וְהָלַךְ וְהֵבִיא לוֹ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה חָלוּק, וּבִשְׁלֹשָׁה טַלִּית – שְׁנֵיהֶם מָעֲלוּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בַּעַל הַבַּיִת לֹא מָעַל, שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר לוֹ ״חָלוּק גָּדוֹל הָיִיתִי מְבַקֵּשׁ, וְהֵבֵאתָ לִי קָטָן וְרַע״!

and the agent went and brought him a robe with three sela and a cloak with three sela , both of them are liable for misuse. The homeowner is liable because his agency was performed with the purchase of the robe for three sela , and the agent is liable because he deviated from the homeowner’s instructions by purchasing the cloak. Rabbi Yehuda says: The homeowner is not liable for misuse, as he can say to the agent: I was seeking a large robe worth a gold dinar and you brought me a small, inferior robe worth three sela , i.e., twelve silver dinars.

גמ׳ שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינָּהּ: מַאן דַּאֲמַר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״זִיל זְבַן לִי כּוֹרָא דְּאַרְעָא״! וְאָזַל וּזְבַן לֵיהּ לִיתְכָא – קָנֵי לוֹקֵחַ!

The Gemara notes: One can learn from the mishna the resolution to an unresolved dilemma in tractate Ketubot (98b), that in a case of one who said to his agent: Go and sell on my behalf a kor of land, and he went and sold for him a half - kor , the purchaser acquires the half- kor of land that he purchased. Although the agent did not fulfill his agency entirely, the part that he did perform is valid.

אָמְרִי: הָכָא הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? כְּגוֹן דְּאַיְיתֵי לֵיהּ שָׁוֶה שֵׁשׁ בְּשָׁלֹשׁ.

Some Sages say that one cannot infer this resolution from the mishna. What are the circumstances of the mishna here? It is referring a case where the agent brought him a robe worth six sela , i.e., the value of the gold dinar that the homeowner gave him, which he acquired for three sela . If so, the homeowner received exactly what he wanted and the agent did not deviate from the agency, except that he also purchased a cloak without being instructed to do so. This is dissimilar to the case of an agent who sells a half- kor of land.

אֵימָא סֵיפָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בַּעַל הַבַּיִת לֹא מָעַל, שֶׁהוּא יָכוֹל לוֹמַר לוֹ ״חָלוּק גָּדוֹל הָיִיתִי מְבַקֵּשׁ, וְהֵבֵאתָ לִי חָלוּק קָטָן וְרַע״!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is the case of the mishna, say the latter clause: Rabbi Yehuda says: The homeowner is not liable for misuse, as he can say to the agent: I was seeking a large robe worth a gold dinar, and you brought me a small, inferior robe worth three sela . It is clear from the mishna that the homeowner did not receive exactly what he wanted, but rather an inferior robe.

דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״אִי יְהַבַתְּ דִּינָר כּוּלֵּיהּ – אַיְיתִית לִי שָׁוֶה שְׁנֵי דִּינָרִין״!

The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda means that the homeowner could have said to the agent: Since you chanced upon a merchant who reduced his prices to such a degree, if you had given the entire dinar as I requested, you could have brought me a much finer robe, worth at least two dinars.

הָכִי נַמִי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּקִטְנִית שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם מָעֲלוּ, שֶׁהַקִּטְנִית בִּפְרוּטָה וְקִטְנִית בְּדִינָר.

The Gemara adds: This too stands to reason, that this is the correct interpretation of the mishna, as it teaches in the latter clause, i.e., it is taught in the Tosefta (2:4): Rabbi Yehuda concedes in a case where the agent purchased only part of the legumes which the one who appointed him requested, that both are liable for misuse of consecrated property. The reason for this ruling is that a small amount of legumes is always sold for one peruta and a larger amount of legumes is invariably sold for a dinar. One can infer from Rabbi Yehuda’s statement that in the case of another item, e.g., a robe, purchasing a superior-quality robe for a higher price would bring additional benefit to the homeowner.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי בְּאַתְרָא דְּזַבְּנֵי בְּשׁוּמָא – גַּבֵּי קִטְנִית נַמִי, דִּיהַב סֶלַע, מוֹזְלֵי לֵיהּ טְפֵי! אֲמַר רַב פַּפָּא: בְּדוּכְתָּא דִּמְזַבְּנֵי בְּכַנֵּי כַּנֵּי, כַּנָּא כַּנָּא בִּפְרוּטָה, דְּהָתָם פָּסֵיק מִילְּתַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara analyzes the baraita : What are the circumstances? If it is referring to a town where they sell legumes by appraisal of an item’s value, then with regard to these legumes as well, purchasing a larger quantity should reduce the price, which would mean that if one gave a sela the price of the legumes would become cheaper. Rav Pappa said: The Tosefta is referring to a town where they sell and set the price by containers, and each container is the same price: Each and every container is sold for one peruta . The significance of this fact is that there the matter is fixed, i.e., each container of legumes is sold for the same price, regardless of the quantity of legumes purchased; there is no reduction for buying in bulk.

מתני׳ הַמַּפְקִיד מָעוֹת אֵצֶל שׁוּלְחָנִי, אִם צְרוּרִין – לֹא יִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן, לְפִיכָךְ אִם הוֹצִיא – מָעַל. אִם מוּתָּרִין – יִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן, לְפִיכָךְ אִם הוֹצִיא – לֹא מָעַל. אֵצֶל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת – בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ לֹא יִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן, לְפִיכָךְ אִם הוֹצִיא – מָעַל. הַחֶנְוָונִי כְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כְּשׁוּלְחָנִי.

With regard to one who deposits consecrated money with a money changer, if the money is bound, the money changer may not use it. Therefore, if the money changer spent the money, he is liable for its misuse. If the money was unbound he may use it, and therefore if the money changer spent the money, he is not liable for its misuse. By contrast, if one deposited money with a homeowner, whether it is bound or whether it is unbound, the one with whom it was deposited may not use it, and therefore if he spent the money, he is liable for misuse. In this regard, the halakhic status of a storekeeper is like that of a homeowner; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The halakhic status of a storekeeper is like that of a money changer.

נָפְלָה פְּרוּטָה שֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ בְּתוֹךְ כִּיסוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר ״פְּרוּטָה בְּכִיס זֶה – הֶקְדֵּשׁ״! כֵּיוָן שֶׁהוֹצִיא אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה – מָעַל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא אֶת כָּל הַכִּיס.

If a consecrated peruta fell into one’s purse, in which there were non-sacred perutot , or in a case where one said: One peruta in this purse is consecrated, once he spent the first peruta from the purse for non-sacred purposes, he is liable for its misuse. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: He is not liable for misuse until he spends all the perutot in the entire purse, as only then is it certain that he spent the consecrated peruta .

וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לַחֲכָמִים בְּאוֹמֵר ״פְּרוּטָה מִן כִּיס זֶה – הֶקְדֵּשׁ״! שֶׁהוּא מוֹצִיא וְהוֹלֵךְ, עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא אֶת כָּל הַכִּיס.

And Rabbi Akiva concedes to the Rabbis in a case where one says: One peruta from the coins in this purse is consecrated, that he may continue spending the perutot in the purse for non-sacred purposes and becomes liable for misuse only once he spends all the perutot in the entire purse. His formulation indicates that his desire was that the final remaining peruta in the purse would be consecrated, and therefore one is liable for misuse only when he spends that peruta .

גמ׳ כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אֲמַר: רָמֵי לֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא?

The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva concedes to the Rabbis in a case where one says: One peruta from the coins in this purse is consecrated, that he may continue spending the perutot in the purse for non-sacred purposes and that he becomes liable for misuse only once he spends all the perutot in the entire purse. With regard to this case, the Gemara relates that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Reish Lakish raised a contradiction to Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is different in the first clause, which addresses a situation where one says: One peruta in this purse is consecrated, in which case Rabbi Akiva disagrees with the Rabbis, and what is different in the latter clause, where he agrees with them?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סֵיפָא – בְּאוֹמֵר ״לֹא יִפְטוֹר כִּיס זֶה מִן הַהֶקְדֵּשׁ״!

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: The latter clause of the mishna is referring to a case where one said: This purse will not be exempt from consecration. In other words, his desire was that he would not spend all of the perutot in the purse without consecrating one to the Temple. Consequently, he is liable for misuse only when he uses the last coin in the purse for non-sacred purposes and leaves none to be consecrated.

כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אֲמַר: כִּיסִין אַשְּׁוָורִים רְמָא לֵיהּ, דִּתְנַן הָאוֹמֵר ״אֶחָד מִשְּׁוָורַיי – הֶקְדֵּשׁ״! הָיוּ לוֹ שְׁנַיִם – הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבָּהֶן הֶקְדֵּשׁ! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סֵיפָא בְּאוֹמֵר ״לֹא יִפְטוֹר כִּיס זֶה מִן הַהֶקְדֵּשׁ״!

The Gemara further relates that when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Reish Lakish raised a contradiction to Rabbi Yoḥanan between the mishna here, discussing purses, and another mishna, discussing bulls. As we learned in a mishna ( Menaḥot 108b): With regard to one who says: One of my bulls is consecrated, if he had two bulls, then the larger of them is consecrated. The reason is that there is an assumption that one consecrates generously, and therefore he would have had the larger of the two bulls in mind. If so, in the case of the purses, why does the mishna not rule that his intent was for the best, i.e., the least worn-out, of the perutot ? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: The latter clause of the mishna is referring to a case where one said: This purse will not be exempt from consecration. In other words, he did not have in mind the best of the perutot , but the last of the coins.