לְאַבַּיֵי, ״כְּלָל״ – לְאַתּוּיֵי בְּשַׂר חֲזִיר, ״כָּזֶה״ – לְמַעוּטֵי פְּלוֹנִי.

And according to Abaye this principle was stated to include the case of a condition that she should eat pig meat, and the expression: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, serves to exclude a condition that she should engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, in which case the divorce takes effect only once the condition is fulfilled, as it is possible to fulfill this condition in a permitted manner.

מֵיתִיבִי: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטֵּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֹּאכְלִי בְּשַׂר חֲזִיר״, וְאִם הָיְתָה זָרָה ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֹּאכְלִי בִּתְרוּמָה״, וְאִם הָיְתָה נְזִירָה ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּשְׁתִּי יַיִן״, נִתְקַיֵּים הַתְּנַאי – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינוֹ גֵּט; לְרָבָא נִיחָא, לְאַבַּיֵי קַשְׁיָא!

The Gemara raises an objection from another baraita ( Tosefta 6:10): If the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you eat pig meat; or similarly, if she was a non-priestess, i.e., the daughter of an Israelite, and he stipulated: On the condition that you partake of teruma ; or if she was a nazirite and he stipulated: On the condition that you drink wine (see Numbers 6:3); in all of these cases, if the condition is fulfilled it is a valid bill of divorce, and if not, it is not a valid bill of divorce. This works out well according to Rava, who holds that a condition that she should perform a forbidden act is binding; according to Abaye it is difficult.

אָמַר לָךְ אַבַּיֵי: מִי סָבְרַתְּ דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל הִיא? הָא מַנִּי – רַבָּנַן הִיא.

The Gemara answers that Abaye could have said to you: Do you hold that this ruling is agreed upon by everyone? That is not the case. Rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita ? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima, maintaining that even a condition that cannot be fulfilled is a valid condition.

וְתֵיפּוֹק לֵיהּ דְּמַתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה הוּא, וְכָל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל!

The Gemara challenges: Regardless of the issue of a condition that cannot be fulfilled, derive that this condition is void from the fact that the husband is stipulating counter to that which is written in the Torah, and there is a principle that with regard to anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.

אֲמַר רַב אַדָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: כִּי אָמְרִינַן מַתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל – כְּגוֹן שְׁאֵרָהּ כְּסוּתָהּ וְעוֹנָתָהּ, דְּהוּא קָא עָקַר, אֲבָל הָכָא אִיהִי קָא עָקְרָה.

Rav Adda son of Rav Ika said in response: When we say that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah his condition is void, the reference is to a case such as a man who betroths a woman on the condition that he will not be obligated to provide her with her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights, as there he is uprooting a matter of Torah law by fulfilling the condition. But here, it is she who is uprooting a matter of Torah law by fulfilling the condition and not him.

מַתְקִיף לָהּ רָבִינָא: כְּלוּם קָא עָקְרָה אִיהִי אֶלָּא לְקַיּוּמֵי לִתְנַאי דִּידֵיהּ, אִישְׁתַּכַּח דְּאִיהוּ קָא עָקַר!

Ravina strongly objects to this response: Isn’t she uprooting it only in order to fulfill his condition? It is therefore found that he is uprooting a matter of Torah law by attaching this condition to the divorce.

אֶלָּא אֲמַר רָבִינָא: כִּי אָמְרִינַן מַתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל – כְּגוֹן שְׁאֵרָהּ כְּסוּתָהּ וְעוֹנָתָהּ, דְּוַדַּאי קָא עָקַר, אֲבָל הָכָא מִי קָאָמַר לָהּ לָא סַגְיָא דְּלָא אָכְלָה? לָא תֵּיכוּל וְלָא תִּיגָּרֵשׁ.

Rather, Ravina said: When we say that if one stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, that his condition is void, the reference is to a case such as that of a man who stipulates that he will not be obligated to provide his wife with her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights, as by attaching this condition he is definitely uprooting a matter of Torah law. But here, is he saying to her that it is not possible for her not to eat? She may not eat and not get divorced. The condition does not counter Torah law in and of itself, as the wife has the choice of whether or not to fulfill it.

״כֵּיצַד יַעֲשֶׂה? יִטְּלֶנּוּ הֵימֶנָּה״ וכו׳. מַאן תַּנָּא? אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר הִיא;

§ It is stated in the mishna: What should he do after giving her the bill of divorce and stipulating that she is not permitted to so-and-so? He should take it from her, and hand it to her again, and say to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that? Ḥizkiyya said that it is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיִּטְלֶנּוּ הֵימֶנָּה, וְיַחֲזוֹר וְיִתְּנֶנּוּ לָהּ וְיֹאמַר לָהּ ״הֵי גִּיטֵּךְ״.

As it is taught in a baraita : If a husband gives his wife a bill of divorce without her knowledge, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that it does not take effect until he takes it from her, and hands it to her again, and says to her: This is your bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it is not necessary for him to hand it to her a second time; rather, it is sufficient for him to tell her that he is giving her a bill of divorce. The mishna is therefore in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who holds that the husband must hand it to her again.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אֲמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי, דִּילְכוֹן אֲמַר: שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, הוֹאִיל וּקְנָאַתּוּ לִיפָּסֵל בּוֹ לִכְהוּנָּה.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You can even say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Your Sage, referring to Rav Kahana, who came from Babylonia to study in Eretz Yisrael, said that it is different here, since the wife has already acquired the bill of divorce with regard to her becoming disqualified from marrying into the priesthood due to it, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that he need not take it back and give it to her again. Since the bill of divorce was already partially effective, it is in the wife’s possession and cannot be used by the husband to divorce her in full unless she gives it back to him and he gives it to her again. Therefore, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees that he must give it to her a second time.

״כְּתָבוֹ בְּתוֹכוֹ״. אֲמַר רַב סָפְרָא: כְּתָבוֹ בְּתוֹכוֹ תְּנַן.

§ It is stated in the mishna that if the husband wrote his qualification inside the bill of divorce, it is invalid even if he subsequently erased it. Rav Safra said: We learned in the mishna that the bill is invalid only if he wrote the qualification inside the bill of divorce, not if he stated it orally.

פְּשִׁיטָא, ״כְּתָבוֹ בְּתוֹכוֹ״ תְּנַן! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי לְאַחַר הַתּוֹרֶף, אֲבָל לִפְנֵי הַתּוֹרֶף – אֲפִילּוּ עַל פֶּה נַמִי פָּסוּל, קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.

The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case, as we learned in the mishna explicitly that he wrote it inside. The Gemara answers: Rav Safra stated this lest you say that this matter applies only when the qualification was written after the essential part of the bill of divorce, which contains the names of the husband and wife and the date, but before the essential part even if the qualification was stated orally, the bill of divorce is invalid, as it was written with the intention that the wife would not be permitted to marry any man. Rav Safra therefore teaches us that only a written qualification in the bill of divorce renders it invalid, and an oral statement does not render it invalid. Consequently, the husband can hand this bill of divorce to his wife without stating the qualification and it will be valid.

וְרָבָא אֲמַר: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר הַתּוֹרֶף, אֲבָל לִפְנֵי הַתּוֹרֶף – אֲפִילּוּ עַל פֶּה נַמִי פָּסוּל.

And Rava said: They taught that it is specifically writing the qualification that invalidates the bill of divorce only when the qualification is stated after the writing of the essential part. But if the qualification is stated before the essential part of the bill of divorce is written, even if it is stated orally, the bill of divorce is invalid.

וְאָזְדָא רָבָא לְטַעֲמֵיהּ, דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ רָבָא לְהָנְהוּ דְּכָתְבִי גִּיטֵּי: שְׁתֹקוּ שְׁתוּקֵי לְבַעַל עַד דְּכָתְבִיתוּ לֵיהּ לַתּוֹרֶף דְּגִיטָא.

And Rava followed his line of reasoning, as Rava said to those who write bills of divorce: Silence the husband until you write the essential part of the bill of divorce, lest he state a condition, thereby rendering the bill of divorce invalid.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כָּל הַתְּנָאִין פּוֹסְלִין בְּגֵט, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי; וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כָּל שֶׁפּוֹסֵל עַל פֶּה פּוֹסֵל בִּכְתָב, וְכָל שֶׁאֵינוֹ פּוֹסֵל עַל פֶּה אֵינוֹ פּוֹסֵל בִּכְתָב, ״חוּץ״ שֶׁפּוֹסֵל עַל פֶּה – פּוֹסֵל בִּכְתָב, ״עַל מְנָת״ שֶׁאֵינוֹ פּוֹסֵל עַל פֶּה – אֵינוֹ פּוֹסֵל בִּכְתָב.

The Sages taught: All conditions that are written in a bill of divorce invalidate it, this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: Any qualification that invalidates the divorce when stated orally by the husband while he hands the bill of divorce to his wife invalidates it when written, and any qualification that does not invalidate it when stated orally does not invalidate it when written. Therefore, issuing a qualification that she is permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, which invalidates the divorce when stated orally, invalidates it as well when written, whereas attaching a standard condition, which does not invalidate it when stated orally, does not invalidate it when written.

אֲמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: מַחֲלוֹקֶת – לִפְנֵי הַתּוֹרֶף, דְּרַבִּי סָבַר: גָּזְרִינַן ״עַל מְנָת״ אַטּוּ ״חוּץ״, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לָא גָּזְרִינַן ״עַל מְנָת״ אַטּוּ ״חוּץ״. אֲבָל לְאַחַר הַתּוֹרֶף

Rabbi Zeira said: This dispute applies to a case where the condition was written in the bill of divorce before the essential part was written, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we issue a decree that a stipulation invalidates the bill of divorce due to a case of an exception, and the Rabbis hold that we do not issue a decree that a stipulation invalidates it due to a case of an exception. But if it was written after the essential part,