וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי מְסִירָה כָּרְתִי?

And Shmuel said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who said that witnesses of the transmission effect the transaction,

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי; רַב סָבַר: חֲלוּקָה עֲדִיפָא, וּשְׁמוּאֵל סָבַר: שׁוּדָא דְּדַיָּינֵי עֲדִיפָא.

The Gemara responds: No, it is possible to say that everyone holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, and here they disagree about the following: Rav holds that in a case of a doubt that cannot be resolved with regard to monetary law, division is preferable, and Shmuel holds that leaving the decision to the discretion of the judges is preferable.

וּמִי מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לֵיהּ לְרַב כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר? וְהָאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּגִיטִּין. כִּי אָמְרִיתָהּ קַמֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל אֲמַר: אַף בִּשְׁטָרוֹת. מִכְּלָל דְּרַב סָבַר – בִּשְׁטָרוֹת לָא! אֶלָּא, מְחַוַּורְתָּא: רַב – כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וּשְׁמוּאֵל – כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר.

The Gemara asks: Can you really establish that the opinion of Rav is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar? Didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce? And Rav Yehuda related further: When I said this halakha in the presence of Shmuel, he said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar even with regard to other legal documents as well. By inference, it is apparent that Rav holds that with regard to other legal documents, no, the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Elazar. Rather, it is clear that Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.

מֵיתִיבֵי: שְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת הַיּוֹצְאִים בְּיוֹם אֶחָד – חוֹלְקִין, תְּיוּבְתָּא דִּשְׁמוּאֵל! אָמַר לָךְ שְׁמוּאֵל: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, וַאֲנָא דַּאֲמָרִי כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita : In the case of two deeds that are issued dated the same day, the recipients of the deeds divide the property equally. Is this not a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Shmuel? The Gemara answers that Shmuel could have said to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita ? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and I said my opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.

אִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר – אֵימָא סֵיפָא: כָּתַב לְאֶחָד וּמָסַר לְאַחֵר, זֶה שֶׁמָּסַר לוֹ, קָנָה. וְאִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר – אַמַּאי קָנָה? הָאֲמַר: עֵדֵי חֲתִימָה כָּרְתִי!

The Gemara continues to ask: If this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, say the latter clause of that same baraita : If he wrote a deed to one individual and then transmitted it to another individual, the one to whom the deed was transmitted has acquired the property. If the baraita is following the opinion of Rabbi Meir, why did the latter individual acquire the property? Didn’t Rabbi Meir say that the signatory witnesses on the document effect the transaction and not the witnesses to its transmission?

תַּנָּאֵי הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יַחֲלוֹקוּ, וְכָאן אָמְרוּ: מַה שֶּׁיִּרְצֶה הַשָּׁלִישׁ יַעֲשֶׂה.

The Gemara responds: The baraita cited above is entirely in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. However, there is a dispute between tanna’im with regard to money whose ownership is uncertain, as it is taught in a baraita : In a case where an individual sent a sum of money to another via a messenger, and by the time the messenger arrived, the intended recipient had died, and in the meantime, the individual who had sent the money also died, the tanna’im disagree about what to do with the money. The Rabbis say: The heirs of the sender and the heirs of the intended recipient should divide the money. And here, in Babylonia, they said: The third party, i.e., the messenger, can do as he pleases with the money, a ruling that is comparable to the solution of leaving the decision to the discretion of the judges.

אִמֵּיהּ דְּרָמִי בַּר חָמָא כְּתַבְתִּינְהוּ לְנִכְסָהּ לְרָמִי בַּר חָמָא בְּצַפְרָא, לְאוֹרְתָא כְּתַבְתִּינְהוּ לְמָר עוּקְבָא בַּר חָמָא.

The Gemara relates that the mother of Rami bar Ḥama wrote a deed in the morning transferring ownership of her property to Rami bar Ḥama, and in the evening she wrote another deed transferring her property to another of her sons, Mar Ukva bar Ḥama.

אֲתָא רָמִי בַּר חָמָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת, אוֹקְמֵיהּ בְּנִכְסָא. אֲתָא מָר עוּקְבָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, אוֹקְמֵיהּ בְּנִכְסָא. אֲתָא רַב שֵׁשֶׁת לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, אָמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי טַעֲמָא עֲבַד מָר הָכִי? אָמַר לֵיהּ: וּמַאי טַעֲמָא עֲבַד מָר הָכִי?

Rami bar Ḥama came before Rav Sheshet and the latter established his right to the property. Mar Ukva, his brother, came before Rav Naḥman and the latter established his right to the property. Rav Sheshet came before Rav Naḥman and said to him: What is the reason that the Master did this, i.e., why did you issue this ruling? Rav Naḥman said to him: And what is the reason that the Master did this, i.e., why did you rule as you did?

אָמַר לֵיהּ: דְּקָדֵים. אָמַר לֵיהּ: אַטּוּ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם יָתְבִינַן, דְּכָתְבִינַן שָׁעוֹת? אֶלָּא מָר מַאי טַעְמָא עֲבַד הָכִי? אָמַר לֵיהּ: שׁוּדָא דְּדַיָּינֵי.

Rav Sheshet said to him: Because Rami bar Ḥama’s deed preceded that of Mar Ukva. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Sheshet: Is that to say that we are sitting in Jerusalem, that we write the hours on our legal documents? The halakha is that in any place where the hours are not recorded on legal documents, it does not matter when during the day a document was written. Rav Sheshet asked Rav Naḥman: But what is the reason that the Master did this, ruling as you did? Rav Naḥman said to him: It was the discretion of the judges, i.e., I ruled this way since it seemed to me that this is the way the mother wanted it.

אָמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא נַמִי – שׁוּדָא דְּדַיָּינֵי. אָמַר לֵיהּ: חֲדָא – דַּאֲנָא דַּיָּינָא וּמָר לָאו דַּיָּינָא, וְעוֹד: מֵעִיקָּרָא לָאו בְּתוֹרַת הָכִי אָתֵית לָהּ.

Rav Sheshet said to Rav Naḥman: I also applied the principle of the discretion of the judges and ruled as I did. Rav Naḥman said to him: One response to your point is that I am a judge, and the Master is not a judge, as Rav Sheshet did not serve in the official capacity of a judge. Furthermore, at the outset, you did not arrive at your conclusion for this reason, but due to your own theory with regard to the dating of the documents, which proved to be incorrect.

הָנְהוּ תְּרֵי שְׁטָרֵי דְּאָתוּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף, חַד הֲוָה כָּתוּב ״בְּחַמְשָׁא בְּנִיסָן״, וְחַד הֲוָה כָּתוּב בֵּיהּ ״בְּנִיסָן״ סְתָמָא, אוֹקְמֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף לְהַהוּא דְּחַמְשָׁא בְּנִיסָן בַּנְּכָסִים.

The Gemara relates another incident in which an individual wrote two deeds about the same piece of property: There were these two deeds that came before Rav Yosef. In one deed, it was written that the owner of the field sold it to a particular individual on the fifth of Nisan, and in the other one it was written that he sold the same property to someone else in Nisan, without specifying on which day in Nisan the sale took place. Rav Yosef established that the one whose deed said the fifth of Nisan had the right to the property.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אִידָךְ: וַאֲנָא אַפְסִיד? אָמַר לֵיהּ: אַתְּ יָדְךָ עַל הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה, אֵימָא בַּר עֶשְׂרִים וְתִשְׁעָה בְּנִיסָן אַתְּ.

The other claimant said to Rav Yosef: Should I lose? After all, it is possible that my deed was written prior to the other deed. Rav Yosef said to him: You are at a disadvantage, because there is no specific date in your deed, allowing one to say that your deed is from the twenty-ninth of Nisan. Since you have no way to prove otherwise, the property is awarded to the one who has a more specific date recorded in his deed.

אָמַר לֵיהּ: וְנִכְתּוֹב לִי מָר

The man said to him: Let the Master write me