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Eiruvin
Daf 26aהָא – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְהָא – רַבָּנַן.
This, the mishna here, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, while that, the other mishna, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
RASHI
מתני' ר"א כדאמר רבי אלעאי שמעתי מר"א:
כְּשֶׁתִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר, לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הַמְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת חֲצֵירוֹ – רְשׁוּת בֵּיתוֹ בִּיטֵּל. לְרַבָּנַן, הַמְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת חֲצֵירוֹ – רְשׁוּת בֵּיתוֹ לֹא בִּיטֵּל.
Rav Sheshet adds: When you examine the matter closely,
RASHI
רשות ביתו ביטל ואע"ג דלא פריש בהדיא רשות ביתו דהא ודאי מתני' בדלא פירש דאי פירש לא מצי למימר ר' אלעאי בקשתי לי חבר ולא מצאתי דהא כ"ע מודו דשרי:
פְּשִׁיטָא!
The Gemara expresses surprise at this comment: But it is obvious that this is the point over which the tanna’im disagree.
RASHI
פשיטא דבהכי פליגי ולמה ליה לרב ששת לומר כשתימצי לומר:
אָמַר רַחֲבָה: אֲנָא וְרַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא תַּרְגֵּימְנָא: לֹא נִצְרְכָא אֶלָּא לַחֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁשְּׁרוּיִן בְּחָצֵר אֶחָד, וְשָׁכַח אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְלֹא עֵירֵב.
The Gemara answers: Raḥava said: Both Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana and I explained: Rav Sheshet’s explanation was necessary only with regard to the case of five people who lived in the same courtyard, one of whom forgot to join in an eiruv with the others.
RASHI
אמר רחבה אנא ורב הונא בר חיננא תרגימנא להאי כשתימצי לומר דרב ששת למאי איצטריך:
ה"ג לא נצרכה אלא לחמשה ששרוין בחצר כו' דאשמעינן רב ששת לשום לב להבין טעם מחלוקתן וללמוד הימנו דבר אחר דלר' אליעזר מבטל בעין יפה מבטל ולא אמרינן חצר דגלי גלי בית דלא גלי לא גלי ונילף מינה דהיכא דבטיל לחד מינייהו בטיל לכולהו ולא אמרינן למאן דגלי גלי למאן דלא גלי לא גלי ולרבנן צריך לבטל לכל אחד ואחד כי היכי דלגבי בית סבירא להו דמאי דלא פריש לא בטיל הכא נמי למאן דלא פריש לא בטיל וכולן אסורין דאע"ג דהאי דבטיל ליה עירב עם חבירו כי עירב מאתמול אדעתא דההיא חולקא לא עירב דההיא שעתא לאו דידיה הוא ודכוותיה תניא בהדר (לקמן עירובין דף ע:) אחד מן השוק שמת והיה לו בית בחצר והניח רשותו לאחד מבני החצר מבעוד יום דהיינו קודם שעירבו דכי עירב אדעתא דההיא חולקא נמי עירב אינו אוסר משחשיכה הרי זה אוסר:
לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, כְּשֶׁהוּא מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּתוֹ – אֵין צָרִיךְ לְבַטֵּל לְכָל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד.
According to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, when he renounces his authority, he need not renounce it to each and every one of the residents, as we already know that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one who renounces authority does so in a generous manner,
לְרַבָּנַן, כְּשֶׁהוּא מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּתוֹ – צָרִיךְ לְבַטֵּל לְכָל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד.
In contrast, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, when he renounces his authority, it does not suffice that he renounces it in favor of one person; rather, he must explicitly renounce it to each and every one, as we cannot presume that he renounces authority in a generous manner.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁשְּׁרוּיִן בְּחָצֵר אֶחָד וְשָׁכַח אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְלֹא עֵירֵב, כְּשֶׁהוּא מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּתוֹ – אֵין צָרִיךְ לְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת לְכָל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד. כְּמַאן – כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
The Gemara continues: In accordance with which tanna is the ruling that was taught in the following baraita ? If five people lived in the same courtyard, and one of them forgot and did not join in an eiruv with the other residents, when he renounces his authority, he need not renounce his authority to each and every one of the residents. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is it? It is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, as explained above.
רַב כָּהֲנָא מַתְנִי הָכִי. רַב טַבְיוֹמֵי מַתְנִי הָכִי: כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁשְּׁרוּיִם בְּחָצֵר אֶחָד וְשָׁכַח אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְלֹא עֵירֵב, כְּשֶׁהוּא מְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּתוֹ – אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת לְכָל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד. כְּמַאן? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר יְהוּדָה, אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כְּמַאן – כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
Rav Kahana taught the passage this way, as cited above, that it was Raḥava and Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana who applied Rav Sheshet’s explanation to the case of the five people living in the same courtyard. Rav Tavyomei, on the other hand, taught it as follows, that it was Rav Sheshet himself who applied it to that case: In accordance with which tanna is the ruling that was taught in the following baraita ? If five people lived in the same courtyard, and one of them forgot and did not join in an eiruv with the other residents, when he renounces his authority, he need not renounce his authority to each and every one of the residents. This statement is in accordance with whose opinion? Rav Huna bar Yehuda said that Rav Sheshet said: In accordance with whom? In accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.
RASHI
רב כהנא מתני הכי להאי כשתימצי לומר דרב ששת אמתניתין ורחבה ורב הונא הוא דתרגמוה לאגמורינן מינה אחמשה שעירבו בחצר כו' הוא דאתא:
ורב טביומי מתני דרב ששת בהדיא אמרה עלה:
כר' אליעזר דאמר מבטל בעין יפה מבטל:
אָמַר לֵיהּ רַב פַּפָּא לְאַבַּיֵי: לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אִי אָמַר ״לָא מְבַטֵּילְנָא״, וּלְרַבָּנַן אִי אָמַר ״מְבַטֵּילְנָא״, מַאי?
Rav Pappa said to Abaye: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, which presumes that one renounces his authority over his house as well, if one who forgot to join in an eiruv with the other residents of the courtyard explicitly stated: I am not renouncing authority of my house, and likewise, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, if he explicitly stated: I am renouncing authority of my house, what is the halakha in such cases?
RASHI
לרבי אליעזר דאמר מסתמא ביטל רשות ביתו:
אם אמר בהדיא לא בטילנא רשות ביתו מי הוי ביתו מותר להן או לא:
ולרבנן דאמרי מסתמא לא ביטל רשות ביתו אמר בהדיא מבטילנא לכו אף רשות ביתו מבטיל אי לא:
טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר: הַמְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת חֲצֵירוֹ – רְשׁוּת בֵּיתוֹ בִּיטֵּל, וְהַאי אֲמַר ״אֲנָא לָא מְבַטֵּילְנָא״.
The Gemara clarifies: Is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason because he maintains in general that one who renounces authority over his share in a courtyard to the other residents presumably also renounces to them authority over his own house, but that since this person explicitly stated: I am not renouncing authority of my house, he therefore maintains his authority?
אוֹ דִּילְמָא: טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מִשּׁוּם דְּבַיִת בְּלָא חָצֵר לָא עֲבִידִי אֱינָשֵׁי דְּדָיְירֵי וְכִי קָאָמַר לָא מְבַטֵּילְנָא – לָאו כָּל כְּמִינֵיהּ, אַף עַל גַּב דַּאֲמַר דָּיֵירְנָא, לָאו כְּלוּם קָאָמַר.
Or perhaps Rabbi Eliezer’s reason is because people do not generally live in a house without a courtyard, and therefore anyone who renounces authority over his share in a courtyard automatically renounces authority over his own house regardless of what he says. Therefore, when he says: I am not renouncing authority over my house, it is not in his power to do so, as even though he says: I will continue to live in and retain authority over my house, he has said nothing.
RASHI
ביתא בלא חצר כיון דאסר עצמו בחצרו שביטל להם:
לאו כל כמיניה דכיון דלית ליה חצר דירת בית לא כלום היא לדידיה:
וּלְרַבָּנַן, אִי אֲמַר ״מְבַטֵּילְנָא״ מַאי? טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבְרִי הַמְבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת חֲצֵירוֹ רְשׁוּת בֵּיתוֹ לֹא בִּיטֵּל – וְהַאי אֲמַר ״מְבַטֵּילְנָא״.
And the question likewise arises according to the opinion of the Rabbis. If one explicitly stated: I am renouncing authority of my house as well, what is the halakha ? Is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis because they maintain that one who renounces authority over his share in a courtyard to the other residents presumably does not renounce authority over his own house to them, but since this person explicitly stated: I am renouncing authority over my house, the other residents should be permitted to carry?
RASHI
והאי כי אמר מבטילנא בטלה דעתו אצל כל אדם ולא ביטל אלא חצר:
אוֹ דִּילְמָא: טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא עָבֵיד אִינִישׁ דִּמְסַלֵּק נַפְשֵׁיהּ לְגַמְרֵי מִבַּיִת וְחָצֵר, וְהָוֵי כִּי אוֹרֵחַ לְגַבַּיְיהוּ. וְהַאי כִּי אֲמַר מְבַטֵּילְנָא – לָאו כָּל כְּמִינֵיהּ קָאָמַר.
Or perhaps the for the opinion of the Rabbis is because one does not usually remove himself entirely from a house and courtyard, making himself like a guest among his neighbors. And therefore, when he states: I am renouncing authority over my house, it is not in his power to do so, and his statement is disregarded.
אָמַר לֵיהּ: בֵּין לְרַבָּנַן בֵּין לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, כֵּיוָן דְּגַלֵּי דַּעֲתֵיהּ – גַּלֵּי.
Abaye said to Rav Pappa in answer to his question: Both according to the Rabbis and according to Rabbi Eliezer, once one has revealed his wishes, he has revealed them,
״וְכֵן שָׁמַעְתִּי מִמֶּנּוּ שֶׁיּוֹצְאִים בְּעַרְקַבְּלִין בַּפֶּסַח״. מַאי עַרְקַבְּלִין? אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: אַצְוָותָא חֲרוּזִיָאתָא. הדרן עלך עושין פסין
The mishna records yet another teaching handed down by Rabbi Elai: And I also heard from Rabbi Eliezer another halakha , that one may fulfill his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover with arkablin ,
RASHI
אצוותא חרזייתא סיב עבה הגדל סביב הדקל ונכרך ועולה בו כלולבי גפנים. חרזייתא תכופות הרבה יחד כמחרוזות וטעם מרור בו:
TOSAFOT
ולא מצאתי לי חבר היינו דוקא בתלמידיו דתניא בכל שעה (פסחים דף לט.) עד שבאתי אצל ר"א בן יעקב והודה לדברי אי נמי לא מצא חבר ששמע מר"א קאמר:
אצוותא חרוזייתא פירש בקונטרס סיב עבה הגדל סביב הדקל ונכרך ועולה כלולבי גפנים ואין נראה לר"י דבפ' כל שעה (פסחים דף לט.) אמרי' מה מצה מין זרעים אף מרור מין זרעים והתם אמרינן דחרחבינא אצוותא דדיקלא ואפשר דהן ב' מינין ושניהן נכרכין סביב הדקל:
SUMMARY
In the course of the deliberation in the Mishna and Gemara in this chapter with regard to upright boards surrounding a well, one got a sense of the complexity of this leniency. On the one hand, there was a tendency to restrict the application of the halakhot of these upright boards. On the other hand, there was an effort to expand the scope of their validity and applicability. In practice, the leniency that allows placing upright boards around wells is in effect only in the specific circumstance of wells containing spring water. Similarly, the time and place where this leniency is in effect is limited to wells containing spring water located on roads used by pilgrims on their ascent to Jerusalem for the three Festivals. At the same time, the Sages determined that all of the halakhot that apply to partitions, including all fundamental leniencies, may be applied to upright boards surrounding a well. Indeed, any partition suitable for use in any other circumstances may be used to surround a well. The other topic discussed in this chapter involves enclosures, gardens, or yards. From the perspective of their partitions, their status should be that of a private domain. However, they are not enclosed for residential purposes. The deliberations here, for all intents and purposes, revolved around a single fundamental principle: A comparison between an ordinary courtyard and the courtyard of the Tabernacle. Just as the construction of and service in the Tabernacle serve as a paradigm for many of the halakhot of Shabbat, the courtyard of the Tabernacle serves as the prototype from which the measures of all courtyards in the halakhot of Shabbat are ascertained. Through their deliberations, the Sages determined which enclosures or yards are deemed similar to the courtyard of the Tabernacle, in which it is permitted to carry as in a full-fledged private domain, and which are those that exceed two beit se’a, which was the area of the Tabernacle, and thus assume a distinct legal status. Although they are considered private domains by Torah law, the Sages prohibited carrying within them just as they prohibited carrying in courtyards and alleyways without an eiruv. This chapter also addressed additional topics. One was the concept of renunciation of rights, which can be effected by a resident of a courtyard who failed to contribute his part to the food designated for the joining of the courtyards before Shabbat. The manner in which renunciation of rights is accomplished, as well as its effect, were discussed in this chapter.
INTRO
Two topics are discussed in this chapter. One is placement of the eiruv, food for one meal, which is an inseparable component of the establishment of any eiruv, whether joining of courtyards, merging of alleyways, or joining of Shabbat boundaries. The necessity of contributing food to the eiruv is due to the fact that the place where one’s food is located is considered his residence. Consequently, inclusion of several people in a common meal creates a form of common ownership of the residence, the precise nature of which is discussed in the Gemara. Placement of one’s food in a specific location is, in a sense, tantamount to moving his residence to that location. The Gemara discusses several issues, among them, the types of food that may constitute a meal for the purpose of eiruv. Are there foods that are not suited for an eiruv? In addition, must all those who placed the eiruv have access to the food in order for the eiruv to be effective? Since the issue of the food suitable for placement in an eiruv applies both to halakhot of joining of the courtyards and joining of Shabbat boundaries, the Gemara in Chapter Three proceeds to discuss the latter subject: The halakhot of joining Shabbat boundaries. The halakha – some say by Torah law while others say by rabbinic law – is that one may not travel more than two thousand cubits outside his place on Shabbat. However, in certain cases the Sages permitted establishing a joining of Shabbat boundaries that allows one to travel a longer distance. This is accomplished by placing food sufficient for two meals in a specific location that is not his place of residence; that location, for all intents and purposes, becomes his residence, and he may travel two thousand cubits from that location. There are many details involved in this universally accepted halakha, and in this chapter the Gemara elucidates how and when one places the food for the eiruv, as well as in what cases the eiruv is in effect and when it is invalidated due either to an inappropriate location or a problem with the food item itself. Similarly, the Gemara discusses whether the placement of the eiruv is an irreversible and unequivocal decision to reside at that location, or whether it is possible to place the eiruv conditionally and to decide in the course of Shabbat when and in which direction the eiruv takes effect. These questions with regard to the halakhot of a joining of Shabbat boundaries are elucidated in this chapter and in those that follow.
מתני׳ בַּכֹּל מְעָרְבִין וּמִשְׁתַּתְּפִין – חוּץ מִן הַמַּיִם וּמִן הַמֶּלַח.
One may establish a joining of houses in courtyards [ eiruv ḥatzerot ] in order to permit carrying on Shabbat in a courtyard shared by two or more houses, and one may establish a joining of Shabbat borders [ eiruv teḥumin ] in order to extend the distance one is permitted to walk on Shabbat; and similarly, one may merge courtyards in order to permit carrying in an alleyway shared by two or more courtyards. This may be done with all kinds of food
וְהַכֹּל נִיקָּח בְּכֶסֶף מַעֲשֵׂר – חוּץ מִן הַמַּיִם וּמִן הַמֶּלַח. הַנּוֹדֵר מִן הַמָּזוֹן – מוּתָּר בַּמֶּלַח וּבַמַּיִם.
The mishna continues with two similar principles: All types of food may be bought with second- tithe money, which must be taken to Jerusalem and used to purchase food (Deuteronomy 14:26), except for water and salt. Similarly, one who vows that nourishment is prohibited to him is permitted to eat water and salt, as they are not considered sources of nourishment.
RASHI
מתני' בכל מערבין עירובי חצירות ותחומין
ומשתתפין במבוי:
חוץ מן המים ומן המלח דלאו מידי דמזון הן וטעמא דעירוב משום דדעתו ודירתו במקום מזונותיו הוא וכיון שנתנו כל בני החצר כדי מזונן בבית אחד נעשה כאילו כולן דרים בתוכו ונמצאו כולן רשות אחת וכו' וכן בעירובי תחומין נעשה כמי ששכב שם ומשם יש לו אלפים אמה לכל רוח הלכך דבר מזון בעינן:
TOSAFOT
מתני' בכל מערבין פי' בקונט' עירובי חצירות ותחומין ואין נראה דבעירובי חצירות בעינן פת לכולי עלמא בפרק הדר (לקמן עירובין דף עא:) וכל האי פירקא מוכח דאיירי בתחומין:
מְעָרְבִין לַנָּזִיר בַּיַּיִן, וּלְיִשְׂרָאֵל בַּתְּרוּמָה. סוּמָכוֹס אוֹמֵר: בְּחוּלִּין.
It was further stated with regard to the laws of joining courtyards that one may establish an eiruv teḥumin for a nazirite with wine, even though he is prohibited to drink it, because it is permitted to others. And similarly, one may establish an eiruv teḥumin for an Israelite with teruma , even though he may not eat it, because it is permitted to a priest. The food used for an eiruv teḥumin must be fit for human consumption, but it is not essential that it be fit for the consumption of the one for whom it is being used. Summakhos, however, says: One may only establish an eiruv teḥumin for an Israelite with unconsecrated food.
RASHI
בכסף מעשר בתוך ירושלים כשהוא מוציאו [לצורך מאכלו] כדכתיב (דברים י״ד:כ״ו) ונתתה הכסף בכל אשר תאוה נפשך:
חוץ מן המים ומלח בגמרא מפרש טעמא דלאו פרי מפרי הוא:
וּלְכֹהֵן בְּבֵית הַפְּרָס, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ בֵּין הַקְּבָרוֹת,
It was additionally stated that one may establish an eiruv teḥumin for a priest in a beit haperas ,
RASHI
מערבין לנזיר עירובי תחומין:
ביין ואף על גב דלא חזי לדידיה חזי לאחריני וכיון דמזונא הוא גבי אחריני שרו ליה רבנן:
ולישראל בתרומה דהא חזיא לכהן:
סומכוס אומר בחולין אבל לא בתרומה דמידי דחזי ליה בעינן ובגמרא מפרש מאי טעמא לא פליג סומכוס איין לנזיר: