שֶׁשָּׁקַל בָּהֶן מִשְׁקָלוֹת – כְּשֵׁרָה! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּגוּפָן, הָא בִּכְנֶגְדָּן.

with which he weighed weights is fit? The Gemara answers: It is not difficult: This baraita is referring to a case where he weighs an object with the water itself, and therefore the water is disqualified. And this statement of Rava’s, that the water is fit, is referring to a case where he weighs an object against the water.

בְּגוּפָן – מַעֲשֶׂה קָא עָבֵיד בְּהוּ, וְאִי הֶיזֵּק שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִיכָּר שְׁמֵיהּ הֶיזֵּק, בְּדִינֵי אָדָם נַמִי לִחַיֵּיב. אֶלָּא, אִידִי וְאִידִי בִּכְנֶגְדָּן, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּאַסַּח דַּעְתֵּיהּ, הָא דְּלָא אַסַּח דַּעְתֵּיהּ.

The Gemara asks: If he weighs an object with the water itself, then he performs a real task with it, and if damage that is not evident is nevertheless categorized as damage, then he should also be liable according to human laws to pay for performing a task with the water. Rather, it is necessary to say that both this and that refer to a case where he weighed an object against the water, and still it is not difficult: This baraita is referring to a case where in the course of the weighing the object his attention was diverted from guarding the water, that statement of Rava’s is referring to a case where his attention was not diverted, and therefore the water did not become disqualified.

מְתִיב רַב פַּפָּא: גָּזַל מַטְבֵּעַ וְנִפְסַל, תְּרוּמָה – וְנִטְמֵאת, חָמֵץ – וְעָבַר עָלָיו הַפֶּסַח, אוֹמֵר לוֹ ״הֲרֵי שֶׁלְּךָ לְפָנֶיךָ״.

Rav Pappa raises an objection against Ḥizkiyya’s opinion from that which is taught in a baraita : If one robbed another of a coin and afterward the coin was rendered invalid by the government, or if he robbed another of teruma and it became ritually impure, or if he robbed another of leavened bread and Passover then elapsed over it, rendering it forbidden, in each of these cases the robber can return the item and say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you. Since the robber returned the stolen item, he is not required to compensate the victim of the robbery for his monetary loss, although the stolen items are currently of minimal or no value.

וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ הֶיזֵּק שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִיכָּר שְׁמֵיהּ הֶיזֵּק, הַאי גַּזְלָן הוּא, מָמוֹנָא מַעַלְיָא בָּעֵי שַׁלּוּמֵי! תְּיוּבְתָּא.

And if you say that damage that is not evident is not categorized as damage, then this man is a robber, and he should be required to pay full compensation for the damage he caused. The Gemara concludes: This is a conclusive refutation, and the opinion of Ḥizkiyya is rejected.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַמְטַמֵּא, וְהַמְדַמֵּע, וְהַמְנַסֵּךְ, אֶחָד שׁוֹגֵג וְאֶחָד מֵזִיד – חַיָּיב, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר; רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג – פָּטוּר, בְּמֵזִיד – חַיָּיב;

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this amoraic dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im , as it was taught in a baraita : With regard to one who renders another’s food ritually impure, or one who mixes teruma with another’s non-sacred produce, or one who pours another’s wine as a libation before an idol, whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, he is liable to pay for the damage he caused; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted unintentionally, he is exempt; if he acted intentionally, he is liable to pay.

מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: הֶיזֵּק שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִיכָּר שְׁמֵיהּ הֶיזֵּק, וּמָר סָבַר: לָא שְׁמֵיהּ הֶיזֵּק!

The Gemara suggests: What, is it not that they disagree about this very issue? As one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that damage that is not evident is nevertheless categorized as damage. Consequently, one is liable to pay even if he caused the damage unintentionally. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that such damage is not categorized as damage, and consequently one is liable to pay only if he caused the damage intentionally, as this is a rabbinically instituted fine.

אֲמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא – הֶיזֵּק שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִיכָּר לָא שְׁמֵיהּ הֶיזֵּק, וְהָכָא בְּקָנְסוּ שׁוֹגֵג אַטּוּ מֵזִיד קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: קָנְסוּ שׁוֹגֵג אַטּוּ מֵזִיד, וּמָר סָבַר: לֹא קָנְסוּ שׁוֹגֵג אַטּוּ מֵזִיד.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that it is possible to say that everyone, including Rabbi Meir, agrees that damage that is not evident is not categorized as damage. And here, they disagree with regard to this question: Did the Sages penalize an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender? As one Sage, Rabbi Meir, who states that the one who caused the damage is liable even if he acted unintentionally, holds that the Sages penalized an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, who states that one is liable only if he acted intentionally, holds that they did not penalize an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender.

וְרָמֵי דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר אַדְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְרָמֵי דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה; דְּתַנְיָא: הַמְבַשֵּׁל בְּשַׁבָּת, בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יֹאכַל, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא יֹאכַל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר; רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יֹאכַל לְמוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּת, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא יֹאכַל עוֹלָמִית;

The Gemara comments: But then it is possible to raise a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Meir and another statement of Rabbi Meir; and it is also possible to raise a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Yehuda and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda. The other statements are as it is taught in a baraita ( Tosefta , Shabbat 2:5): With regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, if he did so unintentionally, he may eat what he cooked. If he acted intentionally, he may not eat what he cooked; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he cooked the food unintentionally, he may eat what he cooked, but only at the conclusion of Shabbat. If he cooked it intentionally, he may never eat what he cooked.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יֵאָכֵל לְמוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּת לַאֲחֵרִים וְלֹא לוֹ, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא יֵאָכֵל עוֹלָמִית לֹא לוֹ וְלֹא לַאֲחֵרִים; קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר אַדְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה!

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar says: If he acted unintentionally, what he cooked may be eaten at the conclusion of Shabbat by others, but not by him, as the food is forbidden to him forever. If he cooked the food intentionally, what he cooked may never be eaten, neither by him nor by others. Consequently, there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and the other statement of Rabbi Meir, and there is also a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר אַדְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר לָא קַשְׁיָא, כִּי קָנֵיס – בִּדְרַבָּנַן, בִּדְאוֹרַיְיתָא – לָא קָנֵיס.

The Gemara answers: There is no contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and the other statement of Rabbi Meir, because one can draw a distinction between them. When Rabbi Meir penalizes an offender for even an unintentional offense, it is where the offender violated a rabbinic law, e.g., he rendered food impure. But where he violated a Torah law, e.g., he cooked on Shabbat, he does not penalize him. The reason for this distinction is that people treat Torah prohibitions more seriously, and consequently there is no need to impose a fine for unintentional transgression in order to distance people from the transgression.

וְהָא מְנַסֵּךְ דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא הוּא, וְקָא קָנֵיס! מִשּׁוּם חוּמְרָא דַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה קְנַס לֵיהּ.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t pouring wine as a libation before an idol prohibited by Torah law, and even so Rabbi Meir penalizes the offender, even if his transgression is unintentional? The Gemara answers: This is an exception to the principle. Due to the severity of the prohibition against idol worship, Rabbi Meir penalizes the offender even if he acts unintentionally.

דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה לָא קַשְׁיָא, כִּי לָא קָנֵיס – בִּדְרַבָּנַן, בִּדְאוֹרַיְיתָא – קָנֵיס. וְהָא מְנַסֵּךְ דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא, וְלָא קָנֵיס! מִשּׁוּם חוּמְרָא דַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מִיבְדַּל בְּדִילִי מִינֵּיהּ.

The Gemara continues: And there is also no contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda. When Rabbi Yehuda does not penalize an offender for an unintentional offense, it is where he violated a rabbinic law. But where he violated a Torah law, he penalizes him even if he transgressed unintentionally, owing to the severity of the transgression. The Gemara asks: But isn’t pouring wine as a libation before an idol prohibited by Torah law, and even so Rabbi Yehuda does not penalize the offender if he acted unintentionally? The Gemara answers: The argument raised previously can be reversed: Due to the exceptional severity of the prohibition against idol worship people avoid it on their own, and so there is no need to impose a fine for unintentional transgression in order to distance people from it.

וְרָמֵי דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר אַדְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בִּדְאוֹרַיְיתָא; דְּתַנְיָא: הַנּוֹטֵעַ בְּשַׁבָּת, בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יְקַיֵּים, בְּמֵזִיד – יֵעָקֵר, וּבַשְּׁבִיעִית, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד – יֵעָקֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר;

The Gemara comments: But then it is possible to raise a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and another statement of Rabbi Meir even with respect to matters that are prohibited by Torah law, as it is taught in a baraita ( Tosefta , Shabbat 2:11): With regard to one who plants a tree on Shabbat, if he does so unintentionally, he may keep the tree. If he acted intentionally, it must be uprooted. And if he planted the tree during the Sabbatical Year, then whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, it must be uprooted; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בַּשְּׁבִיעִית, בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יְקַיֵּים, בְּמֵזִיד – יֵעָקֵר, וּבְשַׁבָּת, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד – יֵעָקֵר!

Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to planting a tree in the Sabbatical Year, if one does so unintentionally, he may keep the tree. If he acted intentionally, it must be uprooted. And if he planted the tree on Shabbat, then whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, it must be uprooted. Although it is prohibited by Torah law to plant a tree in the Sabbatical Year, Rabbi Meir penalizes the offender and requires that the tree be uprooted, even if he acted unintentionally. This seems to contradict Rabbi Meir’s ruling in the previously mentioned baraita , that one who unintentionally cooked on Shabbat is not penalized.

וּלְטַעֲמִיךְ, תִּקְשֶׁה לָךְ הִיא גּוּפָהּ, מִכְּדִי הָא דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא וְהָא דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא, מַאי שְׁנָא שַׁבָּת וּמַאי שְׁנָא שְׁבִיעִית?

The Gemara asks: And according to your reasoning, that you raise such a contradiction, raise a contradiction in this baraita itself. Since this prohibition of planting on Shabbat is by Torah law and this prohibition of planting in the Sabbatical Year is by Torah law, what is different about Shabbat and what is different about the Sabbatical Year, that both Sages distinguish between the two halakhot .

אֶלָּא הָתָם כִּדְקָתָנֵי טַעְמָא: אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר, מִפְּנֵי מָה אֲנִי אוֹמֵר: בְּשַׁבָּת בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יְקַיֵּים, בְּמֵזִיד – יֵעָקֵר, וּבַשְּׁבִיעִית בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד – יֵעָקֵר? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל מוֹנִין לַשְּׁבִיעִית,

Rather, there the reason is as is taught explicitly: Rabbi Meir said: For what reason do I say: If one planted a tree on Shabbat unintentionally, he may keep the tree, but if he did so intentionally, it must be uprooted; but in the Sabbatical Year, whether the tree was planted unintentionally or intentionally, it must be uprooted? It is because Jews count the years of the tree, with regard to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [ orla ] and with regard to the halakha of fourth-year produce, from the Sabbatical Year.