שְׁקִילָא טִיבוּתָךְ שַׁדְיָא אַחִיזְרֵי, כְּבָר תַּרְגְּמָא רַב הוֹשַׁעֲיָא לִשְׁמַעְתֵּיהּ בְּבָבֶל.

Your good is taken and cast on thorns, i.e., we do not owe you a debt of gratitude for informing us of this statement, as Rav Hoshaya himself already interpreted and ruled this halakha of yours in Babylonia.

״בְּנָן נוּקְבָן דְּיֶהֱוְיָין לֵיכִי מִינַּאי״ וכו׳. רַב תָּנֵי: עַד דְּתִלָּקְחָן לְגוּבְרִין, וְלֵוִי תָּנֵי: עַד דְּתִבָּגְרָן. לְרַב – אַף עַל גַּב דְּבָגַר, וְלֵוִי – אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִינְסִיב?

§ The mishna taught that one of the stipulations of the marriage contract is the clause: Any female children you will have from me will be sustained from my property. The Gemara notes that Rav would teach that the daughters are entitled to sustenance until they are taken as wives by men, and Levi would teach that they are entitled to sustenance until they become grown women. The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Rav, are daughters entitled to sustenance even though they have become grown women, if they are still unmarried? Yet how can this be correct? After all, adult daughters are no longer under their father’s jurisdiction even in his lifetime. And can Levi possibly maintain that even though they are married they still receive sustenance from their father’s estate until they become grown women?

אֶלָּא, בָּגַר וְלָא אִינְסִיב, אִינְסִיב וְלָא בָּגַר – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי. כִּי פְּלִיגִי – בַּאֲרוּסָה וְלָא בָּגַר. וְכֵן תָּנֵי לֵוִי בְּמַתְנִיתֵיהּ: עַד דְּתִבָּגְרָן וְיִמְטֵי זִמְנֵיהוֹן דְּאִינַסְּבָן. תַּרְתֵּי?! אֶלָּא: אוֹ תִּבָּגְרָן, אוֹ יִמְטֵי זִמְנֵיהוֹן לְאִיתְנַסְּבָא.

Rather, in a case where they became grown women and were not married, or were married and had not become grown women, everyone agrees that they are not entitled to sustenance. When they disagree it is with regard to a daughter who was betrothed and had not become a grown woman. Levi maintains that as she is still unmarried she remains under her father’s jurisdiction. And Levi likewise taught the following version of this stipulation in his baraita : Until they become grown women and the time arrives for their marriage. The Gemara asks: Are these two conditions both necessary? She leaves her father’s domain when one of these conditions is fulfilled. Rather, Levi means that they can continue to receive sustenance either until they become grown women or their time arrives for marriage.

כְּתַנָּאֵי: עַד מָתַי הַבַּת נִזּוֹנֵית – עַד שֶׁתֵּאָרֵס. מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמְרוּ: עַד שֶׁתִּבָּגֵר. תָּנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: עַד דְּיֶהֱוְויָין. אִיבַּעֲיָא לְהוּ: הֲוָיָה דְּאֵירוּסִין, אוֹ הֲוָיָה דְּנִישּׂוּאִין? תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara observes: The dispute between Rav and Levi is like a dispute between tanna’im . As we have learned: Until when is a daughter sustained from her father’s property? Until she is betrothed. In the name of Rabbi Elazar they said: Until she becomes a grown woman. Rav Yosef taught the version: Until they become married. The meaning of the expression: Until they become married, is unclear, and therefore a dilemma was raised before the scholars: Does this refer to becoming betrothed or to becoming married? No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב יוֹסֵף: מִי שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, אֲרוּסָה יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת אוֹ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִשְׁמַע לָא שְׁמִיעַ לִי, אֶלָּא מִסְּבָרָא לֵית לָהּ. כֵּיוָן דְּאֵירְסָהּ – לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּתִיתְזִיל.

Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Yosef: Have you heard anything from Rav Yehuda with regard to whether a betrothed orphan has sustenance from the brothers’ inheritance of their father’s estate, or whether she does not have sustenance? Rav Yosef said to him: As for hearing, I have not heard anything, but by logical reasoning I can conclude that she does not have sustenance from the inheritance. The reason is that since her husband has betrothed her it is not satisfactory for him that she be demeaned by having to request her sustenance from the inheritance, when he himself can provide for her.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִם מִשְׁמַע לָא שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ – מִסְּבָרָא אִית לָהּ, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא קִים לֵיהּ בְּגַוָּהּ – לָא שְׁדֵי זוּזֵי בִּכְדִי.

Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Yosef: If you have not heard this halakha , by logical reasoning she should have sustenance from the brothers. The reason is that since her husband is not sure that he will marry her, he will not throw away money for nothing.

וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִשְׁמַע לָא שְׁמִיעַ לִי, מִסְּבָרָא אִית לָהּ, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא קִים לֵיהּ בְּגַוָּהּ – לָא שְׁדֵי זוּזֵי בִּכְדִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי מִשְׁמַע לָא שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ – מִסְּבָרָא לֵית לָהּ, כֵּיוָן דְּאֵירְסָהּ – לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּתִיתְזִיל.

And some say a different version of this discussion. Rav Yosef said to Rav Ḥisda: As for hearing, I have not heard anything, but by logical reasoning I would say that she does have sustenance from the brothers: Since he is not sure that he will marry her, he will not throw away money for nothing. In response, Rav Ḥisda said to him: If you have not heard this halakha , by logical reasoning she should not have sustenance from the inheritance: Since he has betrothed her it is not satisfactory for him that she be demeaned by having to ask the brothers for food, and he would rather provide for her himself.

סִימָן דְּגַבְרֵי: ש״ק זר״ף, מֵאֲנָה וִיבָמָה שְׁנִיָּה אֲרוּסָה וַאֲנֻסָה.

§ The Gemara states a mnemonic device for the men, i.e., the Sages, who appear in the following discussion: Shin , kuf , zayin , reish , peh . This refers to Rav Sheshet, Reish Lakish, Rabbi Elazar, Rava, and Rav Pappa. The dilemmas themselves are listed in the following mnemonic: She refused, and a yevama , a secondary forbidden relationship, a betrothed woman, and woman who was raped.

בָּעוּ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מְמָאֶנֶת יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת אוֹ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת?

The Gemara analyzes these cases one by one: The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: With regard to one who refused, i.e., a minor orphan girl who was married off by her brothers or mother and then refused her husband, thereby nullifying the marriage, does she have sustenance from her father’s inheritance or does she not have sustenance? Is she considered to have been married, and therefore her right to sustenance has lapsed, or does her refusal nullify the marriage to the extent that it is as though she were never married at all, and therefore she is still entitled to sustenance?

אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: אַלְמָנָה בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ, וּגְרוּשָׁהּ בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ, וְשׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ – יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עוֹדָהּ בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ – יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, אֵינָהּ בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ – אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת.

Rav Sheshet said to them: You learned it in the following baraita : In the case of a widow in her father’s house, or a divorcée in her father’s house, or a widow awaiting her yavam in her father’s house, she has sustenance. Rabbi Yehuda says: If she is still in her father’s house she has sustenance; if she is not in her father’s house she does not have sustenance.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא! אֶלָּא לָאו – מְמָאֶנֶת אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אִית לָהּ, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: לֵית לָהּ.

Rav Sheshet analyzes this baraita : The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda is to all appearances the same as that of the first tanna . What is their dispute? Rather, is it not the case that there is a practical difference between them concerning a girl who refused her husband, as the first tanna maintains that she has sustenance, as her marriage has been annulled and it is as though it never occurred, and Rabbi Yehuda maintains that she does not have sustenance, as she permanently forfeited this right when she left her father’s house in marriage.

בָּעֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בַּת יְבָמָה יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת אוֹ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת?

Reish Lakish raised a dilemma: With regard to the daughter of a yevama , i.e., a woman who married her yavam in levirate marriage and gave birth to a daughter before he passed away, does she have sustenance from the property of the yavam , i.e., the girl’s father, or does she not have sustenance?

כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר מָר: כְּתוּבָּתָהּ עַל נִכְסֵי בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן – לֵית לָהּ, אוֹ דִּלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּאִי לֵית לָהּ מֵרִאשׁוֹן – תַּקִּינוּ לָהּ רַבָּנַן מִשֵּׁנִי, אִית לָהּ? תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara clarifies the sides of the dilemma: Since the Master said that the payment of the marriage contract of a yevama is taken from the property of her first husband, not that of the yavam , her daughter should therefore not have rights to sustenance from the property of the yavam . Her sustenance is a stipulation of the marriage contract, which does not apply to the yavam . Or perhaps, since if she does not have enough to cover the amount of her marriage contract from the property of the first husband, the Sages enacted for her a marriage contract from the second one, i.e., the yavam . Therefore, her daughter should have sustenance from his property. No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: בַּת שְׁנִיָּה יֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, אוֹ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת?

Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma: With regard to the daughter of a secondary forbidden relationship, i.e., a girl born to a man and women forbidden to each other by rabbinic law, whose mother is penalized by being deprived of a marriage contract, does her daughter have sustenance or does she not have sustenance?