גמ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּנַן – ״כְּדֵי רִשְׁעָתוֹ״ כְּתִיב, מִשּׁוּם רִשְׁעָה אַחַת אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ, וְאִי אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ מִשּׁוּם שְׁתֵּי רִשְׁעִיּוֹת. אֶלָּא רַבִּי מֵאִיר מַאי טַעֲמָא?

With regard to the initial dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis in the mishna whether conspiring witnesses pay and are flogged, the Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, the verse that states: “The judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before him, according to the measure of his wickedness” (Deuteronomy 25:2), is written concerning one who was liable to receive lashes. From “according to the measure of his wickedness” it is inferred with regard to an individual who commits one transgression: For one evildoing you can render him liable, but you cannot render him liable for two evildoings, i.e., one cannot receive two punishments for the same act. But according to Rabbi Meir, what is the reason that he is punished twice for committing a single transgression?

אֲמַר עוּלָּא: גָּמַר מִמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, מַה מּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם – אַף כָּל לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם. מַה לְּמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע שֶׁכֵּן קְנָס! סָבַר לָהּ כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין קְנָסָא הוּא.

Ulla said: Rabbi Meir derived this halakha from the halakha concerning one who defames his wife, claiming that when he consummated the marriage he discovered that she was not a virgin: Just as the defamer is flogged and pays, as it is written: “And they shall chastise him and fine him one hundred silver coins” (Deuteronomy 22:18–19), so too, anyone who commits a transgression punishable with lashes and a monetary payment is flogged and pays. The Gemara questions this derivation: What is notable about the case of a defamer? It is notable in that the payment of the defamer is a fine, which is a fixed sum that the Torah deems him liable to pay. How can the halakha of conspiring witnesses, whose payment is monetary restitution, be derived from there? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: The payment that conspiring witnesses are liable to pay is a fine.

אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לְהָא דְּעוּלָּא אַהָא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״לֹא תוֹתִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר וְהַנֹּתָר מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר״ וגו׳ – בָּא הַכָּתוּב לִיתֵּן עֲשֵׂה אַחַר לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

The Gemara comments: There are those who teach this statement of Ulla with regard to that which is taught in a baraita : It is stated with regard to the Paschal offering: “And you shall let nothing of it remain until morning, but that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10). The verse comes to provide a positive mitzva to burn the remains after it has taught a prohibition, which states: “You shall let nothing of it remain,” to say that one is not flogged for its violation; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. This is a prohibition whose transgression entails the fulfillment of a positive mitzva, in which the mitzva serves to rectify the violation of the prohibition, and no lashes are administered.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִן הַשֵּׁם הוּא זֶה, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה, וְכָל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו. מִכְּלַל דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה לוֹקִין עָלָיו. מְנָא לֵיהּ?

Rabbi Akiva says: The fact that one is not flogged is not for that reason; rather, it is due to the fact that this prohibition: “And you shall let nothing of it remain,” is a prohibition that does not involve an action, as one violates the prohibition through failure to take action, and concerning any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for its violation. The Gemara learns by inference that Rabbi Yehuda holds in principle with regard to a prohibition that does not involve an action, that one is flogged for its violation. From where does Rabbi Yehuda derive that one is flogged in that case?

אֲמַר עוּלָּא: גָּמַר מִמּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע, מַה מּוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה לוֹקִין עָלָיו – אַף כָּל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה לוֹקִין עָלָיו. מַה לְּמוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע שֶׁכֵּן לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם!

Ulla said: Rabbi Yehuda derived this halakha from the defamer; just as the defamer violates a prohibition that does not involve an action, as it involves only speech, and one is flogged for its violation, so too, with regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is flogged for its violation. The Gemara questions this derivation: What is notable about the case of the defamer? It is notable in that he is flogged and pays for violation of a single prohibition. Due to that stringency, other less stringent prohibitions cannot be derived from the case of the defamer.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: גָּמַר מֵעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין, מָה עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה לוֹקִין עָלָיו – אַף כָּל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה לוֹקִין עָלָיו. מַה לְּעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין שֶׁכֵּן אֵין צְרִיכִין הַתְרָאָה!

Rather, Reish Lakish says: Rabbi Yehuda derives this principle from the case of conspiring witnesses. Just as the conspiring witnesses violate a prohibition that does not involve an action and an individual is flogged for its violation, so too, with regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is flogged for its violation. The Gemara questions this derivation: What is notable about the case of conspiring witnesses? It is notable in that the witnesses do not require forewarning in order to administer their punishment, which is an exception to the principle that corporal punishment may be administered only after forewarning. Due to that stringency, other less strin-gent prohibitions cannot be derived from the case of conspiring witnesses.

מוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע יוֹכִיחַ. וְחָזַר הַדִּין, לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה וְלוֹקִין עָלָיו – אַף כָּל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה לוֹקִין עָלָיו.

The Gemara answers: The case of the defamer will prove that the absence of forewarning is not a significant factor, as the defamer requires forewarning and nevertheless is flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The defining characteristic of this case is not like the defining characteristic of that case, and the defining characteristic of that case is not like the defining characteristic of this case. Their common denominator is that in both cases there is a prohibition that does not involve an action and one is flogged for its violation. So too, with regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is flogged for its violation.

מַה לְּהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן שֶׁכֵּן קְנָס! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לָא סָבַר לָהּ כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

The Gemara questions this derivation: What is notable about their common denominator? They are notable in that payment in both cases is a fine, and therefore other, less stringent prohibitions cannot be derived from them. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; Rabbi Yehuda does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva that the payment of conspiring witnesses is a fine. In his opinion, therefore, that is not a common denominator.

אֶלָּא, מַה לְּהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן צַד חָמוּר! וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, צַד חָמוּר לָא פָּרֵיךְ.

Rather, the Gemara proposes an alternative refutation: What is notable about their common denominator? They are notable in that the cases of the defamer and of conspiring witnesses both contain a stringent aspect; therefore, other, less stringent prohibitions cannot be derived from them. The stringency in the case of the defamer is that he both is flogged and pays, and the stringency in the case of conspiring witnesses is that they do not require forewarning. The Gemara answers: And Rabbi Yehuda does not refute a derivation from a common denominator based on the fact that both cases contain a different stringent aspect. He holds that the mere fact that there is a stringency in each does not serve as a common denominator.

וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״לֹא תַעֲנֶה בְרֵעֲךָ עֵד שָׁקֶר״ מַאי דָּרְשִׁי בֵּיהּ?

§ The Gemara resumes its analysis of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis in the case of conspiring witnesses who testify that another is liable to receive lashes. Rabbi Meir holds that they are flogged with eighty lashes, one set of lashes due to violation of the prohibition: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13), and one set of lashes due to the verse: “And you shall do to him as he conspired” (Deuteronomy 19:19). The Rabbis say: They are flogged with only forty lashes, due to the verse “And you shall do to him as he conspired.” The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, concerning this verse: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor,” what do they derive from it, if one is not flogged for its violation?

הַהוּא מִיבָּעֵי לֵיהּ לְאַזְהָרָה לְעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין. וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, אַזְהָרָה לְעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין מְנָא לֵיהּ? אֲמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״וְהַנִּשְׁאָרִים יִשְׁמְעוּ וְיִרָאוּ וְלֹא יֹסִיפוּ עוֹד״.

The Gemara answers: They require that verse as a prohibition against conspiring witnesses. Every punishment enumerated in the Torah, including that of conspiring witnesses, is accompanied by an explicit verse prohibiting the action that results in the punishment. The Gemara asks: And with regard to Rabbi Meir, who holds that conspiring witnesses are flogged for violating this prohibition, from where does he derive a prohibition for conspiring witnesses? Rabbi Yirmeya said: He derives it from the verse written in the context of conspiring witnesses: “And those who remain shall hear and fear, and shall not continue to perform any more evil of this kind in your midst” (Deuteronomy 19:20). The verse warns that conspiring witnesses should not continue with their sinful conduct.

וְרַבָּנַן, הַהוּא מִיבָּעֵי לֵיהּ

The Gemara asks: And concerning the Rabbis, what do they derive from that verse? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary according to the Rabbis