שֶׁפְּצָעָהּ בְּפָנֶיהָ. אָמַר רַב זֵירָא אָמַר רַב מַתָּנָה אָמַר רַב, וְאָמְרִי לָהּ אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַב מַתָּנָה אָמַר רַב: בַּת הַנִּיזּוֹנֶת מִן הָאַחִין – מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ לְעַצְמָהּ, דִּכְתִיב ״וְהִתְנַחַלְתֶּם אוֹתָם לִבְנֵיכֶם אַחֲרֵיכֶם״ אוֹתָם לִבְנֵיכֶם וְלֹא בְּנוֹתֵיכֶם לִבְנֵיכֶם, מַגִּיד שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מוֹרִישׁ זְכוּת בִּתּוֹ לִבְנוֹ.

We are dealing with a case when he injured her in her face, and therefore he must also pay for the loss of her value, a sum that belongs to her father. Rav Zeira said that Rav Mattana said that Rav said, and some say Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Mattana said that Rav said: With regard to a daughter who is sustained by the brothers, her earnings belong to her, as it is written: “And you may make them an inheritance for your sons after you” (Leviticus 25:46), which indicates: It is them, slaves, that you bequeath to your sons, and not your daughters to your sons. This verse teaches that a man does not bequeath a right that he has over his daughter to his son.

אָמַר לֵיהּ אֲבִימִי בַּר פַּפִּי: שָׁקוּד אֲמָרָהּ. שָׁקוּד מַנּוּ – שְׁמוּאֵל, הָא רַב אֲמָרָהּ! אֵימָא אַף שָׁקוּד אֲמָרָהּ. אֲמַר מָר בַּר אָמֵימַר לְרַב אַשִׁי: הָכִי אָמְרִי נְהַרְדְּעֵי, הִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת. רַב אַשִׁי אֲמַר: הִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב. וְהִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב.

Avimi bar Pappi said to Rabbi Zeira: Shakud said this halakha . The Gemara asks: Who is Shakud? This is a nickname for Shmuel. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rav say it? The Gemara answers: One should say that Avimi bar Pappi meant that even Shakud said it, i.e., Shmuel also agreed with this ruling. Mar bar Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: The Sages of Neharde’a say as follows: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet, that brothers who are sustaining their sister are entitled to her earnings. Rav Ashi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, that her earnings belong to her. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

מתני׳ הַמְאָרֵס אֶת בִּתּוֹ וְגֵרְשָׁהּ, אֵירְסָהּ וְנִתְאַרְמְלָה – כְּתוּבָּתָהּ שֶׁלּוֹ. הִשִּׂיאָהּ וְגֵרְשָׁהּ, הִשִּׂיאָהּ וְנִתְאַרְמְלָה – כְּתוּבָּתָהּ שֶׁלָּהּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הָרִאשׁוֹנָה שֶׁל אָב. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אִם מִשֶּׁהִשִּׂיאָהּ – אֵין לְאָבִיהָ רְשׁוּת בָּהּ.

One who betroths his minor daughter to a man, and the man subsequently divorces her, and her father then betroths her to another, and she is widowed, the payment specified in her marriage contract, even from her second husband, is his, i.e., it belongs to the father. However, if her father married her off and her husband divorced her, and her father then married her to another man and she was widowed, even the payment specified in her marriage contract from her first marriage is hers. Rabbi Yehuda says that the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to the father. They said to him: If it was after he married her off, even the first time, her father no longer has authority over her.

גמ׳ טַעֲמָא – דְּהִשִּׂיאָהּ וְגֵרְשָׁהּ, הִשִּׂיאָהּ וְנִתְאַרְמְלָה, אֲבָל נִתְאַרְמְלָה תְּרֵי זִמְנֵי – תּוּ לָא חַזְיָא לְאִינְסוּבֵי. וְאַגַּב אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָא סָתֵים לָן תַּנָּא כְּרַבִּי, דְּאָמַר: בִּתְרֵי זִמְנֵי הָוְיָא חֲזָקָה.

The Gemara infers from the language of the mishna: The reason is that he married her off, and the husband divorced her, and he married her off to another man, and she was widowed. However, if she was widowed twice she is no longer fit to be married, due to the concern that she is the cause of her husbands’ early demise. The Gemara comments: And the tanna incidentally teaches an unattributed opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that presumption is established by two occasions. Consequently, she is already considered a danger after two husbands have passed away, as opposed to the opinion that three incidents are required to establish a presumption.

״רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הָרִאשׁוֹנָה שֶׁל אָב״. מַאי טַעֲמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: הוֹאִיל וּמִשְּׁעַת אֵירוּסִין זָכָה בָּהֶן הָאָב.

§ The mishna taught that Rabbi Yehuda says the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to the father. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains that Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Since the father is entitled to the payments of the marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, when the first husband obligated himself to pay her marriage contract, as the girl was under her father’s authority at the time, the father receives the money. Although the money is actually paid only after the girl was married and divorced, at which time she is under her own jurisdiction, her father acquired his right to the marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, when she was under his authority.

מְתִיב רָבָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הָרִאשׁוֹנָה שֶׁל אָב, וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בִּמְאָרֵס אֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא קְטַנָּה, וּבָגְרָה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשֵּׂאת – שֶׁאֵין לְאָבִיהָ רְשׁוּת בָּהּ. אַמַּאי? הָכָא נַמִי לֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וּמִשְּׁעַת אֵירוּסִין זָכָה בָּהֶן הָאָב!

Rava raised an objection from a baraita : Rabbi Yehuda says that the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to her father. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes in the case of one who betroths his daughter when she is a minor, and she matures and subsequently marries, that her father no longer has authority over her once she becomes an adult, and he does not retain his rights to her marriage contract. According to the above explanation, why does Rabbi Yehuda agree in that case? Here too, let him say: Since the father is entitled to the payment of her marriage contract from the time of her betrothal, he receives the payment even if she married after she reached majority.

אֶלָּא, אִי אִתְּמַר הָכִי אִתְּמַר: רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: הוֹאִיל וּבִרְשׁוּתוֹ נִכְתָּבִין.

Rather, if this statement was stated, it was stated as follows: Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Since the amounts of the marriage contract are written under his authority, as the marriage contract is drafted right before the marriage, at which point the girl was still under her father’s jurisdiction, he is therefore entitled to the money. This explains why the ruling is different if she reached majority before her marriage. In this case, the marriage contract was written when she was no longer under her father’s jurisdiction, and therefore her father is not entitled to the payment of her marriage contract.

וּמִיגְבָּא מֵאֵימַת גָּבְיָא?

And now that it has been established that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the rights to a marriage contract are determined based upon the time of marriage and not the time of betrothal, despite the fact that its sum is fixed at that time, the Gemara asks: From when does the husband’s property become liened to ensure collection of his wife’s marriage contract?

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מָנֶה, מָאתַיִם – מִן הָאֵירוּסִין, וְתוֹסֶפֶת – מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין. וְרַב אַסִי אָמַר: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה – מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין.

Rav Huna said: With regard to the one hundred dinars for a non-virgin and the two hundred for a virgin, the basic sums of a marriage contract instituted by the Sages, she has a lien on her husband’s property from the time of the betrothal, as she acquired this amount when she was betrothed, but with regard to the addition, i.e., additional sums of money stipulated by the husband himself, the wife’s lien on his property takes effect only from the time of the marriage. And Rav Asi said: The lien for both this and that take effect only from the time of their marriage.

וּמִי אֲמַר רַב הוּנָא הָכִי? וְהָאִתְּמַר: הוֹצִיאָה עָלָיו שְׁתֵּי כְּתוּבּוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל מָאתַיִם וְאַחַת שֶׁל שְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת. וְאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: בָּאתָה לִגְבּוֹת מָאתַיִם – גּוֹבָה מִזְּמַן רִאשׁוֹן, שְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת – גּוֹבָה מִזְּמַן שֵׁנִי.

The Gemara asks: And did Rav Huna actually say this, that a woman has a lien on her husband’s property from the time of betrothal with regard to payment of the one hundred or two hundred dinars that constitute the main sum of her marriage contract? But wasn’t it stated that amora’im discussed the case of a woman who produced against her husband, upon their divorce, two marriage contracts, written at different times, one of two hundred dinars and the other one of three hundred? And Rav Huna said: Since she can claim only one marriage contract, if she came to collect the first sum of two hundred dinars, she can collect that amount even from property her husband sold after the first point in time, when this marriage contract was written, and if she wishes to collect the one worth three hundred dinars, she can collect from property her husband sold after the second point in time.

וְאִם אִיתָא – תִּיגְבֵּי מָאתַיִם מִזְּמַן רִאשׁוֹן, וּמֵאָה מִזְּמַן שֵׁנִי!

The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if it is so, that Rav Huna maintains that the lien for the basic sum and the addition can be ascribed to different dates, let her collect two hundred dinars from property sold after the first point in time, as she was already entitled to the basic sum of her marriage contract from that day, and she can collect the additional one hundred dinars from property sold after the second point in time.

וּלְטַעֲמִיךְ תִּיגְבֵּי חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת כּוּלָּם, מָאתַיִם מִזְּמַן רִאשׁוֹן, תְּלַת מֵאָה מִזְּמַן שֵׁנִי!

The Gemara refutes this argument: And even according to your reasoning, let her collect the entire five hundred dinars, the sum of both marriage contracts. She should be able to collect two hundred from property sold after the first point in time and three hundred from property sold after the second stipulated time.

אֶלָּא: חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת מַאי טַעֲמָא לָא גָּבְיָא – כֵּיוָן דְּלָא כָּתַב לָהּ ״צָבִיתִי וְאוֹסִיפִית לָךְ תְּלַת מֵאָה אַמָּאתַיִם״ הָכִי קָאָמַר לָהּ: אִי מִזְּמַן רִאשׁוֹן גְּבִיאַת – גָּבְיָא מָאתַיִם, אִי מִזְּמַן שֵׁנִי גְּבִיאַת – גָּבְיָא תְּלַת מֵאָה.

Rather, what is the reason that she may not collect the entire sum of five hundred dinars? Since he did not write to her in the second marriage contract: I chose to add to the payment of your marriage contract, and therefore I am writing a contract for three hundred dinars in addition to the first two hundred dinars, it is apparent that this is what he meant to say to her by writing a second marriage contract: If you collect from property sold after the first point in time, you may collect two hundred dinars; if you collect from property sold after the second point in time, you may collect three hundred dinars.