קָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים – מוֹעֲלִין בְּאֵימוּרֵיהֶן וּבַבָּשָׂר, לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים – מוֹעֲלִין בְּאֵימוּרֵיהֶן וְאֵין מוֹעֲלִין בַּבָּשָׂר.

How so? The status of offerings of the most sacred order is that before the sprinkling of blood, one is liable for misusing their sacrificial portions that are to be burned on the altar, and for misusing the meat that is to be eaten by the priests. Since the meat is prohibited prior to sprinkling the blood, it is in the category of items consecrated to God, which are subject to the halakhot of misuse. After the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of the most sacred order, one is still liable for misuse of their sacrificial portions, as they remain prohibited to be eaten and are in the category of items consecrated to God, but one is not liable for misuse of the meat, as it is now permitted for consumption by the priests. This explains how there is an aspect of leniency in the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of the most sacred order.

וְעַל זֶה וְעַל זֶה חַיָּיב מִשּׁוּם פִּיגּוּל, נוֹתָר, וְטָמֵא. נִמְצָא מַעֲשֵׂה דָּמִים בְּקָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים לְהָקֵל וּלְהַחְמִיר.

By contrast, for consumption of both this, the sacrificial portions, and that, the meat, after the sprinkling of the blood, one is liable to receive karet due to violation of the prohibition against consumption of piggul , and the prohibition against consumption of notar , and the prohibition against consumption of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. Consequently, the act of sprinkling blood of offerings of the most sacred order is found to contain an aspect of leniency and an aspect of stringency.

וּבְקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים כּוּלָּן לְהַחְמִיר, כֵּיצַד: קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים אֵין מוֹעֲלִין לֹא בָּאֵימוּרִין וְלֹא בַּבָּשָׂר, לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים – מוֹעֲלִין בָּאֵימוּרִין וְאֵין מוֹעֲלִין בַּבָּשָׂר,

But with regard to the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of lesser sanctity, all of their aspects are of stringency. How so? The status of offerings of lesser sanctity is that before the sprinkling of the blood, one is not liable for misuse, not for their sacrificial portions nor for the meat. After the sprinkling of the blood, one is liable for misuse of their sacrificial portions, but one is not liable for misuse of the meat. This explains how the sprinkling of the blood in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity causes a stringency in terms of the halakhot of misuse.

עַל זֶה וְעַל זֶה חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם פִּיגּוּל, נוֹתָר, וְטָמֵא. נִמְצָא מַעֲשֵׂה דָּמִים בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים כּוּלָּן לְהַחְמִיר.

And for consumption of both this, the sacrificial portions, and that, the meat, after the sprinkling of the blood, one is liable to receive karet due to violation of the prohibition against consumption of piggul , and of the prohibition against consumption of notar , and of the prohibition against consumption of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. Consequently, in the act of sprinkling the blood of offerings of lesser sanctity, it is found that all of their aspects are of stringency.

גמ׳ קָתָנֵי ״אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בַּבָּשָׂר״, מְעִילָה הוּא דְּלֵיכָּא, הָא אִיסּוּרָא אִיכָּא! וְאַמַּאי? הָא מָמוֹנָא דְּכֹהֵן הוּא!

The mishna teaches: After the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of the most sacred order, one is not liable for misusing the meat. The Gemara infers from this that there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property, but there is a prohibition for the priest to eat from it even after the blood has been sprinkled. The Gemara therefore asks: But why is there such a prohibition? Isn’t the meat the property of the priests after the blood has been sprinkled, and therefore it is permitted for them in consumption?

לָא קַשְׁיָא, מִשּׁוּם דִּנְסִיב רֵישָׁא ״מוֹעֲלִין״ – נָסֵיב סֵיפָא ״אֵין מוֹעֲלִין״.

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as the above inference is invalid. The reason that the mishna taught that one is not liable, rather than saying that the meat is permitted, is as follows: Since the first clause mentions the phrase: One is liable for misusing, the latter clause also mentions the parallel phrase: One is not liable for misusing. Therefore, the above inference is incorrect, as there is in fact no prohibition for the priests to eat the meat.

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים כּוּלְּהוּ לְהַחְמִיר, כֵּיצַד? בְּשַׂר קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים – אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן וּבְאֵימוּרֵיהֶן, וְאֵין חַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם פִּיגּוּל נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא, לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים – מוֹעֲלִין בְּאֵימוּרֵיהֶן וְאֵין מוֹעֲלִין בַּבָּשָׂר.

The Gemara continues to analyze the mishna. Say the latter clause: But with regard to the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of lesser sanctity, all of their aspects are of stringency. How so? The status of the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity is that before the sprinkling of the blood, one is not liable for misuse, not for their meat nor for their sacrificial portions. And one is not liable due to violation of the prohibition against piggul , notar , or the consumption of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. After the sprinkling of the blood, one is liable for misuse of their sacrificial portions, and one is not liable for misuse of the meat.

מְעִילָה הוּא דְּלֵיכָּא, הָא אִיסּוּרָא אִיכָּא! וְאַמַּאי? הָא מָמוֹנָא דִּבְעָלִים הוּא!

The Gemara infers as above: There is no liability for misuse of the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, but there is a prohibition for the owners to consume it, even after the blood has been sprinkled. But why is there such a prohibition? Isn’t this meat the property of the owners after the blood has been sprinkled, and it is permitted for them in consumption?

אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לַיּוֹצְאִין, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא,

Rabbi Ḥanina says in explanation: This is referring to meat that was taken out from the place where it is permitted to be eaten before the sprinkling of the blood, and the blood was later sprinkled. In such a case, the meat is prohibited. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in the mishna on 6b, who rules that sprinkling is effective in that it exempts the meat of the offerings of the most sacred order from the halakhot of misuse, and renders the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity subject to misuse, even if the meat left the courtyard.

כִּי אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא זְרִיקָה מוֹעֶלֶת לַיּוֹצֵא לִשְׂרֵיפָה,

Rabbi Ḥanina continues: The tanna here is teaching that when Rabbi Akiva says that sprinkling is effective with regard to the meat of offerings of the most sacred order or the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left the courtyard, with regard to the halakhot of misuse, piggul , notar , and the prohibition against consumption of sacrificial meat while ritually impure, that applies specifically with regard to the halakhot of its burning, that it is not burned right away, but that one must wait until the following morning to burn it.