Tractate Ḥullin is part of the order of Kodashim, which is devoted almost in its entirety to the numerous aspects of the halakhot of consecrated items, including the mitzvot relating to the sacrifice of the various offerings, the manner in which offerings and other items designated for the Temple are consecrated, the procedures in the Temple, and the service performed therein. In contrast to the rest of the tractates in the order of Kodashim, Ḥullin is devoted entirely to halakhot that relate to the non-sacred. A significant portion of this tractate is dedicated to discussion of the slaughter of non-sacred animals, rendering their meat fit for consumption, and the distinction between food from living beings that is permitted and food from living beings that is forbidden. In addition, the tractate addresses a series of mitzvot that relate to living beings that lack the sanctity of sacrificial animals. Although ostensibly the tractate addresses non-sacred matters exclusively, its placement in the order of Kodashim is not by happenstance. Not only do all of these issues relating to non-sacred matters have certain aspects that are parallel or similar to the halakhot of sacrificial animals, but their details also share characteristics with those of consecrated items. For example, the slaughter of non-sacred animals does not stand alone as a series of technical halakhot; rather, implicitly or explicitly, it is influenced by the halakhot relating to sacrificial animals. Concerning the slaughter of sacrificial animals, and likewise the slaughter of non-sacred animals, the tractate delineates the people fit to perform slaughter, with special attention given to the intent of the slaughterer. In general, most of the definitions and halakhot relate to mundane matters, but they all relate in some manner to sacrificial concepts. In a more general sense, this is true with regard to all of the halakhot in the Torah. Even the most mundane halakhot, such as those relating to monetary law, which ostensibly deal with practical ordinances governing commerce, nevertheless contain an element of sanctity. Furthermore, not only do the mitzvot in the Torah affect every detail of life, they infuse each of those details with a uniqueness that underscores the idea that non-sacred does not mean completely secular but also indicates an element of sanctity. This is true of monetary matters, of marital life, and in particular of matters relating to food. These halakhot, as they relate to food that grows from the ground and all parts of the world of flora that mankind utilizes, constitute the topics covered in the order of Zera’im; the elements to which these halakhot apply are thereby imbued with various forms of sanctity. Tractate Ḥullin addresses matters from the world of fauna. That the concept of non-sacred indicates an element of sanctity is already manifest in the language of the Torah, as in every place in the Torah where the kosher and non-kosher animals are enumerated, their mention is linked to the concept of sanctity: “Sanctify yourselves, and you will be holy” (Leviticus 11:44); “For you are a holy people unto the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:21). The lesson is that these halakhot are components of the structure of sanctity, meaning that the manifestation of sanctity and sanctification is not limited to the service performed in the Temple. Rather, even in life outside the Temple there is a certain aspect of sanctity, and the status of the entire Jewish people is that of attendants of sanctity. That is the reason the halakhot of slaughter and the halakhot of animals with a wound that will cause them to die within twelve months [tereifot], which constitute a central portion of this tractate, are structurally similar to the sacrificial service performed in the Temple. Obviously, actions performed in the Temple possess a more fixed ceremonial framework. With regard to non-sacred animals, this structure is maintained, although it is less ceremonial and its framework broader. For example, blemished animals may neither be sacrificed nor eaten in the Temple, and tereifot are forbidden to all. The conditions that render an animal a tereifa parallel the blemishes that disqualify a sacrificial animal; in both cases, the afflicted animal is deemed not fit for the holy people. In a sense, tractate Ḥullin, with the various topics addressed therein, does not deal with true non-sacred matters but with matters of sanctity. The various prohibitions in this tractate have no obvious utility to people; rather, they are in essence arrays of halakhot relating to sanctity, which governs the lives of the sacred nation even outside of their most sacred space, the Temple. It is prohibited to consume, and in some cases even to derive benefit from, certain items, but these items are not intrinsically abhorrent. Whether their halakhic status is characterized as not valid, ritually impure, or forbidden in benefit, that is the case only vis-à-vis the conduct and lives of the Jewish people. All of the prohibitions addressed in tractate Ḥullin, which relate primarily to the meat of living beings, are based on another essential concept, which is not explicit in the Torah, although it does inform those prohibitions, and there are biblical allusions to it in the language of the Torah in several places. The idea is that the very permission granted people to kill living beings and utilize them was not part of the original plan in the creation of humans (see Genesis 1:29). Although the Torah permitted slaughter and consumption of living beings, this was a mere allowance, and was not meant to be employed liberally. Therefore, there are numerous restrictions and guidelines governing how living beings are killed and how the meat and the limbs are treated thereafter. All these indicate that although living beings were permitted to people “as the green grass” (Genesis 9:3), there is a special obligation to take into consideration that they are living beings. Most of the halakhot addressed in this tractate are directly or indirectly related to the halakhot of slaughter. That is why in early generations the tractate was called Sheḥitat Ḥullin, the slaughter of non-sacred animals, in contrast to tractate Zevaḥim, which was called Sheḥitat Kodashim, the slaughter of sacrificial animals. Nevertheless, in the course of analyzing certain halakhot related to slaughter, the tractate provides a broad treatment of topics that go beyond its purview. One topic is the halakhot of mixtures; tractate Ḥullin is one of the primary sources for numerous fundamental halakhot in that area. Similarly, there is a series of discussions primarily devoted to matters related to the order of Teharot, which addresses matters of ritual impurity, especially the halakhot of the impurity of foods. Tractate Ḥullin contains significant derivations taken from halakhic midrash, with regard to both those halakhot that are the primary focus of this tractate and other associated topics. Although Ḥullin also contains certain aggadic segments, they do not comprise a significant portion of the tractate.

And any man of the children of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among them, who traps a trapping of an undomesticated animal or bird that may be eaten, he shall pour out its blood and cover it with earth. (Leviticus 17:13)

Although the mitzva of covering the blood of a slaughtered undomesticated animal or a bird is stated explicitly in the Torah, its precise halakhot are not, and therefore, there are aspects of the mitzva that must be clarified. The Torah states that the mitzva of covering the blood applies to one who traps an undomesticated animal or a bird. Is the act of trapping critical for the obligation of the mitzva, or is this obligation applicable any time one slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird, even if no trapping is involved? Moreover, does the mitzva of covering the blood apply only if the act of slaughter is valid, i.e., when it permits the meat for consumption, or is it applicable even when the slaughter is not valid? Furthermore, the verse states that only a bird and an undomesticated animal are included in the mitzva of covering the blood; domesticated animals are not included. If so, given that undomesticated animals may not be offered as sacrifices, can it be inferred that the mitzva of covering the blood applies only to non-sacred animals and birds? Or does the Torah mean to exclude only sacrificial animals but not sacrificial birds, in which case the mitzva to cover the blood applies to a sacrificial bird as well? Other uncertainties arise with regard to the act of covering: Is the mitzva of covering the blood incumbent only upon the one performing the slaughter, or is it incumbent upon any individual who sees the blood uncovered? What is the halakha in an instance where the blood was covered as a result of natural causes, without human intervention: Is the mitzva considered to have been performed? Must one cover the blood of each slaughtered animal or bird separately, or may he cover all the blood at the same time? Is the mitzva to cover the blood of an undomesticated animal separate from the mitzva to cover the blood of a bird, or are these acts considered one mitzva? It is also unclear how much blood needs to be covered: All of it or only part of it? If the latter, which part of the blood needs to be covered? Must one cover specifically the blood that spurts out at the time of the slaughter, or may one cover the blood that issues from the animal in another manner? The covering process itself requires clarification as well: Must the blood be covered with only one layer of earth, or must the blood be covered with earth from both above and below? What is the precise meaning of the term “earth” mentioned in the verse? Is it limited to earth specifically, or is the verse referring even to other substances that share a common characteristic with earth? These are the primary subjects discussed in this chapter.