With regard to the sums in the marriage contract, the conclusion is that a man can add as large an additional sum as he likes. However, the additional sum can be collected only by a woman who was widowed or divorced after marriage. If the relationship ends during the betrothal stage, the woman receives only the main sum of her marriage contract, but not the additional sum. By rabbinic law, the husband is prohibited from reducing the sum below the minimum amount, even if his wife agrees. If a man does not write a marriage contract at all, or writes one for less than the minimum amount, their relationship amounts to licentious sexual intercourse. After betrothal, unless the couple agrees otherwise, there is generally an appointed date set for the marriage. Once this date arrives, the woman is entitled to be sustained from the husband’s assets. Nevertheless, due to various considerations, the Sages ruled that a woman who is betrothed to a priest may not partake of teruma until they are actually married. With regard to the wife’s obligation to perform tasks, the conclusion is that she is responsible for the primary maintenance of the household: Preparing food and caring for the young children, and other household duties. Additionally, she must do some work to aid in producing income for the family. Nevertheless, these are not absolute obligations, as a woman has the prerogative to declare that she will forfeit the right to sustenance from her husband in return for being able to keep her earnings. Additionally, if the wife brings property into the marriage from her dowry, or if the husband or wife is from a family that is not accustomed to performing household tasks, she is exempt from those tasks, due to the halakha that a woman ascends with her husband to his social status but does not descend from her status if his is lower. Despite this, even a wealthy woman must perform certain acts of affection for her husband. These are tasks that do not require great effort but create feelings of closeness between them. Also, a woman may not be completely idle, as this leads to sin. For these and other reasons, the conclusion is that the husband cannot consecrate his wife’s earnings. The Sages delineated specific intervals at which the husband must engage in sexual relations with his wife, depending on his occupation, and he is not permitted to reduce the frequency of his conjugal obligations below this minimum without the wife’s agreement. Nevertheless, he is permitted to leave her for a time in order to study Torah, despite the resultant neglect of his conjugal obligations during his absence. The conjugal obligations are so significant that if one of the parties becomes completely unable to fulfill them, the couple is required to get divorced. If the husband is the one who deprives his wife of sexual intercourse, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. If the wife deprives the husband, she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract. Furthermore, if one spouse refuses to engage in conjugal relations with the other due to a disagreement between them, this spouse is declared rebellious and is subject to monetary fines. And the Sages decreed that if the disagreement is not resolved within a short time, the couple should get divorced. The Sages also set minimum amounts of food, clothing, and household necessities that the poorest of Jewish husbands must provide for their wives. These amounts, like other details of the stipulations in the marriage contract, fluctuate with the accepted practice in each community. Additionally, the couple has the right to stipulate different terms between them.

The marital bond is, from its inception, a sacred bond, which explains the fact that the term for betrothal is sanctification [kiddushin]. That bond can be terminated only by the death of one of the parties or by means of a special document, a bill of divorce. Violation of this bond by means of adultery engenders severe punishments administered both by man, i.e., execution by stoning or strangulation, and by Heaven, i.e., karet, in addition to fines and monetary penalties. At the same time, according to halakha, the relationship between husband and wife within the framework of marriage is founded upon a system of mutual commitments fashioned on the basis of provisions and arrangements agreed upon by the parties. This system of arrangements is set out in a marriage contract [ketuba] formulated between the husband and wife or their representatives. This ketuba is fundamentally a written [katuv] contract, and is characterized in that manner because it is, for all intents and purposes, the only written document that every person requires. Since the provisions between husband and wife are articulated in the marriage contract, it is clear that the discussion in tractate Ketubot is fundamentally a comprehensive analysis of the marital rights and obligations. The significance of the marriage contract is not merely as a practical apparatus regulating married life. The Sages established that marital ties not regulated by a marriage contract do not constitute marriage at all. The fundamental difference between a casual relationship, licentious relations, and marriage is contingent upon both the existence of an agreement between the parties articulating their mutual commitments for the duration of their relationship and the arrangements governing their potential separation. Any marital relationship that is not regulated by a marriage contract is tantamount to a licentious relationship. The details of the agreement between husband and wife are like the details of any contract; both parties entering into marriage establish the provisions on the basis of which they intend to live their life together. Certain restrictions exist, as the marriage agreement, like any other agreement, cannot include stipulations that are against halakha, because of the principle: Anyone who stipulates a condition counter to what is written in the Torah, his condition is void. This includes stipulations that call for violation of a prohibition as well as those that abrogate obligations incumbent upon the parties by Torah law. Furthermore, over the generations, a system of permanent provisions was instituted, which constitute the standard formula of the marriage contract. Although husband and wife can agree to abrogate certain details, or to add details and other arrangements, the standard marriage contract has a fixed configuration that establishes the guidelines for the marriage, unless additional provisions were stipulated. Analysis of these provisions, ranging from the commitments that stem from the marriage by Torah law to the various rabbinic ordinances, as well as the cases where the standard formula can be amended and the manner in which these changes are effected, constitute the primary topics of this tractate. Most of the provisions and arrangements in the marriage contract are universally accepted. However, the Sages of the Mishna and the Gemara disputed the details: Which provisions and halakhot are by Torah law and which are by rabbinic law; which provisions are compulsory for all and which of them are merely customary and can be amended. Fundamentally, the conclusion reached is that there is a distinction between provisions that govern interpersonal relations, which cannot be abrogated, and monetary agreements, even those by Torah law, which can be amended or abrogated at the agreement of the two parties. Based on Exodus 21:10, the obligations of a husband to his wife by Torah law are food, clothing, and conjugal rights. Food refers to the husband’s obligation to provide sustenance to his wife according to her needs; clothing, his obligation to provide her with garments; and conjugal relations, his obligation to engage with her in sexual relations at regular intervals. Also by Torah law, the husband is entitled to nullify certain vows taken by his wife. After her death he inherits her property, although not everyone agrees that this is by Torah law. By rabbinic law, the husband is obligated to pay his wife’s medical bills and to redeem her from captivity. The Sages instituted that the wife perform certain tasks in the home as well as contribute to supporting the family. Income that the wife earns from work, as well as any profits accrued from property belonging to her, and any lost item that she finds, belong to the husband. The Sages also instituted ordinances relating to the rights of the woman after the ties between them are severed by means of divorce or death. One primary ordinance is the fixed sum of money identified as payment of the bill of divorce, which the husband is obligated pay his wife if he divorces her, or the heirs are obligated to pay the wife if she is widowed. For this payment, there is a distinction between a virgin, whose marriage contract is two hundred dinars, and one who is not a virgin, whose marriage contract is one hundred dinars. The husband is permitted to add to that sum any amount of money that he chooses, but he may not reduce the fixed sum. If he does, that is tantamount to nullification of the marriage contract, and the couple’s relations are considered licentious and not marital relations. The early Sages instituted that all the husband’s property is liened to payment of the marriage contract. After the woman dies, the husband is obligated to bury her. After the death of the husband, the widow may continue to live in his house and be supported from his property for the duration of her widowhood. Likewise, there is a fixed condition that by the authority of the marriage contract, daughters born to the husband from this wife are supported from his property after his death, and sons born to this woman inherit the sum of her marriage contract in addition to their share in the inheritance. This system of marital obligations and rights is typically in effect in every marriage, as even if a particular stipulation is omitted from the document, it is in effect as a stipulation of the court. However, the precise application of these provisions in different cases requires analysis. Similarly, the question arises: Which are the provisions that cannot be amended or abrogated, either due to their essence or because the Sages decreed that they cannot be changed or eliminated? And with regard to the provisions that can be amended, what is the legal way to effect this? Marriage is based on agreement, and as such, conflict is apt to arise between the parties. Quarrels or incompatibility require intervention of the courts or halakhic authorities only if the couple decides to separate. However, there are additional conflicts that require halakhic resolution. One example is when husband and wife each accuse the other that he or she violated the provisions of the agreement. These claims can be with regard to the marriage itself, e.g., when one of the parties claims that he was misled to the extent that he would not have agreed to marry had he been privy to that information. Cases where this problem arises after betrothal and prior to marriage are discussed in tractate Kiddushin; cases where this problem arises after marriage belong in tractate Ketubot. There are additional claims with regard to fulfillment of the provisions of the agreement between the parties, where each accuses the other of failure to fulfill the obligations. When these disputes come before the court, there are two stages to the halakhic deliberation. First, the court seeks to ascertain whether or not the claims are true. In this case, more than in any other agreement, there are various details that are difficult or impossible to ascertain. For example, if the husband claims that he discovered on the wedding night that his wife was not a virgin, there is rarely external testimony supporting either the husband’s claim or the bride’s counterclaim. In order to resolve the dispute, the court must rely on general determinations with regard to the credibility of the people and their claims. The second stage involves ameliorating the situation. Based on the severity of the claims of the husband or wife, there are different manners of resolution, e.g., annulment of the marriage; mandating that the husband divorce his wife, paying her marriage contract if he was the guilty party and not paying it if she was the guilty party; or imposing fines and penalties to compel fulfillment of the terms of the ketuba. All these topics, both in terms of whether certain actions are permitted or prohibited as well as with regard to the monetary ramifications of those actions, constitute the primary focus of tractate Ketubot. In addition, several related matters are discussed, e.g., the halakhot of lineage, victims of rape and seduction, and the halakhot of the slanderer. Typically, the Gemara addresses various tangential matters that arise in the course of discussion of these matters. There are three general sections in this tractate: The first deals with the halakhot of a virgin; her marriage, as a victim of rape, and as a victim of slander. The second explores the details of the standard provisions of the marriage contract. The third discusses the halakhot of the wife’s property and payment of the marriage contract. There are thirteen chapters in the tractate, the last eight of which are included in the present volume. Typically, some chapters address one defined issue and some address several issues, while some topics are discussed in a number of different chapters. Chapter Six deals primarily with the monetary aspects of the marriage contract, in terms of the sums that are to be paid and the relationship between the marriage contract and the usufruct property that the woman brings to the marriage. Chapter Seven explores the partial or total abrogation of the marriage contract due to vows or blemishes of the husband or the wife. Chapter Eight discusses the extent of the control that the husband has over the usufruct property of the wife. Chapter Nine analyzes the authority of a marriage contract, both in terms of the ability to waive some of the rights included therein and in terms of the relationship between the marriage contract and other monetary commitments. Chapter Ten discusses the manner in which the husband’s property is divided among several wives and the division of property between various claimants. Chapter Eleven deals with the rights of a widow in the marriage contract and the circumstances under which she collects her marriage contract. On a related note, it deals with women who are not entitled to the marriage contract because of flawed lineage. Chapter Twelve explores the halakhot of a widow, including the rights stemming from the provisions of her marriage contract and special monetary agreements. Chapter Thirteen discusses problems stemming from relocation, including the woman’s right to sustenance when her husband is out of the country and the rights of both the husband and the wife to relocate.