בָּעֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: אֵין חֲרִישָׁה בְּשַׁבָּת, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן כֵּיוָן דְּקָא מוֹדוּ בְּכוּלְּהוּ מִלְּתָא, כְּבִיטּוּל מִקְצָת וְקִיּוּם מִקְצָת דָּמֵי, אוֹ דִּלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּקָא עָקְרִיָּין לֵיהּ לַחֲרִישָׁה כָּל עִיקָּר, כַּעֲקִירַת גּוּף דָּמֵי?

§ Apropos the ruling of a court to nullify a mitzva, Rav Yosef raises a dilemma: If the court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against plowing on Shabbat, what is the halakha ? The Gemara elaborates: Do we say that since the judges agree to the application of the entire matter of prohibitions on Shabbat and their ruling is exclusively with regard to plowing, its status is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva? Or perhaps, since the judges are abolishing the principal category of labor of plowing in its entirety, it is tantamount to abolishing the essence of the mitzva of Shabbat.

תָּא שְׁמַע: יֵשׁ נִדָּה בַּתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַבָּא עַל שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם פָּטוּר; וְאַמַּאי? הָא עָקְרִיָּין לְשׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם כָּל עִיקָּר!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge is exempt. And why should they be liable in that case? Didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge, in its entirety? Apparently, nullification of one category of halakha in a mitzva is not tantamount to abolition of the essence of an entire mitzva.

אָמַר לָךְ רַב יוֹסֵף: שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם דְקָאָמְרִין כִּדְשַׁנִּין.

The Gemara rejects this: Rav Yosef could say to you: The ruling concerning a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge is as we stated, as we explained earlier. The reference is not to abolition of the entire halakha of the woman who observes a day for a day, but rather to a case where the judges ruled that the initial stage of intercourse is permitted.

תָּא שְׁמַע: יֵשׁ שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים פָּטוּר; וְאַמַּאי? הָא עָקְרִיָּין לְהוֹצָאָה כָּל עִיקָּר!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, but one who carries out objects from the private domain to the public domain is exempt. And why should they be liable in that case? Didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of the principal category of labor of carrying out in its entirety?

הָתָם נַמִי כִּדְשַׁנִּין.

The Gemara rejects this: That too is as we explained earlier, that the court rules to nullify only a portion of the labor, e.g., throwing or passing an item from domain to domain.

תָּא שְׁמַע: יֵשׁ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַּתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה פָּטוּר; אַמַּאי? וְהָא עָקְרִיָּין לְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה כָּל עִיקָּר!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, but one who bows to the idol but did not sacrifice an offering is exempt. And why should the court be liable in that case? But didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of bowing in its entirety?

אָמְרִי: הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה נַמִי כִּדְשַׁנִּין.

The Sages say: Bowing, too, is as we explained earlier, that the court rules to nullify only an aspect of bowing, not to abolish the prohibition against bowing in its entirety.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי זֵירָא: אֵין שַׁבָּת בַּשְּׁבִיעִית, מַהוּ? בְּמַאי טָעוּ? בְּהָדֵין קְרָא: ״בֶּחָרִישׁ וּבַקָּצִיר תִּשְׁבֹּת״, בִּזְמַן דְּאִיכָּא חֲרִישָׁה אִיכָּא שַׁבָּת, וּבִזְמַן דְּלֵיכָּא חֲרִישָׁה לֵיכָּא שַׁבָּת,

Apropos rulings to nullify a mitzva or part of a mitzva, Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: If a court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, what is the halakha ? Before seeking to resolve that dilemma, the Gemara asks: With regard to what matter did they err that resulted in that ruling? They erred with regard to this verse written with regard to Shabbat: “In plowing and in harvest you shall rest” (Exodus 34:21), which the judges interpreted to mean: During a time when there is plowing, i.e., in all years of the Sabbatical cycle other than the Sabbatical Year, there is a prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. But during a time when there is no plowing, i.e., during the Sabbatical Year, there is no prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat.

מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דִּמְקַיְּימִין לָהּ בִּשְׁאָר שְׁנֵי שָׁבוּעַ, כְּבִיטּוּל מִקְצָת וְקִיּוּם מִקְצָת דָּמֵי, אוֹ דִּלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּקָא עָקְרִיָּין לֵיהּ בַּשְּׁבִיעִית, כַּעֲקִירַת הַגּוּף דָּמֵי?

The Gemara elaborates on Rabbi Zeira’s dilemma. Do we say: Since one fulfills the mitzva of Shabbat during the rest of the years of the Sabbatical cycle, nullifying Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva? Or perhaps, since the court is abolishing Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, it is tantamount to abolishing the entire essence of the mitzva?

אֲמַר רָבִינָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: נָבִיא שֶׁנִּתְנַבֵּא לַעֲקוֹר דָּבָר מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה – חַיָּיב, לְבִיטּוּל מִקְצָת וּלְקִיּוּם מִקְצָת – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: פָּטוּר. וּבַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, אֲפִילּוּ אָמַר: הַיּוֹם עוֹבְדָהּ וּלְמָחָר בַּטְּלָהּ – חַיָּיב; שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: אֵין שַׁבָּת בַּשְּׁבִיעִית – כְּבִיטּוּל מִקְצָת וְקִיּוּם מִקְצָת דָּמֵי, שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ.

Ravina said: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from a baraita : In the case of a prophet who prophesies to abolish a matter of the matters of the Torah, he is deemed a false prophet and is liable to be executed through strangulation. If he prophesies for the nullification of part and the fulfillment of part of a matter in the Torah, Rabbi Shimon says he is exempt from execution. And with regard to idol worship, even if he says: Worship it today and revoke its status tomorrow, everyone agrees that he is liable, as with regard to idol worship, even a ruling to nullify part of the mitzva involves a severe prohibition. Learn from it that in a case where a court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, it is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it.

מתני׳ הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין, וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ וְאָמַר לָהֶן: ״טוֹעִין אַתֶּם״, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה מוּפְלָא שֶׁל בֵּית דִּין שָׁם, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶן גֵּר אוֹ מַמְזֵר אוֹ נָתִין, אוֹ זָקֵן שֶׁלֹּא רָאוּי לְבָנִים – הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר,

If the court issued a ruling, and one of the judges knew that they erred and he said to them: You are mistaken; or if the most distinguished [ mufla ] member of the court was not there for that session of the Sanhedrin, or if one of the judges was disqualified from serving as a judge, e.g., because he was a convert, or a child born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [ mamzer ], or a Gibeonite, or an old man no longer able to father children, this court is exempt, because they have not rendered a full-fledged ruling.

שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר כָּאן ״עֵדָה״ וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״עֵדָה״, מָה ״עֵדָה״ הָאֲמוּרָה לְהַלָּן – כּוּלָּן רְאוּיִן לְהוֹרָאָה, אַף ״עֵדָה״ הָאֲמוּרָה כָּאן – עַד שֶׁיִּהְיוּ כּוּלָּן רְאוּיִן לְהוֹרָאָה.

This is derived by means of a verbal analogy, as “assembly” is stated here with regard to a court that issues an erroneous ruling: “And if the entire assembly of Israel shall act unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:13), and “assembly” is stated there with regard to the halakha of one who commits murder unwittingly: “And the assembly shall judge between the one who struck and the blood redeemer” (Numbers 35:24). Just as in the “assembly” stated there, with regard to the unwitting murderer, all the judges must be fit to issue rulings, so too, in the “assembly” stated here, with regard to the court that issued an erroneous ruling; the court will not be liable unless all the judges will be fit to issue rulings.

גמ׳ אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה מוּפְלָא שֶׁל בֵּית דִּין שָׁם. מְנָלַן? אֲמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, וְכֵן תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרוּ: הוֹרוּ בְּדָבָר שֶׁהַצְּדוֹקִין מוֹדִין בּוֹ – פְּטוּרִין? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהָיָה לָהֶם לִלְמוֹד וְלֹא לָמְדוּ. לֹא הָיָה מוּפְלָא שֶׁל בֵּית דִּין שָׁם נַמִי פְּטוּרִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהָיָה לָהֶם לִלְמוֹד וְלֹא לָמְדוּ.

The mishna teaches: Or if the most distinguished member of the court was not there, the court is exempt. From where do we derive this halakha ? Rav Sheshet said, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For what reason did the Sages say: If the court issued a ruling with regard to a matter with which the Sadducees agree, the judges are exempt? It is due to the fact that it was incumbent upon them to learn that halakha that is written explicitly in the Torah, and they did not learn it. Similarly, in a case where the most distinguished member of the court was not there, the judges are also exempt, as it was incumbent upon them to learn and they did not learn.

״נֶאֱמַר שָׁם עֵדָה וְנֶאֱמַר כָּאן עֵדָה…עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ כּוּלָּן רְאוּיִן לְהוֹרָאָה״. וְהָתָם מְנָלַן? דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהִתְיַצְּבוּ שָׁם עִמָּךְ״, ״עִמָּךְ״ – בְּדוֹמִין לְךָ.

The mishna teaches: “Assembly” is stated there and “assembly” is stated here… the court will not be liable unless all the judges will be fit to issue rulings. The Gemara asks: And there, from where do we derive that all the judges must be fit to issue rulings? The Gemara answers that this is as Rav Ḥisda says that the verse states in connection with the transfer of the Divine Spirit from Moses to the Elders: “That they may stand there with you” (Numbers 11:16). The term “with you” is explained to mean: With similarity to you, in the sense that they must be fit to issue rulings.

וְאֵימָא: עִמָּךְ לַשְּׁכִינָה! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְנָשְׂאוּ אִתָּךְ״, אִתָּךְ – בְּדוֹמִין לְךָ.

The Gemara challenges: And say that the term “with you,” means that they shall be like Moses in that they will all be fit for the Divine Presence to rest upon them. Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says that it is derived as the verse states in the context of the advice that Yitro gave to Moses: “And they shall judge the people at all times…and ease your burden from upon you and bear it with you” (Exodus 18:22). “With you” is interpreted to mean: Similar to you.

מתני׳ הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שׁוֹגְגִין וְעָשׂוּ כָּל הַקָּהָל שׁוֹגְגִין – מְבִיאִין פָּר, מְזִידִין וְעָשׂוּ שׁוֹגְגִין – מְבִיאִין כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה, שׁוֹגְגִין וְעָשׂוּ מְזִידִין – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין.

If the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling unwittingly and the entire congregation performed a transgression unwittingly on the basis of their ruling, the court brings a bull, as it is stated in the Torah with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering. If the court issued the erroneous ruling intentionally, as they knew that their ruling was incorrect, and the congregation performed a transgression unwittingly on the basis of the ruling of the court, each member of the congregation brings a female lamb or a female goat as an individual sin-offering. If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally, i.e., with the knowledge that the ruling of the court was erroneous, these people are exempt from bringing an offering.

גמ׳ ״שׁוֹגְגִין וְעָשׂוּ מְזִידִין – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין״. הָא שׁוֹגֵג דּוּמְיָא דְּמֵזִיד – חַיָּיב, וְהֵיכִי דָמֵי? שֶׁהוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר וְנִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ,

The mishna teaches: If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally, these people are exempt. The Gemara infers: But if the person performed a transgression unwittingly in a manner similar to that of an intentional transgression, liable. And what are the circumstances of that performance? It is a case where the court issued a ruling that forbidden fat is permitted, and the forbidden fat became confused for a person with permitted fat and he ate the forbidden fat.

לֵימָא: תִּפְשׁוֹט הָא דְּבָעֵי רָמִי בַּר חָמָא! אָמַר לָךְ, מִשּׁוּם דִּתְנָא רֵישָׁא: מְזִידִין וְעָשׂוּ שׁוֹגְגִין, תָּנָא סֵיפָא: שׁוֹגְגִין וְעָשׂוּ מְזִידִין.

The Gemara suggests: If so, let us say: Resolve from here that which Rami bar Ḥama raises as a dilemma (2a) with regard to this case, a dilemma that remained unresolved. The Gemara rejects this: Rami bar Ḥama could say to you that the dilemma cannot be resolved based on this inference, as due to the fact that the tanna taught the first clause of the mishna: If the court issued the erroneous ruling intentionally, and the congregation performed a transgression unwittingly, he taught the latter clause employing a similar style: If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally.

מתני׳ הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ כָּל הַקָּהָל אוֹ רוּבָּן עַל פִּיהֶן – מְבִיאִין פָּר, וּבַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – מְבִיאִין פָּר וְשָׂעִיר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר; רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר שְׁבָטִים מְבִיאִין שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר פָּרִים, וּבַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – מְבִיאִין שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר פָּרִים וּשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר שְׂעִירִים;

If the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling and the entire congregation or a majority thereof performed a transgression on the basis of their ruling, the judges bring a bull as an unwitting communal sin-offering. And if the erroneous ruling involved idol worship, the judges bring a bull and a goat, as it is written in the Torah (see Numbers 15:24); this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not the court that brings the offering, it is the people. Twelve tribes, each of which performed a transgression, bring twelve bulls, i.e., each tribe brings one, and for idol worship they bring twelve bulls and twelve goats, as each tribe is a congregation.