גִּיטָּא לָא הָוֵי עַד דְּמָטֵית לְמָתָא מְחַסְיָא.

However, it is not a valid bill of divorce until you reach Mata Meḥasya.

״וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר מִיָּד״. פְּשִׁיטָא, דְּהָא מַרְאָה מָקוֹם הִיא לוֹ!

The mishna teaches that if the woman said to the agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me in such and such a place, Rabbi Elazar prohibits her from partaking of teruma immediately. The Gemara asks: That is obvious, as she is merely indicating a place for him to receive the bill of divorce and not stipulating that the divorce is contingent upon receipt of the document in that place.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאָמְרָה לֵיהּ ״זִיל לְמִזְרָח דְּאִיתֵיהּ בַּמִּזְרָח״, וְקָא אֲזַל לַמַּעֲרָב, מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא בַּמַּעֲרָב הָא לֵיתֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן, דִּילְמָא בַּהֲדֵי דְּקָאָזֵיל מֵיגַס גָּאֵיס בֵּיהּ וִיהַב לֵיהּ גִּיטָּא.

The Gemara answers: No, Rabbi Elazar’s ruling is necessary in a case where she said to him: Go to the east, as my husband is in the east, and the agent went to the west. Lest you say that since the husband is certainly not in the west and the agent will not find him there, the bill of divorce will certainly not take effect until later, Rabbi Elazar teaches us that perhaps while he was going west, the agent happened to encounter the husband, and the husband gave the bill of divorce to the agent.

הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״עָרֵב לִי בִּתְמָרִים״ וְעֵירֵב לוֹ בִּגְרוֹגָרוֹת, ״בִּגְרוֹגָרוֹת״ וְעֵירֵב לוֹ בִּתְמָרִים, תָּנֵי חֲדָא: עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, וְתַנְיָא אִידָךְ: אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב!

The Gemara cites a related halakha . With regard to one who says to his agent: Establish an eiruv of Shabbat boundaries on my behalf with dates, and he established an eiruv on his behalf with dried figs, or if said to his agent: Establish an eiruv on my behalf with dried figs, and he established an eiruv on his behalf with dates, it is taught in one baraita : His eiruv is a valid eiruv . And it is taught in another baraita : His eiruv is not a valid eiruv .

אֲמַר רַבָּה, לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא רַבָּנַן, הָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר; הָא רַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי: קְפֵידָא; הָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּאָמַר: מַרְאָה מָקוֹם הִיא לוֹ.

Rabba said: This is not difficult. This baraita , in which it is taught that it is not a valid eiruv , is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and that baraita , in which it is taught that it is a valid eiruv , is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. He explains: This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: When one gives instructions to his agent, there is insistence on his part that the agent implement those instructions without deviation. Failure to do so revokes his designation as his agent. And that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: She is merely indicating a place for him to receive the bill of divorce and not stipulating that the divorce is contingent on receipt of the document in that place. In the baraita as well, he was not particular as to what food should be used to establish the eiruv .

וְרַב יוֹסֵף אֲמַר: הָא וְהָא רַבָּנַן, כָּאן בְּשֶׁלּוֹ, כָּאן בְּשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ.

And Rav Yosef said: Both this baraita and that baraita are the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: When one gives instructions to his agent, there is insistence on his part that the agent implement those instructions without deviation. However, not all deviations are equal. Here, where the baraita rules that it is a valid eiruv , the reference is to a case where the one who designated the agent instructed him to establish the joining of the courtyard with his dates or dried figs and the agent deviated and established the eiruv with the other type of fruit, but it belonged to the one issuing the instructions. There, where the baraita rules that it is not a valid eiruv , the reference is to a case where the one who designated the agent instructed him to establish the joining of the courtyard with the dates or dried figs of another, and the agent deviated and established the eiruv with the other type of fruit belonging to that other person. The eiruv is not valid because that other person authorized use of only a specific type of fruit.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבַּיֵי, וְאֶלָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״עָרֵב לִי בְּמִגְדָּל״ וְעֵירֵב לוֹ בְּשׁוֹבָךְ, ״בְּשׁוֹבָךְ״ – וְעֵירֵב לוֹ בְּמִגְדָּל, דְּתַנְיָא חֲדָא: עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, וְתַנְיָא אִידָךְ: אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, הָתָם מַאי שֶׁלּוֹ וְשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ אִיכָּא?

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: However, that which is taught in a baraita : With regard to one who says to his agent: Establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries on my behalf in a tower, and he established the eiruv in a dovecote, or he said to the agent: Establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries on my behalf in a dovecote, and he established the eiruv in a tower, it is taught in one baraita : His joining of Shabbat boundaries is a valid eiruv . And it is taught in another baraita : His joining of Shabbat boundaries is not a valid eiruv . There, what distinction between his fruit and fruit of another is there?

הָתָם נַמִי אִיכָּא פֵּירֵי דְּמִגְדָּל וּפֵירֵי דְּשׁוֹבָךְ.

The Gemara answers: There too, there is a distinction between fruit of the tower and fruit of the dovecote. In these baraitot the instruction did not relate to the location of the placement of the eiruv ; rather, the instruction was related to the location of the fruit to be used in establishing the eiruv . In one baraita , the produce in both locations belongs to the one who designated the agent; in the other baraita , the produce in both locations belongs to another.

מתני׳ הָאוֹמֵר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט וּתְנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי״, ״גָּרְשׁוּהָ״, ״כִּתְבוּ אִיגֶּרֶת וּתְנוּ לָהּ״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ;

With regard to a husband who says to two people: Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife, or: Divorce her, or: Write a letter and give it to her, they should write the document and give it to her. In each of those cases his intent is clear. He is instructing them to effect her divorce.

״פַּטְּרוּהָ״, ״פַּרְנְסוּהָ״, ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כַּנִּימוּס״, ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כָּרָאוּי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.

However, one who said: Release her, or: Sustain her, or: Treat her according to the law [ nimus ], or: Treat her appropriately, said nothing, as none of these expressions clearly expresses his desire to divorce his wife.

גמ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״שַׁלְּחוּהָ״, ״שִׁבְקוּהָ״, ״תַּרְכוּהָ״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ; ״פַּטְּרוּהָ״, ״פַּרְנְסוּהָ״, ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כַּנִּימוּס״, ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כָּרָאוּי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.

The Sages taught that if the husband said: Send her, or: Separate her, or: Banish her, then all of these expressions convey his will to divorce her, and consequently, they should write the bill of divorce and give it to her. However, one who said: Release her [ patruha ], or: Sustain her, or: Treat her according to the law, or: Treat her appropriately, said nothing.

תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: ״פַּטְּרוּהָ״ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין, ״פִּיטְרוּהָ״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. אֲמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן דְּבַבְלָאָה הוּא, וְדָיֵיק בֵּין ״פִּיטְרוּהָ״ לְ״פַטְּרוּהָ״, תַּנָּא דִּידָן דְּבַר אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא, לָא דָּיֵיק.

It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: If one said patruha , his statement stands, and they give her a bill of divorce. However, if one said pitruha , he said nothing. Rava said: Rabbi Natan, who is a Babylonian, distinguished between pitruha and patruha . Pitruha means exempt her, which is unrelated to divorce; patruha means release her, which is very much related to divorce. However, the tanna of our mishna, who is a resident of Eretz Yisrael, did not distinguish between these two expressions.

אִיבַּעֲיָא לְהוּ: ״הוֹצִיאוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״עִזְבוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״הַתִּירוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״הַנִּיחוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״הוֹעִילוּ לָהּ״, מַהוּ? ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כַּדָּת״, מַהוּ?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the husband said: Remove her, what is the halakha ? Abandon her, what is the halakha ? If he said: Unbind her, what is the halakha ? If he said: Let her be, what is the halakha ? If he said: Be useful for her, what is the halakha ? If he said: Treat her according to the custom, what is the halakha ?

פְּשׁוֹט מִיהָא חֲדָא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כַּדָּת״, ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כַּנִּימוּס״, ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כָּרָאוּי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.

The Gemara answers: Resolve at least one of these expressions, as it is taught in a baraita : One who said: Treat her according to the custom, or: Treat her according to the law, or: Treat her appropriately, said nothing and it is not a valid bill of divorce. Apparently, the expression: Treat her according to the custom, is not an unequivocal instruction to effect divorce.

מתני׳ בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ אוֹמְרִים: הַיּוֹצֵא בְּקוֹלָר, וְאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר: אַף הַמְפָרֵשׁ, וְהַיּוֹצֵא בְּשַׁיָּירָא; רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שְׁזוּרִי אוֹמֵר: אַף הַמְסוּכָּן.

At first the Sages would say: In the case of one who is taken out in a neck chain [ kolar ] to be executed and who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, these people should write the document and give it to his wife even though there was no explicit instruction to give it to her. They then said: Even with regard to one who sets sail and one who departs in a caravan to a far-off place and says: Write a bill of divorce to my wife, his intention is to write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if one who is dangerously ill gives that instruction, they write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife.

גמ׳ גְנֵיבָא יוֹצֵא בְּקוֹלָר הֲוָה, כִּי הֲוָה קָא נָפֵיק, אֲמַר: הֲבוּ אַרְבַּע מֵאָה זוּזֵי לְרַבִּי אָבִינָא, מֵחַמְרָא דִּנְהַר פַּנְיָא. אֲמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא:

The Gemara relates: Geneiva was one who went out in a neck chain to be executed. When he was going out, he said to the people there as his dying bequest: Give four hundred dinars to Rabbi Avina from wine that I have in the city of Nehar Panya. Rabbi Zeira said: