בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, לְדִבְרֵיהֶם קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי – לָא שְׁנָא אֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר וְלָא שְׁנָא אֵבֶר דִּבְהֵמָה, כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ;

Rabbi Meir’s statement appears inconsistent with his opinion, as he holds that a hanging limb is not rendered pure by slaughtering the animal. The Gemara suggests that this difficulty can be resolved only according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s version of the Rabbis’ opinion, but not according to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s version. Granted, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, one can explain that Rabbi Meir was speaking in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, as follows: According to my own opinion, there is no difference with regard to the limb of a fetus, and there is no difference with regard to a limb hanging from an animal; they are the same in that the slaughter of the animal does not render either of them pure. Accordingly, Rabbi Meir must have been speaking in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that a limb hanging from an animal is rendered pure by the animal’s slaughter.

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – קַשְׁיָא!

But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that both the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir agree that a limb hanging from an animal is not rendered pure by the animal’s slaughter, Rabbi Meir’s statement is difficult, as it is inconsistent with both his opinion and the Rabbis’ opinion. The Gemara concedes the challenge.

אֶלָּא, אִי אִתְּמַר הָכִי אִתְּמַר: אֲמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ כְּמַחֲלוֹקֶת בְּעוּבָּרִים – כָּךְ מַחֲלוֹקֶת בְּאֵיבָרִין. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אֲמַר: מַחֲלוֹקֶת – בְּאֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר, אֲבָל בְּאֵבֶר דִּבְהֵמָה – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל.

Rather, if such a dispute was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to fetuses whose limbs emerged from the womb, so too, they have a parallel dispute with regard to limbs hanging from an animal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Their dispute is only with regard to the limb of a fetus that emerged from the womb; but with regard to a limb hanging from an animal, everyone agrees that the slaughter of the animal does not render such a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and does not impart the impurity of a carcass. According to this version of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s understanding of the dispute, Rabbi Meir’s statement is consistent even with his own opinion.

אֲמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? הַאי – גּוּפָהּ, וְהַאי – לָאו גּוּפָהּ.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the reason for the distinction made by Rabbi Yoḥanan concerning the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that the slaughter of an animal does not render pure the limb of its fetus, but it does render pure a limb hanging from the animal itself? It is that this hanging limb is part of the animal’s body, but that, the limb of the fetus, is not part of its body.

אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים שֶמִּיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל, וְאֵין שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל.

§ The Gemara continues to elucidate the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Everyone agrees that the death of an animal by means other than slaughter renders a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the animal’s death. Therefore, it will not have the impurity of a carcass, but it will have the impurity of a limb taken from a living animal. And likewise, everyone agrees that the slaughter of the animal does not render a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and therefore it will not have the impurity of a carcass.

בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בְּאֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר – מִיפְלַג פְּלִיגִי! אֶלָּא בְּאֵבֶר דִּבְהֵמָה – מִיתָה תָּנֵינָא, שְׁחִיטָה תָּנֵינָא!

The Gemara clarifies: What are we dealing with here? If we say we are dealing with a limb of its fetus that emerged from its womb, Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis explicitly disagree with regard to this case. Rather, we are dealing with a limb hanging from an animal. But if so, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is unnecessary. With regard to a hanging limb, we already learn about the effect of the death of the animal in a mishna elsewhere, and we already learn about the effect of the slaughter of the animal in a mishna elsewhere.

מִיתָה תָּנֵינָא: מֵתָה הַבְּהֵמָה – הַבָּשָׂר צָרִיךְ הֶכְשֵׁר, וְהָאֵבֶר מְטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי, וְאֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַנְּבֵלָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

The Gemara elaborates: We already learn about the effect of the death of an animal in the mishna (127b): If the animal died without slaughter, any hanging flesh needs to be rendered susceptible to contracting ritual impurity in order to become impure. This is accomplished by coming in contact with liquid, with the owner’s approval. The reason is that its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living animal, which is ritually pure and does not have the status of an unslaughtered carcass. And a hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from a living animal, but does not impart impurity as a limb from a carcass; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Evidently, Rabbi Meir holds that upon the animal’s death, anything hanging from the animal is considered as though it had already fallen off before the animal’s death. Since the mishna does not record that the Rabbis disagree, it would appear that they agree.

שְׁחִיטָה נַמִי תָּנֵינָא: נִשְׁחֲטָה בְּהֵמָה – הוּכְשְׁרוּ בְּדָמֶיהָ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לֹא הוּכְשְׁרוּ!

Likewise, we already learn about the effect of the slaughter of an animal in the same mishna: If the animal is slaughtered, they, the limb and the flesh hanging from it, are thereby rendered susceptible to impurity, by coming in contact with its blood. Blood is one of the seven liquids that render foods susceptible to impurity and its presence is considered to be with the approval of the owner, as it makes the meat look redder and fresher; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: They were not rendered susceptible to impurity through the animal’s own blood, but only once they were wet with another liquid, with the owner’s approval. It is apparent that both opinions in that mishna agree that the limb does not have the impurity of a limb severed from a living animal. Evidently, they hold that the slaughter does not render the hanging limb as though it had already fallen off beforehand.

אִי מֵהַהִיא, הֲוָה אָמִינָא: מַאי הוּכְשְׁרוּ – אַבָּשָׂר.

Given that the mishna has already taught both halakhot , what was the necessity of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement? The Gemara answers: If these halakhot were derived only from that mishna, I would say that actually, slaughter does render a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off beforehand, and such a limb would have the impurity of a limb severed from a live animal. If so, what does the mishna mean when it states: They are rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with its blood? Ostensibly, the intention is that both the limb and the flesh must be rendered susceptible to impurity, which indicates that the limb does not have any impurity of its own. The Gemara explains: One would have explained that the need to be rendered susceptible to impurity is referring only to the flesh, as flesh severed from a living animal does not have any impurity of its own.

וְהָא ״הוּכְשְׁרוּ״ קָתָנֵי! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: חַד לְבָשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִן הַבְּהֵמָה, וְחַד לְבָשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִן הָאֵבֶר.

The Gemara objects: But the mishna teaches: They are rendered susceptible, in the plural, which is apparently referring to both the flesh and the limb, which were mentioned previously in the mishna. The Gemara explains: You might say that the plural is used because the statement is referring to two types of hanging flesh that upon slaughter are considered to have been separated from a living animal: One is for flesh that separates from the body of the animal, and the other one is for flesh that separates from the hanging limb. Neither type has its own impurity, so they must be rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with liquid.

וּמַאי אוּלְמֵיהּ דְּהַאי מֵהַאי? סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמִינָא: הוֹאִיל וּמְטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה אַגַּב אָבִיו – אֵימָא לָא לִיבָּעֵי הֶכְשֵׁר, קָמַשְׁמַע לָן.

The Gemara asks: But in what way is it more compelling to apply the halakha to this type of flesh than to that type, making it necessary to state the halakha with regard to both? The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that since flesh that is attached to a limb severed from a living animal imparts the same severe form of ritual impurity as the limb on account of being a part of it, one might say that once the flesh is separated from the limb it does not need to then be rendered susceptible to impurity. To reject this possibility, the mishna uses the plural form to teach us that this type of flesh does need to be rendered susceptible to impurity.

אֲמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: נְקוֹט דְּרַב יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף בִּידָךְ, דְּרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה קָאֵי כְּוָותֵיהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: ״וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״ – לְהָבִיא הָאֵבֶר וְהַבָּשָׂר הַמְדוּלְדָּלִין בִּבְהֵמָה וּבְחַיָּה וּבְעוֹף, וּשְׁחָטָן – שֶׁהֵן אֲסוּרִין; וְאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן:

§ Rav Yosef said: Take the statement that Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, i.e., that the slaughter of an animal does not render a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, in your hand, i.e., accept it as correct, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana also holds in accordance with this opinion. As it is taught in a baraita : “And flesh that is torn in the field, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). This serves to include the case of the limb or the flesh that was partially cut off but was still hanging on a domesticated animal or on an undomesticated animal or on a bird, and one slaughtered them; it is derived that they are prohibited as limbs severed from a living animal. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says with regard to the ruling of this baraita :