תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אָמְרוּ לִפְנֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: הוֹאִיל וְזוֹ אִשְׁתּוֹ וְזוֹ אִשְׁתּוֹ, זוֹ מִכְרָהּ בָּטֵל – אַף זוֹ מִכְרָהּ בָּטֵל! אָמַר לָהֶן: עַל הַחֲדָשִׁים אָנוּ בּוֹשִׁים, אֶלָּא שֶׁאַתֶּם מְגַלְגְּלִים עָלֵינוּ אֶת הַיְּשָׁנִים?! שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: דִּיעֲבַד קָאָמַר, שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ.

The Gemara replies: Come and hear an answer to this question, as it is taught in a baraita : Rabbi Yehuda said that they said before Rabban Gamliel: Since this one, when she is fully married, is legally his wife, and that one, when she is merely betrothed, is legally his wife, therefore, just as for this married one her sale is void, so too, for this betrothed one her sale should be void. Rabban Gamliel said to them: With regard to the new property, which she inherited after marriage, we are ashamed of this ruling, while you seek to impose upon us the same ruling even with regard to the old property that she owned beforehand? Learn from this that Rabbi Yehuda stated his question with regard to the halakha of a case brought after the fact, as they claim that the sale should be void. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that it is so.

תַּנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן עֲקַבְיָא: לֹא כָּךְ הֵשִׁיבָן רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לַחֲכָמִים, אֶלָּא כָּךְ הֵשִׁיבָן: לֹא אִם אֲמַרְתֶּם בִּנְשׂוּאָה – שֶׁכֵּן בַּעְלָהּ זַכַּאי בִּמְצִיאָתָהּ וּבְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ וּבַהֲפָרַת נְדָרֶיהָ, תֹּאמֵרוּ בַּאֲרוּסָה שֶׁאֵין בַּעְלָהּ זַכַּאי לֹא בִּמְצִיאָתָהּ וְלֹא בְּמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ וְלֹא בַּהֲפָרַת נְדָרֶיהָ!

It is taught in a baraita : Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya said that Rabban Gamliel did not respond to the Sages in that manner. Rather, this is what he replied to them: No, if you said that the sale is void with regard to a married woman, concerning whom the husband has many rights, as her husband is entitled to items she has found and to her earnings and to the right to nullify her vows, will you say the same with regard to a betrothed woman, whose husband is not entitled to items she has found, nor to her earnings, nor to the right of nullification of her vows?

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: רַבִּי, מָכְרָה לָהּ עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִשֵּׂאת, נִשֵּׂאת וְאַחַר כָּךְ מָכְרָה – מַהוּ? אָמַר לְהוּ: אַף זוֹ מוֹכֶרֶת וְנוֹתֶנֶת וְקַיָּים. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הוֹאִיל וְזָכָה בָּאִשָּׁה לֹא יִזְכֶּה בַּנְּכָסִים?! אָמַר לָהֶם: עַל הַחֲדָשִׁים אָנוּ בּוֹשִׁין, אֶלָּא שֶׁאַתֶּם מְגַלְגְּלִין עָלֵינוּ אֶת הַיְּשָׁנִים?!

The Sages said to him: My teacher, this reasoning is accepted if she sold it for herself before she was married, but if she was married and afterward sold the property she had earlier inherited, what is the halakha ? Rabban Gamliel said to them: Even this one may sell the property and gives it away, and her action is valid. They said to him: Since he acquired the woman, will he not acquire the property? He said to them: With regard to the new property she inherited later we are ashamed, and now you impose upon us the old property?

וְהָאֲנַן תְּנַן: עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִשֵּׂאת וְנִשֵּׂאת, רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אִם מָכְרָה וְנָתְנָה – קַיָּים!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: If she inherited property before she was married and was later married, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold it or gave the property away, the transaction is valid. The wording of the baraita , in contrast, indicates that she may sell or give the property away ab initio .

אֲמַר רַב זְבִיד: תְּנֵי: מוֹכֶרֶת וְנוֹתֶנֶת וְקַיָּים. רַב פַּפָּא אֲמַר: לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הָא – רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן עֲקַבְיָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. וְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן עֲקַבְיָא כְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי? הָכִי קָאָמַר: לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵית הִלֵּל עַל דָּבָר זֶה.

Rav Zevid said: Teach the text of the mishna as follows: She may sell and give away the property, and her transaction is valid. Rav Pappa stated another answer: This is not difficult, as this mishna is consistent with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda according to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, but that baraita is consistent with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya according to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. The Gemara poses a question: If so, then apparently Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya agrees with Beit Shammai, as Beit Hillel maintain that she may not sell the property ab initio even while she is betrothed; yet it is well known that the halakha is ruled in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Ḥanina is saying: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to this matter of property that a woman inherited before marriage, as they agree she may sell it ab initio .

רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: בֵּין שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לָהּ נְכָסִים עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִתְאָרְסָה, בֵּין שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לָהּ נְכָסִים מִשֶּׁנִּתְאָרְסָה וְנִיסֵּת – הַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת.

The Gemara cites the opinions of Rav and Shmuel, who both say: Whether property was bequeathed to her before she was betrothed, or whether property was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed and she was then married, and after her marriage she sold it or gave it away, the husband may repossess the property from the purchasers.

כְּמַאן? דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְלָא כְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן עֲקַבְיָא! אִינְהוּ דְּאָמְרִי כְּרַבּוֹתֵינוּ. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבּוֹתֵינוּ חָזְרוּ וְנִמְנוּ: בֵּין שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לָהּ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּתְאָרֵס, וּבֵין שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לָהּ מִשֶּׁנִּתְאָרְסָה וְנִיסֵּת – הַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת.

The Gemara asks: According to whose opinion was this stated? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya, who both maintain that the sale is valid. The Gemara answers: They, i.e., Rav and Shmuel, say so, in accordance with the opinion of our Rabbis. As it is taught in a baraita : Our Rabbis returned and voted after discussing this issue and decided that whether property was bequeathed to her before she was betrothed, or whether property was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed and she was subsequently married, the husband may repossess it from the purchasers.

״מִשֶּׁנִּיסֵּת אֵלּוּ וְאֵלּוּ מוֹדִים״. לֵימָא תָּנֵינָא לְתַקָּנַת אוּשָׁא? דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: בְּאוּשָׁא הִתְקִינוּ: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמָּכְרָה בְּנִכְסֵי מְלוֹג בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ, וּמֵתָה – הַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת!

§ It was taught in the mishna that if she inherited the property after she was married, both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that the husband may repossess it from the buyers. The Gemara comments: Let us say that we already learned in the mishna about the rabbinic ordinance instituted in Usha. As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: In Usha they instituted an ordinance that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property, i.e., property that she alone owns and her husband benefits only from the dividends, in her husband’s lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. This appears to be the same halakha stated by the mishna.

מַתְנִיתִין – בְּחַיֶּיהָ וּלְפֵירוֹת, תַּקָּנַת אוּשָׁא – בְּגוּפָהּ שֶׁל קַרְקַע, וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה.

The Gemara responds: This is not so, as the mishna is discussing the husband’s claim during her lifetime, and it is referring only to the value of the produce that the husband collects from the purchasers if she sold the land during their marriage, as the produce of usufruct property belongs to him but the land itself remains fully in the possession of the buyer. The ordinance of Usha, in contrast, applies even to the land itself, and even after the death of his wife he may repossess it because he inherits it.

״רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן חוֹלֵק בֵּין נְכָסִים״. אֵלּוּ הֵן יְדוּעִין וְאֵלּוּ הֵן שֶׁאֵינָן יְדוּעִין? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: יְדוּעִין – מְקַרְקְעֵי, שֶׁאֵינָן יְדוּעִין – מִטַּלְטְלִין. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֵלּוּ וְאֵלּוּ יְדוּעִין הֵן. וְאֵלּוּ הֵן שֶׁאֵינָן יְדוּעִין – כָּל שֶׁיּוֹשֶׁבֶת כָּאן, וְנָפְלוּ לָהּ נְכָסִים בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם.

§ The mishna further taught that Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between property that is known to the husband and property that is unknown to him. The Gemara asks: Which properties are deemed known and which properties are deemed unknown? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: Property that is known is referring to land, which cannot be concealed. The husband knew that she would inherit it, and he married her with the intention of using its produce. Property that is unknown is referring to movable property. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Both these, land, and those, movable property, are deemed known property. And these are unknown properties: They are properties in any case where she resides here and property was bequeathed to her overseas. Since the husband did not consider this property when marrying her, the sale is binding after the fact.

תַּנְיָא נַמִי הָכִי: אֵלּוּ הֵן שֶׁאֵינָן יְדוּעִין – כָּל שֶׁיּוֹשֶׁבֶת כָּאן וְנָפְלוּ לָהּ נְכָסִים בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם.

The Gemara comments: That opinion is also taught in a baraita . The baraita states: These are unknown properties: They are properties in any case where she resides here and property was bequeathed to her overseas.

הַהִיא אִיתְּתָא דְּבָעֲיָא דְּתַבְרְחִינְהוּ לְנִכְסָהּ מִגַּבְרָהּ, כְּתַבְתִּינְהוּ לִבְרַתָּהּ, אִינְסִיבָה וְאִיגַּרְשָׁה.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who was about to remarry after she was divorced or widowed, who sought to distance the rights to her property from her future husband. She therefore wrote a document stipulating that her property be given as a gift to her daughter before marriage. Ultimately, the daughter was married and then divorced. She wanted her daughter to return the property, and her daughter claimed that it was given to her as a gift.